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9Preface
In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, under state socialism, decent 
aﬀ ordable housing was considered a basic human en-
titlement, guaranteed by central authorities. During 
the transition from planned to market economies in 
these countries, authorities withdrew their support 
for housing. Th e status of housing quickly changed 
from a fundamental right to a political and economic 
liability. As a result, funding for new housing con-
struction, and for maintenance of existing housing, 
declined dramatically. By law, by market forces, and 
by default, primary responsibility for housing was 
transferred from state to local governments and to the 
general public. 
Th ese conditions have spawned a class of “housing 
poor”—people unable to rent or buy market-rate 
housing or maintain the housing they own. 
To better understand the circumstances of the 
housing poor and of the governmental responses to 
their problems, the Local Government and Public 
Service Reform Initiative (LGI) of the Open Society 
Institute (OSI) initiated studies of the problems facing 
the housing poor in ﬁ ve capital cities in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.1 Th e 
objective of the studies was to provide an in-depth 
examination and analysis of: 1) the living conditions 
and economic circumstances of the housing poor; 
2) the state and local government housing policies 
and programs that address those conditions; and 3) 
the eﬀ ectiveness of those policies and programs. Of 
particular interest were the: 
• eﬀ ects of housing privatization; 
• allocation of responsibility, between central and 
local governments, for housing the poor; 
• eﬀ ects of past government policies on the produc-
tion and availability of aﬀ ordable housing; 
• political and economic causes of any decline in 
housing production; 
• quantity and types of housing built since transi-
tion; 
• eﬀ ects of tenant protections; and 
• groups that primarily beneﬁ ted from and were 
primarily burdened by government regulations.
After describing and analyzing the situation and 
existing policies, the authors were to recommend 
alternative policies and strategies for addressing 
the problems of the housing poor in the selected 
countries. 
Th e Belgrade (Serbia), Budapest (Hungary), and 
Prague (Czech Republic) studies are included in this 
volume.2 A comprehensive picture of housing condi-
tions and policies in those cities was not possible 
without discussing housing conditions and policies 
in other areas of each country. Each study, therefore, 
includes some information and analysis on areas 
outside the primary study area. 
For the purposes of this volume, “housing poor” 
has been deﬁ ned as those who are: homeless; living 
in overcrowded conditions; living in illegal or sub-
standard housing; paying more than a nationally-
deﬁ ned acceptable percentage of income for rent; or 
unable to pay for utilities and/or maintenance. Within 
this deﬁ nition, “homelessness” generally referred to 
people who are “rooﬂ ess”—not those who have shelter 
but would prefer better or diﬀ erent shelter. 
Although the countries share common experiences 
and characteristics, their housing problems and poli-
cies vary dramatically. In each country, prior to 
1989, housing was primarily built and maintained by 
central government and state enterprises. Although 
the quality of the housing varied, and much of it was 
not well maintained, there was generally enough to 
house the population. Rents and utility costs were 
subsidized and therefore extremely low, usually less 
than 5 percent of family income. Cooperative housing, 
partially funded from the central government budget, 
and privately-built and ﬁ nanced housing provided 
limited home ownership opportunities. Th ere was no 
private rental housing market and no oﬃ  cial system 
for buying and selling privately-owned housing. 
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In 1989, state governments began rapidly with-
drawing their support for housing. Privatized state 
enterprises, which could no longer aﬀ ord to subsidize 
housing, abandoned their support for housing al-
together. In each country, state-owned housing, and 
the responsibility for maintaining and operating that 
housing, was transferred to local governments. In the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, the transfer occurred 
in 1991. In Serbia, housing became a local government 
responsibility in 1992. Th e transfer of housing and the 
responsibility for housing, however, was not accom-
panied by the legal authority and ﬁ nancial resources 
needed to properly discharge that responsibility. 
When state-owned housing was transferred 
without the ﬁ nancial resources needed to operate and 
maintain it, government oﬃ  cials were faced with the 
unenviable choice of dealing with unending citizen 
complaints about housing conditions, or of raising 
rents substantially to pay for maintenance and major 
improvements. Th e decision was avoided by selling 
most of the housing, and with it the maintenance 
problems, to the public, often at below market prices. 
In the Czech Republic, half of state-owned housing 
was transferred to public ownership. In Hungary 
and Serbia, virtually all state-owned housing was 
privatized. As a result of this rapid and sometimes 
indiscriminate privatization, many local governments 
received less revenue for the housing sold than its 
true value and, in Hungary and Serbia, practically 
eliminated the supply of publicly-owned social 
housing, to the later regret of housing advocates and 
some government oﬃ  cials. 
As central governments shifted the cost of housing 
maintenance to families and individuals, they were 
also eliminating subsides for water, gas and electricity. 
At the same time, a variety of factors—including the 
transition from centralized to market economies, 
government policies, privatization of state enterprises, 
and corruption—caused dramatic increases in poverty 
and widening income disparities.3 To make matters 
worse, state housing subsidies intended to relieve poor 
households from the burden of ever-increasing housing 
costs were often granted to members of middle- and 
upper-income levels. Increases in poverty, housing 
privatization, and misdirected government subsidies 
worked together to create a class of people who owned 
their ﬂ ats but lacked the ﬁ nancial means to maintain 
them or pay utility costs. 
After 1990, central governments, short of revenue, 
essentially stopped building. At the time there were 
few (if any) private housing developers, especially 
developers of multi-family housing.4 New develop-
ment business and housing construction, therefore, 
declined dramatically. While there has been a steady 
increase in the number of units con-structed in recent 
years, the number of units built and planned is still 
very small while demand for new units continues to 
grow. Th e number of privately-built housing units, 
especially rental housing, is very small. In the Czech 
Republic, for example, privately-owned rental units 
made up only 5 to 10 percent of the rental housing 
stock in 2001. While there has been a steady increase 
in the number of units constructed in recent years, 
the number of private market units built and planned 
is still small relative to need. 
Th e increased demand for aﬀ ordable housing 
generated by the increasing numbers of people 
in poverty, and the decrease in new housing con-
struction has resulted in increased overcrowding 
and homelessness. Overcrowding and homelessness 
proved diﬃ  cult to measure in these studies: there 
are no uniform deﬁ nitions of these terms and little 
data on these subjects is kept. Th e evidence available, 
however, indicates that overcrowding is a problem in 
all countries and homelessness is a problem in some 
countries but not others.5 New household formation 
did not cease when government housing supports 
ended, and as a consequence far fewer units aﬀ ordable 
to these new households are now available. Th ese new 
households, it is generally believed, are now living 
with other family members in existing housing. 
Homelessness, where it exists, is a complex problem, 
not to be solved by simply providing more housing. 
Th e homeless, largeley made up of alienated youth, 
divorced people who lack the ﬁ nancial means to rent 
or buy housing, people with mental or physical health 
problems, and people recently evicted from their 
housing, require a variety of housing and treatment 
programs. 
Each study recognizes the need for both social 
housing and a functioning private rental housing 
market as essential elements of a comprehensive hous-
ing strategy. In most of Europe and in North America 
housing tends to be privately-built and owned. In the 
Netherlands, which has the highest percentage of 
social housing, approximately 60 percent of housing 
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units are privately-owned. At the other extreme, in the 
United States social housing (called public housing) is 
less 2 percent of total housing.6 
Th e studies also reveal, however, substantial im-
pediments to the construction of social housing and 
to the development of a functioning private rental 
housing market. Financial circumstances make it 
very unlikely that substantial numbers of new social 
housing units will be built. Construction of new 
social housing requires large sums of money that 
will not be available in the foreseeable future. But 
as important, maintenance of social housing is a 
huge burden on local government budgets. Until 
social housing rents are raised to a level to cover 
maintenance and operations costs, or additional rent 
subsides are provided by the central government, new 
social housing will be disfavored.
Th e legal infrastructure needed to support a 
private housing market is generally inadequate. Tenant 
protections controlling rents and severely restricting 
evictions discourage private investment in rental 
housing. Th ere are no reliable and eﬃ  cient mortgage 
foreclosure procedures. Government regulations and 
restrictions make the housing development process 
lengthy and uncertain. Competitive ﬁ nancial insti-
tutions, needed to provide the loans for housing 
construction and purchase, are scarce. 
Despite the similarities in housing conditions and 
government housing objectives in these countries, the 
particular circumstances of the housing poor, and 
government responses to those circumstances, are 
determined by pre-transition economic and social 
conditions, political and economic choices made 
since the transition, and the “cultural” values of each 
country. Th e particular circumstances of the housing 
poor, and government responses, therefore, vary 
substantially from country to country. 
Serbia is a country of impoverished homeowners 
with almost no rental housing, signiﬁ cant over-
crowding, a substantial refugee problem, almost no 
social housing and no funding for construction or 
acquisition of social housing, no system for private 
housing ﬁ nance or development, and a government 
that considers housing a second or third priority. 
Moreover, there is a critical lack of reliable data on 
housing conditions for the country, which makes it 
diﬃ  cult to accurately describe the nature and extent 
of the housing problem. Under these circumstances, 
little progress is being made on the country’s housing 
problems. A comprehensive housing strategy is being 
developed, which includes not only public and market 
housing development programs, but also programs to 
address housing issues by reducing poverty. 
Hungary, following its radical privatization of 
housing in the mid-1990s, is now, like Serbia, a 
country primarily of homeowners with a critical 
shortage of social housing, a lack of funds to build, 
acquire or maintain social housing, and a shortage of 
rental housing. Overcrowding is also a problem, as 
well as homelessness, especially in the major urban 
areas. Unlike Serbia, housing is, and has long been, 
a government priority. Th ere are established housing 
subsidy programs for renters and owners, an estab-
lished system for mortgage lending, a small but 
functioning private rental housing market, and a 
developing housing construction industry. Hungary’s 
housing goals and objectives include increasing the 
supply of social housing, retargeting subsidies to 
provide greater beneﬁ ts to those most in need, 
improving the system for ﬁ nancing new housing 
construction, reducing homelessness, and expanding 
the private sector’s role in providing and operating 
rental housing.
Th e Czech Republic, unlike Hungary and Serbia, 
retained a substantial portion of its state-owned hous-
ing following during the transition and therefore now 
has a supply of social housing for those who cannot 
aﬀ ord market rents. Like Hungary, and unlike Serbia, 
the Czech Republic has much of the legal and ﬁ nan-
cial infrastructure needed to support private market 
ﬁ nancing and construction of housing, a small but 
functioning private rental housing market, and a 
variety of housing subsidy programs. In the last ﬁ ve 
years several hundred municipally-owned ﬂ ats have 
been built in the Czech Republic, mostly in Prague. 
Although homelessness is not a problem, there is 
signiﬁ cant overcrowding. Th e challenges facing the 
Czech Republic include: 1) the modiﬁ cation of repeal 
of rent regulations carried over from socialist times 
that primarily beneﬁ t the middle and upper classes, 
and actually restrict housing availability for the poor; 
2) targeting housing subsidies more toward low in-
come people; 3) the creation of a viable social housing 
system without creating a system of social segrega-
tion; 4) improving the legal and economic climate 
for the construction of new, private rental housing; 
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and 5) improving local government management and 
administration of housing and housing policies. 
Th ese papers are intended, ﬁ rst and foremost, to 
serve as policy papers and to provide information and 
analysis to policy- and opinion-makers and govern-
ment oﬃ  cials in the countries studied. As such, these 
studies provide useful historical background, and 
in-depth examinations of existing economic, political 
and social conditions, and of the governments’ re-
sponses to those conditions in each country. Together, 
they oﬀ er an opportunity for comparative analysis of 
conditions and approaches, not just for the countries 
studied, but also for other countries transitioning 
from government-owned and managed housing to a 
mixed public and private market housing system. 
James Fearn
Fellowship Team Mentor
April 2004
ENDNOTES
1 Although the housing poor live in both urban and rural areas, the greatest concentrations of housing poor are in major urban areas, which are therefore 
most impacted by their problems. Th e urban areas selected were Belgrade, Budapest, Moscow, Prague, and Soﬁ a. 
2 Th e studies for the countries not included in this publication can be found on LGI’s website at http://lgi.osi.hu.
3 In Serbia, 10 years of war and ethnic conﬂ ict were also major causes of poverty increases.
4 Th e number of privately built housing units, especially rental housing, continues to be very small. In the Czech Republic for example, privately-owned 
rental units made up less than 10 percent of the rental housing stock in 2001.
5 According to the studies, homelessness is a signiﬁ cant problem in Budapest, but is regarded as a marginal social problem in Prague and Belgrade. 
6 Vakili-Zad, Cyrus (1996): “Privatizing Public Housing in Canada: A Public Policy Agenda.” Netherlands Journal Housing and the Built Environment 
47–67. Ball, M. et al. (1990): Housing and Social Change in Europe and the USA. London: Routledge.
S t u a r t  L o w e
Overview
Too Poor to Move, Too Poor to Stay
T O O  P O O R  T O  M O V E ,  T O O  P O O R  T O  S T A Y
A  R E P O R T  O N  H O U S I N G  I N  T H E  C Z E C H  R E P U B L I C ,  H U N G A R Y  A N D  S E R B I A
15
Overview
Too Poor to Move, Too Poor to Stay
S t u a r t  L o w e
No single summary of the diverse housing market in 
Central and Eastern Europe has emerged in the last 
ﬁ ve years. Looking back to the era of state socialism, 
there was never one ubiquitous East European hous-
ing model (Turner, Hegedus and Tosics 1992) that 
spanned across the region. “Markets” of one sort or 
another were endemic under state socialism. Most in-
habitants, most of the time, were in reality outside the 
state housing system and had to fend for themselves, 
particularly through self-building, unlocking the “sec-
ond economy” and the common (but illegal) practice 
of selling state rental ﬂ ats, usually for hard currency. 
Many similar social practices have in fact continued 
into the post-socialist era, and one general feature 
can be observed: the signiﬁ cant degree of continuity, 
including privileges, carried forward by families well 
placed in the old system. Th is has manifested in the 
regressive nature of subsidy systems through which 
middle-class households continue to beneﬁ t from low 
rents or, more typically, are able to utilize subsidized 
interest rates on mortgages. Essentially, societies dif-
fered from one another as much as they did from the 
Western European neighbors. 
Th e decline of state socialism has not been a 
“clean” break. And despite the rapid and inevitable 
adoption of “western” market economic strategies, 
post-socialism has not been experienced the same 
way everywhere; rather, countries have emerged 
from the ﬁ rst period of transition with very diﬀ erent 
consequences and diﬀ erent problems. 
Th e three countries represented in this study 
exemplify three potentially distinct trajectories of 
change. Two have very high home ownership (Serbia 
and Hungary); the third (Czech Republic) retains 
a signiﬁ cant portion of rental housing. Th is case is 
much more typical of neighboring European nations 
northward and westward, with a balance of owning 
and renting. Serbia, at 98 percent owner occupation, 
is in the vanguard of a southeastern European cluster 
of states, with no eﬀ ective rental sector—apart from a 
wholly unregulated private rental market that operates 
in the cash economy outside the tax system. Hungary, 
also at the upper end of the owner occupation spec-
trum, shares some features of this unregulated owner-
occupied housing economy.  In recent years, in the 
context of a strongly recovering economy and growth 
in gross domestic product (GDP), Hungary has been 
able to support subsidized mortgages for both newly 
built and existing properties. Evidence of a sharp 
increase in house building and increased mobility 
indicates the beginning of something resembling 
“normality” in the Hungarian housing market, al-
though the undersized rental tenures create a plethora 
of problems, as will be discussed. Th e most prominent 
feature of the papers presented here is how signiﬁ cantly 
diﬀ erent each case is.  Th ese diﬀ erences are almost 
certainly crucial for the paths of development in the 
housing systems of all three countries.   
Th at said, there are common features of post-
socialism, notably: an exacerbation of social inequal-
ities; problems of governance; and widespread diﬃ  cul-
ties met by households—even those enjoying middle 
range incomes—in meeting the costs of living in eco-
nomies no longer sheltered by COMECON subsidies1 
but increasingly wedded to global market pricing. 
Sadly, it is the impoverishment of, on average, an 
estimated 50 percent of these populations—and in 
some cases more—that uniﬁ es this small sample of 
states. Th e scale and degree of poverty experienced 
by the millions of households encompassed is diﬃ  cult 
to convey.  
Masa Djordjevic (this volume) alludes to the 
harshness of transition, suggesting that 40 percent 
of Belgrade ﬂ ats lack central heating. Such cases can 
be found elsewhere: for instance, 44 percent of the 
population of Soﬁ a, Bulgaria, have stopped complete 
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or partial use of their central heating because of its 
unaﬀ ordable price (Elbers and Tsenkova 2003, 123). 
Case studies also illustrate other distinctive features of 
housing for low-income households during transition: 
overcrowding (Djordjevic proposes 42 percent “criti-
cal or partial” overcrowding in Belgrade ﬂ ats), poor 
conditions, and spiraling costs that subsume a grow-
ing share of household budgets.
Perhaps the saving grace in all this is that, on a day-
to-day basis, for many—likely, for the majority—the 
daily housing situation has not changed dramatically 
(albeit colder and more expensive). Most continue 
to live in the same dwelling, with the same facilities 
and surrounded by the same clutter and treasured 
possessions that are the essence of homemaking. Th e 
“personal pole,” as Giddens describes the experience 
of individuals, is the vital building block of everything 
that happens (Giddens 1990). 
It is indeed possible to discern patterns since 1990, 
and to identify the special role that “housing” has 
played in this period. Th e following section outlines 
some of these general patterns across the region as a 
whole, looking in particular at the problems that have 
been faced by low-income families in the so-called 
transitional period. 
TRANSITION TO THE MARKET: 
THREE PHASES
Immediately following the collapse of state social-
ism, most of the countries in the region engaged in a 
rapid privatization of their state rental housing. From 
a base in which home ownership was already high, 
especially in rural areas, this has caused the creation 
of a number of super-owner occupied nations. Two of 
the cases in this volume have over 95 percent of their 
housing stock in owner occupation (Serbia and Hun-
gary). In the case of the Czech Republic, a large part 
of what had previously been cooperative housing in 
eﬀ ect falls into this category of ownership—although 
this country has retained a signiﬁ cant amount of mu-
nicipal rental housing and a state-managed rent set-
ting system. As was suggested above, these important 
contrasts should not be overlooked, as they lead to the 
possibility of very diﬀ erent long-term solutions to the 
housing issues they all face. 
Rapid privatization was an inevitable conse-
quence of transition, and happened almost by default 
from 1990 to 1995. Various explanations have been 
oﬀ ered, with both political and economic reasons 
heavily represented. It was almost certainly the choice 
of the people who needed to feel a sense of security at 
a time when the wider economies were in a stage of 
traumatic ﬂ ux. It was a politically favored option, and 
was an early example of the diﬀ erence that democ-
racy can make in oﬀ ering choices.  Meanwhile, it also 
reveals that the policy process, for better or worse, 
has political as well as economic drivers even in a 
period of crisis. Struyk famously argued that hous-
ing acted as a “shock,” taking up the impact of what 
was happening in the economy and society as a whole 
(Struyk 1996). Within their homes, people did, at 
least, retain control and ﬁ nd security. Politically, 
central governments, presiding over what in eﬀ ect 
were bankrupt economies, had no resources to put 
toward housing.  Across the board, the pattern was for 
housing to be devolved to local governments which, 
lacking any resources for even basic management and 
maintenance costs, engineered “give away” sales. Th is 
phase ended in most countries by the mid-1990s, 
including a variety of policies for the restitution of 
property “illegally” nationalized by the state in the 
1940s. 
Th e second phase of the transition following pri-
vatization can be characterized by the massive prob-
lem of aﬀ ordability, related to the costs of housing 
related services, especially energy costs, other utilities 
and the price of building materials. Th is phase coin-
cided with serious recession in regional economies, 
mass unemployment, decreasing GDPs and decreas-
ing real incomes. Th e post-privatization witnessed the 
disengagement with a variety of more or less radical 
innovations, to a period that has been dominated by 
pragmatic and incremental responses to the legacies 
of the early transitional years. As Tsenkova neatly 
summarized: “…where the policy trajectory includes 
‘trial and error’ and oﬀ ers concessions to diﬀ erent in-
stitutional interests.” (Tsenkova 2003, 193). Th ere is 
no question that the newly evolving, private building 
industries and the interests of the mortgage industry 
and banks more generally have vied with each other 
for precedence in inﬂ uencing the subsidy systems. 
Middle-class voters have exerted considerable populist 
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pressure, too, and low-income households, compris-
ing a majority of inhabitants in the region, have been 
marginalized.  Low-income households ﬁ nd their 
standards of living squeezed and their needs excluded 
from the mainstream of political inﬂ uence.
Th e third and current stage began at the end of 
the 1990s, when governments realized the need to 
develop housing policies that would support labor 
mobility, address the problems (created by the lack 
of investment in the housing program for nearly a 
decade) and face the consequences of the absence of a 
stock of social housing.  Th ey began to acknowledge 
the necessity of alleviating the chronic problems of 
overcrowding, stagnant housing markets and the al-
most total inability of newly forming households to 
enter the market except for the fortunate few whose 
families are in a position to assist. A particular incen-
tive to re-think housing strategies were the criteria for 
accession to the European Union.  It is not coinci-
dental that Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic have been the ﬁ rst to experiment with a new 
range of housing policies designed to improve their 
social housing, or at least to alleviate the worst prob-
lems caused by the transitional decade.
It should be made clear that these three stages 
overlapped to some extent, and happened at diﬀ er-
ent times in diﬀ erent countries. Yet, it is possible to 
discern to a greater or lesser degree these phases in all 
post-socialist states.
 
RESPONSES TO THE HOUSING CRISIS
Housing programs aimed at alleviating the pressures 
and mounting problems caused by neglect of this 
policy area for over a decade have broadly focused on 
three strategy types.  Th ese are: housing allowances 
and measures to assist families to cope with rising 
housing costs; plans to revitalize and build new stocks 
of social housing; and policies that support household 
investment into the owner-occupied market (both 
access and construction subsidies). Th ere has been a 
great deal of debate about the best way to create an 
eﬀ ective social housing sector. Much attention has fo-
cused on private sector solutions (the most politically 
acceptable method) but increasingly, an awareness has 
developed that this route is rather expensive and not 
well targeted.   
Housing allowances: Many governments in 
the region have explored the use of some form of 
demand-side subsidies that essentially support the 
housing costs of low-income families. Th ese have 
taken a number of forms—decreasing the prices of 
services, increasing the eﬃ  ciency of service providers, 
or targeting income support to the most needy house-
holds. Th ere is no question that ultimately, an ef-
fective housing allowances system is needed. But, at 
present, central governments lack suﬃ  cient funds and 
local governments are unable to raise local taxes for 
this purpose. When 35 to 50 percent of the popula-
tion qualify as poor housing, allowances in the best 
scenario can do little to help. It is also clear invent-
ing a housing allowances system in isolation from 
the wider welfare state and social security systems 
is meaningless.  Neither of these systems have made 
much headway in the context of economies that are 
struggling for survival and in which GDP is only now 
beginning to show real signs of sustained recovery.
Social housing: Support for building social hous-
ing has reappeared on the policy agendas in the last 
few years. Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary 
have initiated programs through local governments 
to build new social housing with various incentives 
and programs aimed at reducing building costs and 
creating a stock of dwellings.  Th ese dwellings can be 
rented at “cost rents”—signiﬁ cantly lower than the 
private sector. Hungary plans in the next few years 
that as much as 15 percent of new building should 
be of this type. But, the fact remains: although the 
need for this housing is widely acknowledged, the 
reality is much more diﬃ  cult to achieve. As Martin 
Lux shows (this volume), in 2000, the vast majority 
of new building in the Czech Republic was private-
sector family houses, with only 9 percent built as ﬂ ats. 
Lux has also discussed the development of non-proﬁ t 
housing associations in Poland, where good quality 
housing was provided at costs largely unaﬀ ordable by 
low-income households (Lux 2003).
Household investment: Following privatization 
in the early 1990s, many of the countries in the region 
are “super owner-occupied” with typically 95 to 98 
percent homeownership. Of the countries discussed 
here, the Czech Republic has a de facto high owner-
ship rate, as cooperative members in eﬀ ect enjoy the 
rights of owner-occupiers. In this case, about a third 
of households remain as renters; the Czech Republic 
18
T O O  P O O R  T O  M O V E ,  T O O  P O O R  T O  S T A Y
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
thus diﬀ ers from the other studies. Th e task in the 
super-owner occupied nations has been to design tax-
related programs that assist access to home ownership 
by low-income households or support renovation 
and reconstruction. Th e diﬃ  culty has been that most 
countries have had to support a wide cross-section of 
income groups, including middle-class households 
unable to participate in the market.  Normally what 
has happened is that central governments initiate pro-
grams to subsidize interest payments on mortgages in 
order to reduce costs to households. Other methods 
have been used in order to defray the heavy early costs 
of taking on a mortgage. In Hungary, for example, 
new owners were oﬀ ered a discounted interest rate for 
the ﬁ rst ﬁ ve years of the loan (1994–1999). Support 
for interest rates, tax breaks on interest payments, and 
support to savings banks (to encourage households 
to save) have been very expensive—from 30 to 50 
percent of budget subsidies in Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic. Needless to say, all these initiatives, which 
have been strongly politically driven due to middle-
class support, have been socially regressive. Th e mil-
lions of low-income households across the region have 
been eﬀ ectively excluded from the system, unable to 
aﬀ ord to stay where they are (let alone contemplate 
moving) and/or take on mortgage debt.    
Across the region, there is also a chronic lack 
of mobility partly due to the inability to move “up-
market.”  In this situation, the social housing that 
remains—and there is a signiﬁ cant amount in the 
Czech case, as there was no centralized “right-to-buy” 
policy—higher income households are both unwill-
ing and unable to move. New rental supply is thus 
extremely limited. One interesting consequence of 
this is that municipal housing in the Czech Republic, 
more by accident than design, is much less socially 
residualized than in the other two countries in this 
report. Th is may have important long-term conse-
quences (to be discussed).   
HOUSING MARKET RIGIDITIES 
Housing market rigidities are at the center of the 
problems faced by all the newly emerging housing 
markets of the region. Th ese arise from a number of 
sources. One problem is the simple lack of supply of 
properties, due to the collapse and very slow recovery 
of the building industry in the 1990s. All the research 
studies and the projects outlined in this publication 
share this feature. What little house building there has 
been is wholly inadequate in scale to meet demand, 
and the large bulk of what has been built has been in 
the proﬁ table up-market, detached housing sector. 
Rather less well known is the extent to which the legacy 
of state socialism continues to stiﬂ e the emergence of 
properly functioning housing markets. Th is arises from 
the continued lack of regulated and institutionally 
supported mortgage products. Th ese are beginning 
to have a presence in some EU accession countries, but 
low-income households have no hope or expectation 
of raising mortgages to support moves. Th ere is still 
insuﬃ  cient knowledge about the income proﬁ les of 
households, and this lack of accurate data makes de-
tailed analysis of housing markets nearly impossible. 
It is very clear, however, from these reports that a 
major stumbling block to unlocking these markets 
arises from the distribution of housing under the old 
system, producing a situation in which many low-
income households live in ﬂ ats that are valuable by 
current standards. Th ese households have managed to 
retain a relatively good position in terms of the type 
and location of their ﬂ at, although incomes have 
fallen and housing costs have risen. Some studies show 
that housing and heating costs in the winter have 
reached as high as 80 percent of income. People below 
the poverty line thus endure cold winters, overcrowd-
ing and high service charges—but hold on to the only 
valuable thing they have: their ﬂ at. Meanwhile, else-
where, and in less desirable locations, better-oﬀ  house-
holds are frustrated in their desire to move up-market. 
State socialism bequeathed a legacy of millions of uni-
form ﬂ ats in blocks. Built in the 1970s and 1980s, 
large quantities of uniform ﬂ ats have created a housing 
market log-jammed with middle-range properties but 
lacking any substantial quantity of up-market pro-
perty, inhibiting the natural movement of households 
in a position to increase their housing consumption. 
Some evidence of renovation and new building suggests 
that this prob-lem may slowly resolve itself—but 
over many years. Th e other danger in this situation, 
for which there is some evidence, is that low-income 
families will in the end drift, out of sheer necessity, 
to worse areas—thereby creating a population ﬂ ow 
to poorer economic regions and gradual social residu-
alization (Szekely 2003).  
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Th e low level of housing market activity, even 
in countries where economic growth has been re-
stored, is matched by a low level of mortgage lend-
ing (even lower than housing market activity per se). 
Governments pour their very scarce resources, under 
pressure from populist public opinion and facing up 
to their electorates, into regressive and poorly targeted 
housing subsidies. It is common for low-interest loans 
to support the incomes of middle-class families and 
certainly very unlike the housing ﬁ nance arrange-
ments that are common in Western Europe. 
Th e regressive nature of these subsidies is one of 
the major issues that needs to be dealt with in the next 
few years, and involves governments and political par-
ties in some politically diﬃ  cult judgements. Eﬃ  cient 
market performance hinges on the development of 
properly performing legal regulation and the legal 
protection of private interests. Acceleration here is vi-
tal, even though such initiatives are invariably absent 
from the policy agenda or it is simply misunderstood 
how thoroughly regulated western (housing) markets 
operate. 
Th e basic story in many of the super-owner oc-
cupied nations is one of extreme diﬃ  culty for house-
holds to invest in moves up-market or to invest in the 
maintenance of their existing homes. Th e impoverish-
ment of very large proportions of the population cou-
pled to the rapid increase in utility charges, especially 
electricity, limits the ability of households to save, in-
cluding medium-income middle-class families. With 
the absence of mortgage products, the only ways to 
move on is through self-help, advantages transferred 
from elsewhere in the extended family, or impossible 
borrowing from banks (which demand large deposits, 
high interest and short maturity periods). 
THE PRIVATE RENTED SECTOR
All the studies in this volume note that the least-
regulated housing sector is private renting. In a nor-
mally functioning private market, there would be 
an expectation that the private rented sector (PRS) 
would reemerge after having been suppressed under 
state socialism. Th e emphasis during rapid privatiza-
tion was on the creation of mass home ownership; 
evidence from the single country case studies suggests 
that a formal housing sector has not been revived. 
On the other hand, as was always the case, there is 
evidence of a thriving informal market, often charging 
very high rents. Djordjevic indicates that inside the 
private sector in Serbia, as much as 10 to 15 percent 
of households (7 percent of ﬂ ats) live in the private 
rented sector, and pay up to 60 percent of income 
in rent. In Budapest and in Czech cities and towns, 
there is a similar story of continuing inability of the 
local authorities and wider governments to regulate 
the PRS and bring it into the mainstream of the tax 
system.   
TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS
Low-income families simply do not ﬁ gure on the 
housing policy agenda. In countries that have moved 
away from supply-side subsidies (the majority), 
evidence suggests that it is only a few targeted house-
holds that might beneﬁ t—those with disabilities, 
some pensioners, the Roma—and that the “ordinary” 
poor remain outside the remit of the skeletal housing 
allowance programmers. Th ey are too poor to move, 
and too poor to stay. Two major problems that are 
common across the region are: increases in utility 
charges; and the repair and maintenance of the high-
rise housing stock. Electricity charges have come in 
line with global pricing in the last couple of years. 
Elbers and Tsenkova report that in Bulgaria, 589,000 
households have been threatened with termination of 
electricity due to unpaid bills, and in several smaller 
towns, communal central heating systems have been 
turned oﬀ  due to voluntary refusal of the service (El-
bers and Tsenkova 2003, 123). Kocsis (this volume) 
suggests that housing costs for the bottom income 
quintile in Budapest comprised nearly 50 percent of 
household income. Similar evidence has been found 
by Djorjevic (this volume): 24 percent of income in 
Serbian urban centers is spent on housing costs/utility 
charges, while 17 percent of households have one or 
more utility bills unpaid.
Another problem is the huge legacy of repair and 
maintenance accruing in the housing stock, especially 
the high-rise blocks built from 1960 to the 1980s by 
state enterprises following Soviet models. Many ex-
perts regard this to be of greater importance than new 
building. Having become mass home-owning socie-
ties, there is rarely any provision made through con-
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dominiums or other organizational structures for the 
maintenance of the common areas and the structures 
of the buildings—many of which, especially in south-
eastern countries, were very poorly constructed in the 
ﬁ rst place. Run-down multi-family blocks occupied 
by destitute low-income households are in a spiral of 
decline. In Romania, for example, one study reported 
an urgent problem arising from substandard infra-
structure and structural deﬁ ciencies in over 17,000 
blocks built in the early 1980s (Budisteanu 2000)     
CONCLUSION
Th e result of the rapid withdrawal of the state from 
the housing sector in the 1990s, very slow develop-
ment of market institutions and informal market 
activity (with widespread unplanned and illegal 
building, particularly in southeastern Europe) caused 
urban life to be dominated by a rampant private 
market. As well, it aﬀ ected the emergence of over-
whelming problems of deprivation in many of the 
mass housing estates occupied by a largely destitute 
population. To a greater or lesser extent, this was the 
position of the three cases presented in this volume. 
Nearly ﬁ fteen years on from the collapse of state 
socialism the true nature and scale of the socialist 
legacy is only now being realized. In the area of hous-
ing policy, distinct clusters of nations have emerged. 
Perhaps the most distinctive (in Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic and Poland) retains signiﬁ cant parts of its 
rental housing.  Housing policy in this group has 
the prospect of evolving into “unitary rental” mar-
kets, similar to the Germanic social market model 
(in which the public and private rental sectors com-
pete with each other and owner occupation is not 
the dominant force). Societies dominated by owner 
occupation tend to operate less socially organized 
rental systems, deferring to the homeowning ethic. It 
should be noted that all the English-speaking home-
owning societies in the “West” operate low tax/low 
spend residual welfare states. Th e connection between 
homeownership and this sort of welfare settlement is 
not coincidental; rather, it arises from the high costs 
of owner occupation and its impact on disposable in-
come (Kemeny 1981). Th e implications of this for the 
super owner-occupied nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe should certainly not go unnoticed.
More immediately, it is not diﬃ  cult to see that 
a great deal remains to be done to meet the housing 
needs of these societies. All three studies in this collec-
tion broadly conclude the necessity for a package of 
measures that include:
• A legal framework for housing that helps to de-
velop market-orientated institutional structures 
(functional mortgage products, regulation of the 
rights of landlords and tenants in the PRS, and so 
on) and measures against tax evasion, arrears, or 
illegal building;
• Measures to encourage the re-establishment of 
rental housing, especially social rental stock to 
provide support for low-income households. Sim-
ilarly for low-income owner-occupiers, institu-
tional support structures such as condominiums 
are crucial for re-establishing and re-engaging the 
people with basic ideas of governance;
• A means for tackling the massive backlog of repair 
and maintenance in the high rise housing stock, 
much of which is urgently in need of structural 
work; and
• A realization of the inevitability of homeowner-
ship, and the development of subsidy systems that 
are less regressive and channel support to low-in-
come owners. Th e need for properly funded hous-
ing allowances is imperative, although it is point-
less to design such a scheme in isolation from the 
wider social security net. 
 
A core lesson to be gleaned from this volume and 
the relevant literature on housing in post-socialist 
Europe is that “housing” is part of a complex agenda 
of economic and political reconstruction.  It cannot 
be treated in isolation from the bigger picture. Th e 
havoc wrought by state socialism on living standards, 
governance and the general well being of regional 
societies will not be repaired in years, but rather over 
multiple decades. Th e situation is not at all like the 
position of Germany after the Second World War: 
there, post-war recovery and reconstruction was rapid 
and well funded.2  A similar passage of time has already 
passed following the largely peaceful decline of state 
socialism. It is clear that the economic globalization 
presents the newly democratizing nations of Europe 
with a much less supported economic and political 
environment. Even the post-socialist states that are 
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outcome of how this narrative of economic recovery 
unfolds that will be the key to what happens in social 
policy and more particularly in the housing systems 
of post-socialist Europe. It is, however, very clear 
from these studies that “politics matters.” Th e policy 
decisions currently being taken by the governments 
and municipal authorities of these three countries 
are already “path dependent.” How Hungary, Serbia 
and Czech Republic will navigate their way through 
future changes and developments has been shaped by 
the previous ﬁ fteen years; it seems increasingly likely 
that they will continue to diverge from one another. 
Th e hard fact is that, at the moment, a very large part 
of the population are untouched by policies, and are 
“too poor to move and too poor to stay.” Th is is likely 
to be the case for many years to come.
now members of the European Union (as of May 
1, 2004) are not in a particularly favorable position. 
For all the rhetoric of free trade and openness, most 
of the existing ﬁ fteen member states have established 
ﬁ ve- to seven-year barriers against citizens of accession 
countries working in their country—let alone 
receiving social security beneﬁ ts—fearing a tidal wave 
of economic migrants. 
Internally, there has been major investment. Th e 
Czech Republic produces more cars than any other 
European state; Peugeot is currently building a huge 
factory. But, external manufacturing investment of 
this type already shows signs of slowing down; there 
has been a discernible shift toward non-EU, post-
socialist nations, where restrictions on labor costs due 
to EU regulation do not yet exist. International capital 
is particularly footloose in this historical era. It is the 
NOTES
1 Th e Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), 1949–1991, was an economic organization of the socialist bloc countries and a kind of 
Eastern European equivalent to the European Economic Community. 
2 Th is is partly because Germany was the main European bulwark against the socialist bloc. Germany thus became the most powerful economy in Eu-
rope by the early 1960s.
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1. HOUSING UNDER STATE SOCIALISM
Under state socialism, housing in the Czech Republic 
was subject to tight, centralized control. With the 
exception of family houses, the entire privately-owned 
housing stock was nationalized. Subsequently, the 
creation of new housing cooperatives was allowed, 
but all rents were controlled by the state. As a result 
of extensive housing construction ﬁ nanced from the 
state budget, the share of state rental ﬂ ats in the total 
housing stock grew rapidly. Four types of housing 
predominated: state rental ﬂ ats; rental ﬂ ats owned 
by state enterprises; cooperative rental ﬂ ats; and pri-
vately-owned family houses. Tenants of both state 
and enterprise ﬂ ats had neither ownership rights nor 
duties, but they had a “decree” claiming their right to 
stay at the ﬂ at for an “unlimited time” and, moreover, 
they had an automatic right to transfer the “decree 
rights” to their children. 
Cooperative housing was based on the notion 
of “collective investment” by cooperative members. 
Each citizen could become a member of one of the 
cooperatives by paying a membership fee. Although 
the construction of cooperative houses was partially 
subsidized by the state, residents had to cover a sub-
stantial part of the construction costs themselves (in 
some cases by cash payments, in other cases by unpaid 
work during the construction of the house). Th e ﬂ ats 
were owned by cooperatives and the members of the 
cooperative did not have any disposal rights to their 
cooperative ﬂ ats. (For example, they could not sell 
them on the open market). Owner-occupied family 
houses represented the last legal form on the housing 
market under state socialism.
2.  HOUSING DURING TRANSITION
2.1  Housing Development
  and Construction
According to Terplan’s estimate (Andrle and Dupal 
1999), from 1991 to 1999, the number of households 
in “involuntary cohabitation” increased from 170,000 
to between 280,000 and 300,000 households (repre-
senting currently 7 to 7.5 percent of all Czech house-
holds). Housing construction, however, decreased 
sharply immediately after 1990 (Table 1). Th e number 
of completed dwellings reached its low point in 1995. 
Since then, there has been steady growth in the number 
of housing unit construction started annually.
Th e decrease in housing construction in the ﬁ rst 
half of the 1990s was caused mainly by the termina-
tion of state housing construction and the withdrawal 
of public subsidies. Th e rapid liberalization of prices 
sharply increased construction costs and raised prices 
of new housing. Sýkora writes: “Th e market could 
not react in an environment of huge disparities be-
tween housing need and demand and the government 
was not willing to bridge the gap between the high 
need (but low purchasing power) of households and 
the sharply increased costs of housing production” 
(2003). Th ough the introduction of some housing 
policy programs (to be discussed) to stimulate hous-
ing consumption positively inﬂ uenced the scale of 
housing construction, new housing remained aﬀ ord-
able only to a small segment of the Czech population. 
Th e demand of higher income households and indi-
viduals was saturated, while the share of population 
that could aﬀ ord new housing did not increase. New 
housing was primarily family houses and ownership 
ﬂ ats. Th e share of rental ﬂ ats of total housing starts 
was only 9 percent in 2000. Private companies or in-
dividual investors now build most housing. 
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Table 1
Housing Construction in the Czech Republic 
(number of dwellings), 1990–2001
Year Number of dwellings
Started Under 
construction
Completed
1990 61,004 158,840 44,594
1991 10,899 128,228 41,719
1992 8,429 97,768 36,397
1993 7,454 72,356 31,509
1994 10,964 62,117 18,162
1995 16,548 66,172 12,662
1996 22,680 74,726 14,482
1997 33,152 90,552 16,757
1998 35,027 103,191 22,183
1999 32,900 112,530 23,734
2000 32,377 118,785 25,207
2001 28,983 121,705 24,759
Note: Apartments in extensions of existing buildings, houses 
for the elderly with social services, and those adapted 
from non-residential premises have been included since 
1996.
Source:  Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce.
In 2001, there were 4,369,239 dwellings in 
the Czech Republic. Th is number has increased by 
292,000 since 1991; permanently inhabited dwellings 
per 1,000 inhabitants increased from 360 in 1991 
to 372 in 2001. Th ere are other dwellings that serve 
residential purposes, but their inhabitants do not per-
manently reside there. If all dwellings are taken into 
account, there are now more than 420 dwellings per 
1,000 inhabitants. 
 
2.2 Decentralization and Privatization 
Transition in the Czech Republic has been charac-
terized by, among other things, the decentralization 
of powers from the central to local level of public 
administration. Decentralization in housing policy 
began in 1991, with a massive transfer of 877,000 
dwellings (23.5 percent of the dwelling stock) from 
state to municipal ownership. It was expected that the 
local governments would become the major admin-
istrators of housing policy. However, the transfer of 
properties was not accompanied by adequate ﬁ nancial 
means. Th e management and maintenance costs were, 
in most local governments, higher than revenues and 
housing became a heavy ﬁ nancial burden for the mu-
nicipal budgets. 
Many state-owned blocks of ﬂ ats were returned 
to their previous owners or their descendants by res-
titution laws. Th e government, however, decided to 
maintain the system of state regulation of rents in res-
tituted houses. Enterprise-owned housing practically 
ceased to exist as virtually all enterprise ﬂ ats were sold 
to private owners when the enterprises themselves 
were privatized. Table 2 indicates the changes in 
tenure structure between 1991 and 2001 (the most 
recent census). Th e decrease in the share of rental 
housing and the increase in homeownership were 
caused by the privatization of municipal (former) 
state housing. Th e Act on Ownership of Apartments 
and Non-Residential Premises, approved in 1994, 
oﬀ ered the possibility of selling individual dwellings 
in an apartment building. Th is law aﬀ ected public 
and private sector rental housing as well as cooperative 
housing by permitting them to be transformed into 
condominiums (homeowners associations). From 
the local government perspective, it created the op-
portunity for municipalities to sell individual ﬂ ats. 
Before approval of the Act they could only sell the 
whole residential buildings, usually to a cooperative 
formed by tenants.
Municipalities now can freely decide on the con-
ditions and scale of housing sales. No central “right 
to buy” legislation (as in the UK, Hungary, Estonia, 
Russia, Romania, or Albania) was implemented, and 
the state did not press local authorities to privatize 
publicly-owned housing. Diﬀ erent models of privati-
zation, therefore, have been applied with various out-
comes. Sýkora suggests: “Most towns prefer sales of 
individual ﬂ ats, however, large cities, such as Prague 
and Brno prefer sales of entire residential buildings. 
About half of the former (pre-privatization in 1991) 
municipal housing stock was transferred to private 
ownership, with over 40 percent through sales of mu-
nicipal housing and the rest by restitution” (2003).
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Table 2
Changes in Tenure Structure, 1991–2001
Tenure 19911) 19942) 20013)
Homeownership 43.25 42.0 46.8
 • in own family house 40.57 40.0 35.8
 • in own apartment dwelling 0.80 2.0 11.0
 • other homeownership 1.88 — —
Rental housing 56.59 57.0 46.0
 • cooperative housing 19.83 19.4 14.3
 • municipal and state housing 35.65 27.0 —
 • private rental housing: family houses — 2.0 28.64)
 • private rental housing: apartment houses — 8.0
 • cooperatives of tenants (privatized public housing) — 0.4 3.1
  • other rental housing (enterprise housing) 1.11 — —
Other tenure 0.11 1.0 6.7
Total 100.00 100.0 100.0
1) Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce (1991): Census 3.3. Statistical Yearbook 1993. Prague: Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce.
2) Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce. Survey on Housing Stock Structure. Prague: Ministry for Regional Development. http://www.mmr.cz. 
3) Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce (2001): Census 3.3. Prague: Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce. http://www.czso.cz.
4) Th e ﬁ gure shows the common share of municipal/state and private rental housing on total housing stock. Th e more detailed tenure 
structure is not, however, available. 
In the restitution process, properties conﬁ scated 
by the Communist regime or given to the state 
under disadvantageous conditions between February 
1948 and December 1990 were returned to original 
owners or their heirs. Most of these transfers were 
accomplished by the end of 1993. It is estimated that 
roughly 10 percent of the dwelling stock, mainly in 
the central parts of towns, was restituted. Restituted 
houses could be immediately marketed which 
supported the creation of a real estate market. 
Th e government decided to maintain the system 
of state-regulated rents, not only in municipal ﬂ ats 
but also in restituted buildings. In 1993, market rents 
were permitted if the tenant was not a citizen of the 
Czech Republic, if the ﬂ at had been vacant before 
the tenancy began, or if the dwelling was a privately-
owned family house. Th e market rental sector made 
up only about 5 to 10 percent of the total rental 
stock in 2001. Regulated rent for the average rented 
2.3. Central Government Housing Policy 
2.3.1  Housing Legislation
Th e law on the transformation of cooperative housing 
changed the status of housing cooperatives. Th e pri-
mary objective of the Transformation Act was the pri-
vatization of cooperative housing stock into the hands 
of cooperative members who lived in cooperative ﬂ ats. 
Members of the cooperatives obtained the right “to 
sell” their share in the cooperative (connected with 
the right to occupy the cooperative ﬂ at) on the open 
market. Until 1995, cooperative members were able 
to apply for the transfer of their cooperative ﬂ ats into 
private ownership. Th e overwhelming majority of 
cooperative members took advantage of this. Conse-
quently, cooperatives became more or less a part of the 
homeownership sector and can no longer be classiﬁ ed 
as purely rental housing.
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ﬂ at rose from CZK 170 in 1990 to CZK 1,021 in 
1998 (approximately an increase of 600 percent in 
nominal terms). However, in real prices, the increase 
in rents does not seem to be so dramatic: the rent 
price increased only by CPI (inﬂ ation) would attain 
CZK 654 in 2000; the real average rent price rose 87 
percent. Moreover, average regulated rent is still only 
one-ﬁ fth of the average “market”1 rent in 2001. Th e 
maximum price of monthly-regulated rent per square 
meter of dwelling ﬂ oor area was calculated according 
to several government edicts before they were all 
abolished by the Constitutional Court. Since then, 
regulated rent prices are frozen until the new Rent 
Act is passed by Parliament. (Th e deﬁ nite version 
of a new act was not known at the time of writing.) 
According to the Local Government and Housing 
Survey, conducted among municipalities with more 
than 5,000 inhabitants, about half of municipalities 
state that current regulated rent is still below the level 
of the average economic rent; that is, the rent is not 
high enough to cover management and maintenance 
costs (Sýkora 2003). 
Th e rent setting mechanism based on the overall 
non-targeted rent regulation does not reﬂ ect the 
diﬀ erent costs of operation in diﬀ erent localities. 
Regulated rents are not well targeted with respect to 
household income and tenure (Lux 2002). Regression 
analysis using the Regional Diﬀ erences in Housing 
Prices 1996-97 data set2 allows for comparing the 
diﬀ erence between the market and controlled rent 
for an average household in municipal rental housing 
(such as the average “hidden subsidy” to tenants 
living in municipal ﬂ ats): according to the results, 
higher income households proﬁ ted more from rent 
regulation in municipal ﬂ ats than lower income 
households did (Lux and Burdova 2000). 
Th e title (possession of decree) on a rent regulated 
ﬂ at has remained transferable to family members, 
exchangeable with some other “owners of the decree” 
and tradable on the black market. Th e amendments 
of the Civil Code in 1991, 1992 and 1994 did not 
eliminate inappropriate tenant protections that 
would allow a more eﬃ  cient functioning of the rental 
housing sector. Judicial procedures are very slow (the 
eviction of tenant refusing to pay the rent takes several 
years) and concerning the tenant protection issues, 
they are not uniﬁ ed in practice. Th ere are no central 
explicit rules for allocating vacant or new municipal 
ﬂ ats that would restrict the municipalities’ choice of 
tenants. No proposal of the new Rent Act counts 
with the deﬁ nition of social/aﬀ ordable housing (with 
special price and income conditions).3
In May 2000, a law setting up a State Fund 
for Housing Development was adopted by the 
Czech Parliament. Th e Fund should cover part of 
the housing construction or reconstruction costs 
by providing grants and preferential loans. Even 
though the aim of the Fund was (according to the 
Government Housing Policy Strategy) to support 
new rental housing construction, its activities are 
not limited to a speciﬁ c housing sector. Th e extent 
of the subsidy is not indicated in the law which 
only speciﬁ es that subsides will be partial. Th ere are 
no further conditions to be fulﬁ lled by applicants 
(income ceilings) to obtain subsidies or qualiﬁ ed loans 
for the reconstruction or construction of the ﬂ ats and 
houses. Th ere were no sources in the Fund for a long 
time. In fact, its activity actually started in 2001 when 
it received the government revenues generated from 
privatization of large enterprises (much lower that it 
was originally expected). Other than providing loans 
and bank guarantees on regeneration of prefabricated 
housing, the Fund allocates also qualiﬁ ed loans at a 
3 percent per annum (p.a.) interest rate for young 
people (under 35 years of age) and gives the interest 
subsidies on mortgages for young people (from 1 to 4 
percentage points). 
A law on new “social” housing associations is in 
the early stages of preparation. Th e proposal of the 
Ministry for Regional Development is waiting for the 
parliamentary discussion. According to the current 
proposal, social housing associations’ activity and 
ﬁ nancing would be based on the ﬁ nancial participation 
of individual members of the association. Th is means 
that the legal form of new housing associations would 
be very close to the cooperative form and future 
tenants will become cooperative members as well. Th e 
housing associations would operate on a non-proﬁ t 
basis. Th e municipality or other legal person (ﬁ ve, at 
least) could also become shareholders. Rents will be 
regulated and the construction costs will be partially 
covered by a grant from the State Fund for Housing 
Development. As the proposal is in the initial stage of 
preparation, there is no further precise information—
such as conditions to be fulﬁ lled to obtain the subsidy 
or qualiﬁ ed loan, the size of the ﬂ at and normative 
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costs per square meter, or details on rent setting and 
subsequent rent increases. 
However, it is now clear that the allocation 
of new “rental” ﬂ ats will not be limited by means 
testing and will not be legally restricted to middle- 
and lower-income households. Th e hybrid character 
of “collective ownership” in the case of housing 
cooperatives even does not allow higher targeting of 
public subsidies to those in higher need. It is mistake, 
this study argues, that the form of pure rental housing 
is not incorporated into the proposal. We can expect 
that public subsidies originally designed for rental 
housing will ﬁ nally support homeownership with no 
regard for social or income criteria.
2.3.2 Housing Policy Programs
State support for housing was substantially restruc-
tured during the 1990s. Th e former system of hous-
ing subsidies ceased to exist and new programs were 
introduced. Th ese include the support given for hous-
ing consumption (support for housing savings and to 
mortgages) as well as the support for the production 
of new housing. Th e state now subsidizes construction 
of new municipal rental housing, housing for the eld-
erly and gives provisions for technical infrastructure 
for all kinds of housing construction. Furthermore, 
several programs aimed at the repair and moderniza-
tion of prefabricated housing stock have been intro-
duced. Th e state has also provided a long list of tax 
relief measures (such as relief of mortgage interests 
and tax exemptions from property tax on privatized or 
newly built homes). Special programs were applied in 
speciﬁ c instances to assist with ﬂ ood damages in 1997 
and 2002.  Th e programs are discussed below.
First, a program for support of municipal rental 
housing construction and technical infrastructure 
provision began in 1995. Th e aim was to provide sup-
port to local authorities to fulﬁ ll objectives concerning 
new housing construction and increase the availability 
and aﬀ ordability of housing. Th e subsidy is given for 
the following: 
1. Th e construction of new municipal rental hous-
ing, construction of attic apartments in empty 
under-roof spaces, reconstruction of non-resi-
dential spaces into housing and reconstruction 
of dilapidated houses that have been vacant and 
uninhabited for at least ﬁ ve years. 
2. Technical infrastructure (engineering networks, 
sewage system and roads) on vacant land zoned 
for future housing construction of all forms (in-
cluding private). 
Support for municipal rental housing had a 
maximum of CZK 320,000 per ﬂ at,4 and support for 
reconstruction of residential spaces that had not been 
used for more than ﬁ ve years could amount to CZK 
200,000. Finally, support for technical infrastructure 
had a maximum of CZK 80,000 per future ﬂ at. Th is 
program has facilitated construction on 5,000–8,000 
ﬂ ats annually. 
Prior to early 2003, there were no limitations 
concerning the maximum cost level per square meter, 
the maximum area of the dwelling, or the income 
ceilings used for future allocation of ﬂ ats. Th ough 
the maximum rent price was settled at three times the 
regulated rent price, the additional ﬁ nancial means 
(50 percent of construction costs) were often paid 
by future tenants (in fact members of cooperatives) 
and not by municipalities themselves. Th e character 
of rental housing was limited only for the period of 20 
years and after this period the ﬂ ats could be transferred 
into the full ownership of tenants. Th us, quite 
spacious and comfortable dwellings were sometimes 
constructed (especially in Prague and Brno) that did 
not ultimately serve as classical rental ﬂ ats. Th ey had 
the character of quasi-ownership dwellings, as new 
occupants were assured free transfer of ﬂ ats into their 
ownership after 20 years. Very low social eﬀ ectiveness 
of the subsidies (no income or other social criteria 
applied and relatively large co-ﬁ nancing requested 
from future tenants) combined with low economic 
eﬃ  ciency (in some cases the subsidies only increased 
the proﬁ t of private developers and did not decrease 
the price) led to the changes in program that were 
introduced in 2003. Th e amount of state subsidy 
increased, but the cooperative form was forbidden 
and an income ceiling as well as costs per square meter 
limits were introduced. It is too soon for evaluation, 
but with changes, the program may become an 
eﬀ ective tool for the “housing poor” (socially dis-
advantaged households) and similar areas. 
Second, a program for the support of construction 
of housing with social care was introduced in 1991. 
Th is program provides subsidies to municipal govern-
ments for the construction of rental housing with a 
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special social regime that consists of small apartments 
for the elderly and handicapped and a provision of 
social care support. Th e primary goal is to provide 
housing for those persons who, due to health or age, 
require social care. As well, the program description 
conﬁ rms the objective of supporting higher vacancies 
in municipal dwellings that could be allocated among 
those who have low access to housing on the open 
market, such as the housing poor (ﬁ ltering). Th e total 
amount of ﬁ nance in this scheme has been declining 
since 1995 and the program ﬁ nished in 2002. Since 
2003, it has been incorporated into a new program on 
“supported housing,” to be brieﬂ y discussed.
In 2001, sources allocated from the Ministry 
for Regional Development and the State Fund for 
Housing Development for this program allowed for 
the construction of 1,415 new ﬂ ats in houses with 
social care support. Since 1995, about 7,500 of dwell-
ings in houses with social care have been raised. Th ere 
is some information, though unreliable, that the pro-
gram really helped to support the ﬁ ltering process and 
more municipal dwellings could be allocated among 
other people in social need. Th e program also pushes 
municipalities to prepare and pass local housing 
policy strategies and to deﬁ ne the priorities and main 
target groups in the ﬁ eld of housing policy. Th e ques-
tion raised currently concerns the number of people 
that are in need of permanent social care; estimates 
shift from around 5 to 19 percent of the total popula-
tion. In some cases, municipalities allocated new ﬂ ats 
also among those people that do not need permanent 
social care and only are of higher age. Naturally, the 
number of applicants exceeds the possibilities of mu-
nicipalities (in Prague, more than twice). 
Th ird, a program in support of housing sav-
ings is based on an Austrian and German model 
(Bausparkasse) and was introduced in 1993 to stimu-
late housing consumption. Each citizen can deposit a 
certain amount to housing savings banks. On top of 
the interest on the savings given by the banks, the state 
gives a premium equal to 25 percent of the annually 
deposited sum (since January 2004 this may change). 
However, the premium is given at a maximum of 
CZK 4,500 per year. After ﬁ ve years, credit equal 
in value to the savings amount is available at 5 to 6 
percent interest (the interest can be deducted from 
income tax). Loans can be used for the purchase, con-
struction or reconstruction of housing. If the person 
does not apply for the loan, the savings (together with 
the state premiums) could be used for any purpose. 
Th e system of housing savings played a very 
important role at the beginning of transition, when 
mortgages were not introduced and/or unaﬀ ordable 
for 95 percent of the population. Th e annual inﬂ a-
tion was high and the interest rate on housing loan, 
at 6 percent a year, was very advantageous; currently, 
however, several banks provide mortgage loans and in-
terest is often lower. Th e number of people using the 
housing savings scheme just for the purpose of savings 
is increasing. Moreover, it has become the most ex-
pensive program of state housing policy: in 2001, the 
state (via the Ministry of Finance) spent almost CZK 
nine billion on savings premiums (almost 41 percent 
of all state housing expenditures); in 2002, the state 
budget allocated for the same purpose almost CZK 
thirteen billion. Th ough it is a relatively well known 
program used by many young households when 
buying/reconstructing a ﬁ rst ﬂ at, the loan volume 
together with the savings is relatively small and other 
loans are also needed. It is also necessary to point 
out that the state premium is allocated also to those 
savers who will not ask for a loan and who will not 
use savings for housing purposes (“good brothers”). 
Th e program is thus not very transparent. As well, 
due to low level of loan extending (only about one 
third of clients ask for a loan when they ﬁ nish their 
saving cycles) the economic eﬃ  ciency of the program 
is probably low. Under the reform of public ﬁ nance, 
the new conditions are prepared to be introduced 
from January 2004. 
Fourth, a housing allowance system was intro-
duced in 1996. It failed, however, to meet its social 
objective and does not correspond to the models 
used in the EU. Owner-occupiers and tenants are 
qualiﬁ ed for the housing allowance if their income 
falls below 16 percent of a minimum subsistence 
income in the last quarter of a calendar year.5 Th e 
allowance is allocated with no regard to real housing 
costs. If a household has a real income equal to zero, 
the allowance is equal to the normative costs. On the 
other hand, if it has a maximum income (1.6 times 
the subsistence minimum), the allowance is zero. Th e 
space for variation is very small. 
Th e current allowance model may be eﬀ ective 
only where non-targeted “ﬁ rst generation” rent con-
trol is applied on the dominant part of the rental 
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stock. Even in this situation, however, there is an 
equal distribution of allowances among households 
with high rent-to-income ratios and low rent-to-in-
come ratios (real housing expenditures are not taken 
into account and the decisive factor is only the income 
of household). Th e allowance thus does not eﬀ ectively 
serve to increase ﬁ nancial aﬀ ordability of housing in 
general; it is allocated among those who do not need 
help (with low rent-to-income ration) and among 
those who are in need (young people living in the 
market rental sector or pensioners with high rent-to-
income ratio). In 2000, the allowance was provided to 
332,000 households (8.2 percent of the total number 
of households according to 1991 census) with the av-
erage value of CZK 633. State expenditures reached 
CZK 2.5 billion.
Fifth, interest subsidies on mortgages for young 
starters were introduced in September 2002. Th e 
interest subsidies to mortgage loans are oﬀ ered to 
young people without their own permanent housing 
and below the age of 36 on mortgage loans used for 
the purchase of older dwellings. Th e interest subsidy 
varies from 1 to 4 percentage points, depending on 
the general level of mortgage interests (in 2002 the 
subsidy was equal to 3 percentage points) and it is 
ﬁ xed for a maximum of ﬁ ve years. Th e subsidy is al-
located for the whole period of loan repayment with 
maximum of ten years and loan ceiling. Th e dwelling 
must be older than two years, and it must serve only 
for the purpose of permanent housing of applicants (it 
cannot be sold during the period of loan repayment). 
Th e subsidy allocation is agreed between applicants 
and those banks that have special agreement with the 
Ministry for Regional Development (eight commer-
cial banks).
Th ough it is too soon to evaluate this program, it 
can be assumed that it will have a positive inﬂ uence 
on the aﬀ ordability of owner-occupied housing for 
young households. Th e current interests on mortgages 
can be lowered with the help of interest subsidy to the 
level of 1 to 2 percent per year interest on mortgages 
can be deducted from the income tax base, and such 
soft loan conditions are very attractive. According to 
the information from several banks, there are tens of 
mortgage loans with the state subsidy extended each 
day (2003). Th e interest subsidies are designed for the 
purchase of older dwellings and prices of older dwell-
ings are lower (sometimes substantially lower) than 
prices for new housing. However, from the point of 
view of the real housing poor, most of whom can only 
dream about mortgage loans, this program is again 
not eﬀ ective. Th e support of homeownership can help 
only those people with middle incomes or with the 
substantial help of larger family. 
Sixth, in early 2003, the Ministry for Regional 
Development introduced supported housing with 
the aim to provide shelter or housing with social care 
for those at a disadvantageous position in housing 
market, due to: age (elderly); social position (Roma 
minority, homeless, former prison inmates); income 
(unemployed, young); family status (divorced); or 
health (handicapped). Th e program includes diﬀ erent 
types of housing: shelters for the homeless; “on the 
half way back” housing for former prison inmates; 
starting ﬂ ats (for homeless obtaining jobs and leaving 
sheltered housing, or youth from children’s homes 
without family); housing with social care (mainly for 
the elderly and handicapped); and integrated “villages 
of cohabitation” (such as for the Roma minority). 
Th e state supports new construction (or reconstruc-
tion of non-residential houses) with grants up to 
CZK 500,000 per housing allocated only among 
municipalities. Municipalities will have to cover the 
rest of expenses. Th e program lists the target groups of 
population, but municipalities will set the particular 
projects as well as allocation criteria themselves. Th e 
housing service must always be accompanied with a 
social care and/or socialization program. 
Th e main conditions of the program seem to be 
set in an eﬀ ective and eﬃ  cient way. In fact, this is 
the ﬁ rst targeted program in the sphere of bricks-and-
mortar subsidies since the beginning of transition. 
However, the Czech Republic lacks a forward-look-
ing conception of social/aﬀ ordable housing, includ-
ing a clear deﬁ nition of “levels” of need. As such, this 
limits the development of eﬀ ective housing allowance 
and legislation in order to introduce, for instance, 
non-proﬁ t housing associations. Such associations 
could become the main providers of new social rental 
housing following the trend in most of EU countries. 
Some programs are very ineﬃ  cient and ineﬀ ective 
(in regard to housing allowances, state premiums to 
housing savings schemes, or former programs sup-
ported for municipal rental housing construction); 
it takes a considerable amount of time for housing 
policymakers to prepare and introduce changes. 
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Non-targeted rent regulation remains a main ob-
stacle to creating an eﬀ ective housing market and to 
decreasing the level of bias in current market rent 
prices. 
2.4  Housing Conditions
2.1.1 General Overview
After substantial changes in both the state and local 
housing policies, housing aﬀ ordability has decreased, 
though not equally among all households. Due to the 
continuation of rent regulation, the introduction of 
restitution of expropriated property and very advanta-
geous housing privatization, two diﬀ erent and sharply 
divided housing markets appeared. Th e overwhelming 
majority of the population lives in the so-called “privi-
leged sector,” Th is refers to those living in:
• rent-regulated dwellings;
• owner-occupied dwellings acquired during state 
socialism in a completely diﬀ erent ﬁ nancial envi-
ronment;
• owner-occupied dwellings acquired under rather 
advantageous terms by setting tenants, through 
the privatization of former public housing in the 
1990s; and
• cooperative dwellings whhich acquired, in fact, 
an ownership title after the introduction of the 
Transformation Cooperative Act at the beginning 
of the transition.
Only a small part of the population is “forced” 
to live in the so-called “unprivileged sector.” Th is 
includes those from the market rental sector and 
those buying/constructing their housing under mar-
ket terms during the 1990s. Such a division of the 
market has an important inﬂ uence on housing aﬀ ord-
ability and consumption, mainly for newly created 
households (young people) who may not obtain rent-
regulated dwellings due to extremely low tenant 
turnover and long waiting periods. On the other 
hand, many high-income households still proﬁ t from 
non-targeted rent regulations. 
As Table 3 shows, late 2000, Czech households 
generally spent about 21 percent of their income on 
Table 3
Housing Expenditures-to-Income Ratio (Czech Republic, 2000) 
Housing Expenditures
[CZK]
Housing Expenditures-to-Income Ratio 
[%]
Social Group According to 
the Head of Household 
Rent Total Rent-to-Income Ratio Total Housing 
Expenditures-to-Income Ratio
Worker 940 3,335 5.59 18.27
Employee 1,059 4,109 5.98 20.45
Farmer 889 3,180 4.96 17.67
Pensioner 790 2,285 9.48 26.15
Tenure
 • Rental 1,189 3,509 8.70 24.43
 • Cooperative 785 3,508 5.47 22.24
 • Own ﬂ at 615 3,346 4.62 21.62
 • Own house — 3,062 — 18.05
Total average 947 3,322 6.85 21.18
Note: “Rent,” in the case of ﬂ ats in homeownership, includes regular payments for house administration and contribution to maintenance. 
In “complete” families, the head of household is always man, in “incomplete” families—the economically active parent. If the 
parent is not economically active, he/she is head of household only if children are also economically non-active. CZK 30=USD 1.
Source: FBS 2000. Calculations by authors.
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housing, while regulated rents took only 7 percent of 
household income (Family Budget Survey, 2000). 
Th e biggest burden on household income is utility/
energy payment, as prices have been completely de-
regulated. Th e average ﬁ gure for total housing expen-
ditures, however, does not show the large diﬀ erences 
within the population. Th ough some inequalities may 
be observed from general statistics, others may only 
be gleaned from special investigations or personal ac-
counts. Many social categories (such as those living 
in unoﬃ  cial or “black market” housing, the Roma 
minority, the handicapped, or the homeless) tend not 
to participate or be included in national surveys.
2.4.2 Th e Housing Poor 
Pensioners (or seniors) form a very special social cate-
gory in the ﬁ eld of housing consumption and housing 
conditions. Many of them, according to Living Condi-
tions (2001), live in apartments that do not meet cur-
rent standards of adequate housing (with the toilet in 
the common corridor, or generally unhealthy housing 
conditions). Moreover, due to their age, many need 
special health and social care. As Table 3 shows, their 
average housing expenditures-to-income ratio is 26 
percent, which is relatively high. Th e most endangered 
are one-member pensioner households, among which 
are single women. Two- or more member households 
attain average housing expenditure-to-income ratio 
of about 22 percent, one-member male households
—28 percent and one-member female households—
more than 30 percent. 
Pensioners, however, from all social categories 
of households in the Czech Republic, are among the 
most satisﬁ ed with their current housing (Housing 
Attitudes 2001). Th is satisfaction ﬂ ows mainly from 
frequent over-consumption of housing, which is 
apparent not only in the owner-occupied housing, 
but also in the rental sector. Pensioners often own 
another, secondary housing for recreational purposes. 
In many cases, such housing is suitable as a primary 
residency.
Th e high housing expenditures-to-income ra-
tio among pensioners is thus caused also by over-
consumption of housing and little interest in moving 
to smaller dwellings. Th is is partially an inheritance 
of the state socialist period, when mobility was 
restricted and ﬁ rst housing was often perceived as 
a home for life. But, in addition, the ineﬀ ective 
operation of the housing market, the decreasing share 
of public housing caused by privatization, the absence 
of counseling and information agencies for elderly 
people to help them with administrative arrange-
ments for any potential move, and the slow integ-
ration of pensioners into community life all present 
obstacles to potential mobility. Figure 1 shows the 
housing expenditure-to-income ratio development 
for pensioner households during the 1990s. Th e data is 
Table 4
Housing Satisfaction According to Age of Respondent 
Age All Respondents N Respondents Living 
in Rental Housing
N
18–25 4.09 540 4.82 136
26–35 3.95 719 4.55 176
36–45 3.77 624 4.68 135
46–55 3.52 599 4.39 120
56–65 3.54 618 4.17 117
66+ 3.10 434 4.05 114
Total 3.71 3,534 4.47 798
Question: If you were to evaluate your satisfaction with current housing, what mark would you assign to it?
Note: On scale from 1 (very satisﬁ ed) to 10 (very unsatisﬁ ed). N = 3.534.
Source: Housing Attitudes 2001. 
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adjusted (reduced) by various, often neglected factors: 
expenditures on secondary housing (ratio 1); housing 
allowances (ratio 2); and over-consumption (ratio 3). 
Figure 1 clearly shows how “real” housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio would sharply decrease 
if over-consumption of housing were to be eliminated 
(on average, by about 16 percent in 1999). For pen-
sioner households, the eﬀ ect of over-consumption on 
housing expenditures is by far the highest of all social 
groups of Czech households. Th e burden of housing 
costs is aﬀ ected also by non-targeted rent deregula-
tion, realized during the 1990s. As rent regulation has 
been non-targeted only for or at those in social need, 
the process of relatively slight real rent deregulation 
equally aﬀ ects all households in this sector. Th e in-
crease in rents may be too high for poorer pensioner 
households. 
Young people form the main social category of 
those who are forced to live in overcrowded housing 
conditions, usually at the beginning of their hous-
ing “career,” with parents, colleagues or other young 
people (Living Conditions 2001). Th ey are also, among 
all Czech citizens, the least satisﬁ ed with their housing 
arrangements and choices (Table 4: Housing Attitudes 
10
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19
22
25
28
1992 1996 1999
Ratio Ratio 1 Ratio 2 Ratio 3
Figure 1
Housing Expenditures-to-Income Ratio Development, 1990s 
Source: FBS 1992, 1996, 1999. Calculations by authors. N = 513 (1992), 498 (1996), 419 (1999).
2001). Many youth, when establishing their own 
families and moving to owner-occupied or market 
rental dwellings, spend more than half of their house-
hold income on housing. Many are not low-income 
(due to their high level of education and career-
oriented outlook); thus, they are not considered 
“poor” under a standard housing market environment. 
Th e lack of “starting dwellings” or “social housing” 
for ﬁ rst-time housing seekers, and the non-sustainable 
situation in the rental sector (combined with non-
eﬀ ective models for housing allowances), however, 
put the youth in the category of the housing poor. 
Th e unemployed who are seeking housing have 
been negatively impacted by rent regulation as well. 
Th e current average rate of unemployment is higher 
than 10 percent (2003), but there are very large re-
gional diﬀ erences. Moving to a place with greater 
employment possibilities, however, means losing the 
right to a rent-regulated ﬂ at, with no right to a rent-
regulated ﬂ at in the new location. As a result, mobility 
rates are very low. 
Th e homeless comprise the subject of increas-
ing public concern in Europe in recent years. Yet, 
homelessness in the Czech Republic is still regarded 
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as a marginal social problem. Under state socialism, 
homelessness existed only in hidden forms. After 
1989, the number of people without permanent hous-
ing increased, due to lower public expenditures in the 
ﬁ eld of new housing construction, unemployment, 
slight rent deregulation, and more active local policies 
toward rent arrears. As will be illustrated, the number 
of homeless in the Czech Republic is relatively small, 
estimated at 3,500 in Prague and 100-300 in Brno 
and Ostrava. 
No deﬁ nition of homelessness has been accepted 
on the central level. Obadalová writes: “As there is 
not a statutory obligation to assist the homeless in the 
Czech Republic, there does not exist an administrative 
deﬁ nition of homelessness either ... Deﬁ ning who is 
homeless would imply the responsibility to undertake 
some action to reduce homelessness and so commit 
public sources to the solution of the problem” (2002, 
32). For the purpose of this study, we use a narrow 
deﬁ nition of “homelessness” to refer to those who 
are “rooﬂ ess,” without shelter of any kind (including 
emergency/temporary accommodation).
Th ere has been no systematic research of homeless 
people in the Czech Republic. In western countries, it 
is estimated that 30 to 90 percent suﬀ er from mental 
illness (Elliot and Krivo 1991, 115–116). Th is can 
not be conﬁ rmed in the Czech Republic. Obadalová 
(2002) suggests the following as the main factors con-
tributing to homelessness: unemployment (and urban 
migration to seek employment); low level of educa-
tion (estimates indicate that 56 percent of homeless 
have only elementary education); and family break-
down (men evicted after a divorce). Alcohol, drugs 
and gambling are interconnected with the issue, but it 
is not possible to say if they are causes or consequences 
of homelessness. Many are often now aware that they 
are entitled to a minimum income (“subsistence mini-
mum”). However, they can apply for public support 
only in the case of permanent residence. Th is is very 
problematic if they “reside” in an other city. 
Each large municipality (Prague, Brno and 
Ostrava) has established a so-called Social Aid and 
Prevention Center, including both municipal and 
private non-proﬁ t organizations, to provide accom-
modation for those in a situation of housing crisis. 
Some of the biggest organizations are members of 
the Association of Homeless Shelter Operators; 
three are members of the European Federation of 
National Organizations Working with the Homeless 
(FEANTSA). Th ey oﬀ er a range of services: advice; as-
sistance with resettlement; day centers; night shelters; 
lodging hostels; halfway houses; and so on.
According to the 2001 census, there are ap-
proximately 11.4 thousand (0.1 percent of all Czech 
citizens) Roma living in the Czech Republic. Th e 
actual size of the community is diﬃ  cult to calculate. 
Many are registered as Czechs, and others as Slovaks. 
Some are not registered at all. Based on information 
from Roma advisers (working in several district oﬃ  ces 
until early 2002), population transfers between the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia are common. During 
the 1990s, a ﬂ ood of Roma households left the Czech 
Republic (mainly to Canada and UK); many have 
returned. 
According to a survey by the Ministry for 
Regional Development on housing conditions and at-
titudes, more than half of all Roma live in municipal 
rental housing, and one-third live in dwellings of the 
lowest (fourth) quality. Nearly one-third of Roma re-
spondents found their dwelling too small for the size 
of their household. 
In connection with the problem of rent arrears, 
the term holobyt (shelter) has recently come into use. 
Th is refers to housing of a very basic standard (one 
room, common bath and kitchen) in abandoned 
buildings (former industrial buildings and empty 
lodging houses) or in new, very basic buildings at 
the edges of cities, occupied by those who are evicted 
for non-payment of rent. Most of the occupants of 
these buildings are Roma. Basically, these structures 
are municipally-owned. Evidence shows that in 112 
Czech municipalities, approximately 33 percent of 
these municipalities had such shelters in 1997. 
Th ere were several examples of active and inno-
vative approaches to the solution of Roma housing 
problems: individual social work; or participation in 
construction/reconstruction of housing. In particular, 
these include the Community Housing Project in Brno; 
construction of asylum housing in Havířov; construc-
tion of family houses by Roma in České Budějovice; 
construction of an integrated “village of cohabitation” 
in Ostrava; and social housing in Štětí. Brno and 
Ostrava examples are described in Chapter 3.
Among the housing poor, therefore, are: pen-
sioners; young people; unemployed; homeless; and 
Roma. Other special categories like single mothers 
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or victims of domestic violence are also considered 
in this research. It is necessary to point out that even 
within these categories, there are sizeable diﬀ erences 
in incomes and the scale of social need. 
3. LOCAL HOUSING CONDITIONS 
 AND POLICIES: 
 PRAGUE, BRNO AND OSTRAVA
3.1 General Overview
Th e Czech Republic consists of about 6,230 mu-
nicipalities and fourteen regions, each with elected 
representation. Prague, the capital, and sixteen other 
so-called “statutory towns” are further subdivided 
into boroughs. More than 70 percent of the popula-
tion is urban, and 63.6 percent of all inhabitants live 
in towns and cities with a population of more than 
5,000. At the same time, 60 percent of municipalities 
have fewer than 500 inhabitants. 
Former state housing was transferred to the own-
ership of municipalities in 1991; the ﬁ eld of housing 
is the independent responsibility of local governments 
(Act 367/1990). Local governments, therefore, are 
responsible fully for: preparing and introducing hous-
ing policy strategies; managing and privatizing mu-
nicipal housing; and constructing and allocating new 
municipal housing and vacant/new ﬂ ats.
3.2 Prague
Prague, with a population of over one million, is 
divided into 22 administrative districts and 57 
independent municipalities (several municipalities 
may form one administrative district). Each 
municipality has its own elected council, board and 
mayor. State Act 172/1991 transferred the original 
state housing stock free-of-charge to the ownership 
of the City of Prague. But, based on the Act on the 
Capital City of Prague and Status of the Capital City 
of Prague, the overwhelming majority of the housing 
stock is managed independently by municipalities,6 
which decide on privatization, rent setting, allocation 
criteria, and so on. Th us, there is a wide range of 
approaches. Some municipalities (e.g. Prague-Řepy) 
decided not to privatize even one dwelling, others 
(Prague 1) decided to privatize the majority of the 
public housing stock. Th ough housing policy issues/
responsibilities are transferred to municipalities, 
the City is primarily responsible for solving general 
social problems concerning, for instance, the elderly, 
handicapped, Roma or homelessness. Municipalities, 
therefore, do not apply for state subsidies provided 
under the above mentioned national programs. 
Th e same applies to the provision of temporary 
accommodations for homeless people (sheltered 
housing, municipal subsidies to foundations, charity 
and non-for-proﬁ t organizations). 
In recent years, several hundred municipal ﬂ ats 
have been constructed annually (782 ﬂ ats in 1995; in 
640 in 1996; 258 in 1997; and 418 in 1998). Th ese 
units make up approximately 50 percent of the an-
nual public housing construction in 1989. Th e City 
of Prague builds the majority of the new municipal 
rental ﬂ ats; municipalities have engaged in only small-
scale projects. 
Rent in new municipal housing is equal to the 
“cost rent” (maximum of three times the regulated 
rent); it is not always clear what costs should be in-
cluded in the calculation of cost rent. Of the 194,501 
municipal ﬂ ats transferred from the state to the City 
of Prague in 1991, over 85,000 had been privatized 
by late September 2002. Another 22,443 ﬂ ats were 
approved for sale by the councils of the munici-
palities. Th is means that almost 44 percent of former 
municipal ﬂ ats were already privatized (55 percent, if 
counting those ﬂ ats assigned for sale). Private rental 
housing is gradually becoming the main segment of 
rental housing in Prague. If all assigned dwellings are 
sold, the share of municipal rental housing of the total 
housing stock should decrease to 17.5 percent. 
Th e former limit set by the Principles for Sale 
of Apartment Houses in the Ownership of City of 
Prague in 1996 was lifted in July 1999; this limit said 
that Prague should retain 20 percent of the total hous-
ing stock in its ownership. Due to pressure from the 
municipalities, amended Principles were adopted and 
the power of municipalities in this area increased. Th e 
only necessary condition for approval of a municipali-
ty’s privatization strategy by the City of Prague is to 
set the housing policy strategy in accordance with the 
Strategy of the City of Prague (this plan, however, 
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Table 5
General Characteristics of Prague
 Area [km2] 496 
Number of municipalities 57 
Population 2001 1,169,000
Population density per km2 2000 2,387 
Average monthly wage salary [CZK] 2000 18,865 
Unemployment rate [%] 2000 3.42
Number of houses 2001 88,234 
Number of apartments 2001 543,306 
Dwelling area per unit [m2] 2001 42.9 
Dwelling area per person [m2] 2001 18.4
Number of rooms per dwelling 2001 2.36
Permanently occupied dwellings 2001 496,940
Tenure [%] 2001
 • homeownership 22.2
 • cooperative 13.0
 • cooperative of tenants 12.2
 • rental 47.2
 • other 4.5
Area of completed housing [m2 per dwelling] 2000 60.4 
Completed housing 1995 1,868
1996 1,934
1997 1,833
1998 3,636
1999 3,455
2000 3,593
Source: Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce.
says little about privatization, allocation of municipal 
ﬂ ats, new housing construction and is primarily only 
recommendations).
Dwellings in Prague have a smaller ﬂ oor area (and 
lower number of rooms) than is typical in the Czech 
Republic. Due to the higher number of dwellings per 
1,000 inhabitants, however, the average ﬂ oor area 
per citizen is the same as in the country overall. Th e 
housing deﬁ cit was estimated to be 10,000 dwellings 
(acute need). High demand is created by incoming 
foreigners who want to stay in Prague for extended 
periods (the number of foreigners living longer than 
one year in Prague is estimated at 80,000 people). 
Concerning the allocation of vacancies in the cur-
rent municipal rental stock, the City does not apply 
any social criteria, because that is the responsibility of 
each municipality. It does allocate a limited number 
of ﬂ ats for needy professionals (police, deputies, state 
and municipal employees, jurists, etc.); in other words, 
“public interest” housing. Th e allocation criteria for 
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dwellings managed by municipalities are set (if they 
are set at all) by particular municipalities (the waiting 
list is often provided and special housing committee 
decides about the allocation). In December 2000, 
the City passed the City Frame Recommendations 
for Municipal Housing Management. According to 
the Frame Recommendations, the vacant dwellings 
should be allocated more carefully and eﬀ ectively, 
taking into account the rent (and other housing ex-
penditures) in the ﬂ at and the income of the applicant 
household. Th e future rise in housing expenditures 
should be also estimated to allocate ﬂ ats with higher 
potential rents (in better location and of higher qual-
ity) to those with higher incomes, and vice versa. Th e 
City Frame Recommendations state: “Total housing 
expenditures in allocated dwellings should not exceed 
33 percent of total household income, even in the ﬁ ve 
years outlook.”
Municipalities should gather important informa-
tion that has not been previously collected, such as 
the applicant’s ownership of other real estate, average 
income, and household income disaggregated by 
members of household. In most cases, information on 
income  is not collected due to the lack of legislative 
regulation concerning social housing. A new rental 
contract in allocated ﬂ ats should be, according to the 
Frame Recommendations, for a deﬁ nite period, not 
for an unlimited period of time as has been the case 
up to now. In this light, the strong tenant protec-
tions established by the Civil Code, unchanged since 
the time of state socialism, can be reduced and the 
eviction of problem tenants made easier. Rental con-
tracts for a deﬁ nite period is especially needed in case 
of so-called “starting ﬂ ats” for young people, where 
a maximum ten years contract is recommended.
In the case of rent arrears, the municipality should 
act immediately to solve the problem by the agree-
ment and repayment calendar, to transfer the housing 
allowances payments directly to the hands of mu-
nicipality (made possible by §59 of the Act 117/1995 
on state social support), or by assistance in moving 
households to cheaper/smaller municipal apartments. 
It is recommended to prepare (construct) temporary 
shelter housing for principal non-payers and socially 
problematic citizens at the edge of the city and set-
tle the debt by new tenants. More than 20 percent 
of households living in municipal housing in Prague 
have some rent arrears (Ústav územního rozvoje 
2001); the main reason is, in many cases, the over-
consumption of housing (living in very large dwell-
ings) or preference to spend income (social support 
transfers) on other consumption. A real inability to 
pay for appropriate (reﬂ ecting the size of household) 
housing is, due to rent regulation, relatively not very 
common. However, moving to smaller dwellings is 
not a very simple task. 
Th e City of Prague is responsible for constructing 
houses that provide social care. From 1995 through 
2001, it built 1,722 new dwelling units in houses 
with social care, serving mostly the elderly and handi-
Figure 2
Prague Municipal Housing Stock Structure, 1999
Source: Housing Department, Municipality of Prague.
4.74% 4+1 and higher
29.0% 3+1
39.1% 2+kk, 2+1
27.16% 1+kk
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capped. Th e allocation of units is decided by the local 
social committee, in which municipalities are repre-
sented. Th e estimated number of applicants is more 
than double the city’s capacity. Dwellings in houses 
with social care should be allocated prior to those ap-
plicants who would vacant their municipal dwelling 
when moving to the house. If the right of occupancy 
(together with regulated rent and tenant protection 
rights) is to be transferred to relatives when moving to 
the house with social care (a common case allowed by 
the current Civil Code), the applicant should be in a 
worse position. 
Th e City is also responsible for homelessness. 
Rough estimates suggest that the number of home-
less increased during the last decade. According to an 
interview made at the local Social Department, the 
typical homeless person is an unemployed man be-
tween 28 and 42 years of age, with an elementary 
education, who is divorced or was evicted for failing 
to pay the rent. Due to strong tenant protections, 
homelessness is not as acute a problem in Prague as 
it is in many capital cities in Europe, the USA and 
elsewhere. 
Th e City of Prague funds an advice bureau for the 
homeless, lodging house and shelter hostel (opened 
during the winter). Th e shelter hostel oﬀ ers the home-
less a place to spend a night for ﬁ ve Czech krona 
and provides basic food free of charge. Th ere is a 
minimum of four and a maximum of ten beds in each 
room. People must leave the hostel in the morning. 
Th e lodging house, “Th e House for People without 
Shelter,” is open year-round. Homeless can stay for 
only a limited period of time (from fourteen days to 
four months), and must pay CZK 40 per night for a 
standard double room. In both the shelter hostel and 
lodging house, social workers try to help those in need, 
oﬀ ering social support administration, employment 
application, and so on; they also try to force people to 
solve housing problems on their own (for example, by 
limiting time spent in the lodging house). 
During the last ﬁ ve years, administrators of the 
lodging house succeeded in accommodating four 
people in municipal rental housing and about ten 
in pensioner homes. Th ough this seems to be mini-
mal success, it is important to consider the current 
situation in (and allocation of) municipal housing. 
In many cases, municipalities do not appear to care 
to solve this problem and prevent from cooperation 
with social curators. Administrators deﬁ ne success to 
be when a person leaves the municipal lodging house 
to a low standard private lodging house, which is not 
supported from public budgets. Th ere is a number of 
private low-cost lodging houses in Prague, but the 
standard of living is lower (and price for housing serv-
ice higher) than in supported housing. 
Other than public institutions, there are several 
private non-for-proﬁ t enterprises providing the shel-
ter for homeless people: Naděje (Hope); the Salvation 
Army; and religious charities. Th ese societies can ap-
ply for grants allocated both by municipalities and 
the City of Prague. Th eir work is thus co-ﬁ nanced 
from public and private sources. Th e Salvation Army 
in Prague provides asylum accommodation (free of 
charge, but only for three days) and permanent lodg-
ing house (around 500 to 600 beds) where homeless 
can stay longer but they must pay CZK 3,000 per 
month. 
Th e municipalities own and manage several hous-
es for single mothers, but there is no special house for 
single women. Finally, the City of Prague owns and 
manages the House of Open Possibilities for adoles-
cents coming from children houses and the Halfway 
House for former inmates leaving prison.
Th e goal of the housing policy strategy of the 
City of Prague, approved in 1999, was to introduce 
a uniﬁ ed policy. However, mainly due to low sup-
port from municipalities, this has not happened up 
to now. Moreover, most goals stated in the strategy 
have not been fulﬁ lled and remain only on paper. For 
example: 
• A part of housing construction (ca. 35 percent) 
should be realized by not-for-proﬁ t housing as-
sociations in the form of cheap housing with 
aﬀ ordable rents. Currently, there are no not-for-
proﬁ t associations working in the ﬁ eld, and new 
municipal housing is usually rented out for higher 
than regulated rents;
• Municipal housing construction should form 
about 20 percent of the total in Prague, and it 
should not drop below 800 municipal dwellings 
annually. Currently, the scale of municipal hous-
ing construction is lower;
• Construct “starting ﬂ ats” for young families with 
limited time rental contracts. Currently, with 
the exception of some superstructures on prefab 
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houses, starting ﬂ ats are provided by some mu-
nicipalities in vacant dwellings;
• Approve the uniﬁ ed city housing policy strategy 
concerning housing allocation and housing pri-
vatization. Currently, rules for housing allocation 
and privatization remain in the form of recom-
mendations. Municipalities are free to apply their 
own policies and, moreover, the privatization 
limit has been lifted;
• Income from rents should be spent only in the 
ﬁ eld of housing, such as new housing construc-
tion, refurbishment, or construction of houses of 
special types. Currently, municipalities may use 
the income from rents for diﬀ erent purposes;
• Use rent-pooling in a way allowed by national 
legislation (Act 176/1993) to increase regulated 
rents in better locations, and to proportionally 
decrease rents in unattractive locations. Currently, 
the “positional rent” has not yet been introduced, 
though it is allowed by central legislation;
• In cooperation with municipalities, create a reg-
ister of all municipal housing and, based on this 
register, select apartments that will be used as 
“supported” housing. Currently, there is still no 
register and the cooperation with some munici-
palities is weak; and
• Increase the control of municipal housing exploi-
tation from the black market. Currently, the black 
market remains at a same level as in 1999. 
Th e basic conditions to realize such goals have not 
yet been created by central housing policy, including 
legislation on social housing, rent deregulation, new 
models of housing allowance, non-for-proﬁ t housing 
associations, higher ﬁ scal decentralization and higher 
targeted subsidies for housing of special types. Th e 
City of Prague has not succeeded to convince munici-
palities that a higher level of unity or centralization 
would improve the system and make it more trans-
parent. Both factors (low willingness of municipalities 
to cooperate with the City, and the slow tempo of 
central legislation improvement) have forced the City 
to partially resign from further shaping local housing 
conditions. Th e situation in the another large Czech 
town, Brno, may demonstrate how a rather diﬀ erent 
approach can work quite well.
3.3 Brno
Brno consists of 29 municipalities. Since 1994, 99.4 
percent of municipal housing stock (former state 
housing transferred to municipal ownership in 1991) 
has been consigned to 15 municipalities (another six 
municipalities do not dispose any housing). Cur-
rently, the City of Brno manages only 0.6 percent of 
municipal housing. However, it applies a much more 
centralized housing policy than found in Prague. 
Only the City can determine which houses will be 
privatized, and at what price. Furthermore, almost all 
the revenue from privatization goes to the municipal 
budget; only the City decides about how the money 
will be spent. It also determines the main conditions 
for renting of vacant municipal housing in a binding 
decree (not just by recommendations), which includes 
a rent ceiling. 
Th e structure of municipal housing in Brno is 
quite similar to that of Prague (Figure 3). Th e number 
of applicants for municipal housing largely exceeds the 
number of vacant ﬂ ats. In 2001, only 279 municipal 
dwellings were vacant, while 5,585 applicants were on 
the housing waiting lists of Brno’s municipalities.
In 1996, the City of Brno approved Decree 3/
1996 (amended in 1998 and 2001) on Rules for Sales 
of Houses, Dwellings and Business Premises, which 
establishes the main conditions for privatization (e.g. 
price calculation, discounts, and repayment period). 
Houses with more than ﬁ ve dwellings can be sold 
only to a legal entity founded by tenants. Houses with 
fewer than ﬁ ve dwellings can be sold directly to ten-
ants (privatization by ﬂ ats). Th e price is determined 
by an expert appraisal (in accordance with a govern-
ment decree). Th e price of prefabricated houses is de-
creased by 50 percent. If there is immediate payment, 
or a bank guarantee, a 34 percent discount is oﬀ ered 
oﬀ  the purchase price. If the price is paid within one 
year, there is a 29 percent discount. In February 2001, 
the Council of the City of Brno approved the list of 
houses recommended (919) and “non-recommended” 
(390) for privatization. Th e status of another 835 of 
houses will be decided later. At the end of 2000, only 
192 houses had been privatized.
According to the Decree, all income from pri-
vatization, together with penalties for late payments 
and rent from land, is to be deposited in the Housing 
Construction Fund. Th ese funds are then:
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Table 6
General Characteristics of Brno
Area [km2] 230
Number of municipalities 29
Population 2001 376,269
Population density per km2 2001 1,636
Average monthly wage salary [CZK] 2000 13,755
Unemployment rate [%] 2001 8.6
Number of houses 2001 37,068
Number of apartments 2001 162,176
Dwelling area per unit [m2] 2001 43.9
Dwelling area per person [m2] 2001 17.9
Number of rooms per dwelling 2001 2.5
Permanently occupied dwellings 2001 151,724
Tenure [%] 
 • homeownership 2001 26.6
 • cooperative 2001 24.5
 • cooperative of tenants 2001 0.6
 • rental 2001 44.4
 • other 2001 3.6
Completed housing 1996 430
1997 465
1998 882
1999 1,451
2000 1,007
2001 1,000
 Source: Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce.
6% 4+1 and higher
28% 3+1
39% 2+kk, 2+1
27% 1+kk
Figure 3
Brno Municipal Housing Stock Structure, 1999
Source: Housing Department, City of Brno
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• used to cover City expenditures arising from the 
privatization process;
• used to support new dwelling owners with grants 
of up to 30 percent of the original privatization 
price for reconstruction of facade, infrastructure, 
roof, and related improvements;
• transferred to the budgets of municipalities, where 
privatized houses are located (10 percent of total 
privatization income); and
• used to supplement other grants and preferential 
loans such as:
• grants for technical infrastructure and land re-
demption for new municipal housing construc-
tion;
• grants for technical infrastructure for new private 
housing construction up to a maximum of 60,000 
CZK;
• grants for new municipal housing construction 
up to a maximum of 200,000 CZK;
• interest-free loans for new municipal housing 
construction up to a maximum of 40 percent of 
total construction costs;
• contributions to maintenance, reconstruction 
and modernization of municipal housing up to a 
maximum of 40 percent of total costs and CZK 
100,000 per dwelling in panel houses and CZK 
140,000 per dwelling in brick houses; and
• interest-free loans for maintenance, reconstruc-
tion and modernization of municipal housing up 
to a maximum of 40 percent of total costs.
Municipalities submit project applications for 
listed grants and loans, and the Council of City of 
Brno decides which projects receive funding. Most 
grants and loans are made for new municipal hous-
ing construction. Th rough the end of 2001, a total 
of CZK 364 million was spent on new municipal 
housing construction. Until 1998, the City of Brno 
preferred to construct new municipal dwellings ex-
clusively from public sources (combination of state 
and municipal grants). Since then, however, the co-
operative housing model has been preferred. In both 
cases the maximum rent is set at a level of three times 
the regulated rent. In cooperative houses, this “rent” 
provides revenue for repayment of mortgage loans 
and new “tenants” must provide relatively large down 
payment when they take possession. Th e primary 
clients for new “municipal” cooperative housing are 
young people (66 percent of applicant are in age 
between 20–35 years).
In 1997 the City of Brno prepared the General 
State of Housing in Brno. Th is report summarized 
the housing conditions and identiﬁ ed main prob-
lems in the ﬁ eld of housing. Th e General is periodi-
cally updated, the last one published in June 2002. In 
December 2001, the Housing Policy Strategy of Brno 
was prepared and approved by the City Council, and 
in June 2002, the Council approved the complex 
Strategy for Brno including, among others, the hous-
ing policy strategy. Th e Strategy determines basic 
goals and priorities for the period of ten years; in 
2005, the Strategy will be evaluated and may be rede-
ﬁ ned according to the actual situation. Th e following 
priorities were selected in the Strategy:
1) reconstruction and modernization of older hous-
ing;
2) regeneration of current prefab panel housing;
3) support for new housing construction designed 
for speciﬁ c targeted groups of people; and
4) support for privatization of municipal housing.
Th e City of Brno, unlike the City of Prague, 
approved a binding Decree on Renting Dwellings 
(4/1996), setting forth the rules for renting vacant 
ﬂ ats owned by the City and managed by munici-
palities. Th is reﬂ ects a more centralized model of local 
housing policy in Brno as well. Th e Decree describes 
the basic legal criteria for vacant municipal housing 
allocation. Municipalities have the freedom to prepare 
additional social criteria (pointing system) that must 
be approved by the City of Brno and in accordance 
with the Decree. Moreover, the Decree imposes a rent 
ceiling for newly allocated existing vacant dwellings at 
a level of two-times multiple of regulated rent. 
Th e “social” criteria applied by diﬀ erent munici-
palities are very similar but they can hardly be labeled 
as social. “Points” are given mainly for having a per-
manent address in Brno (non-residents are disadvan-
taged), the number of years on the waiting list, the size 
of household and source of permanent income. Points 
for overcrowding are also included but the weight giv-
en is small. No income criteria are applied and, in fact, 
households with higher incomes may have a preferred 
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status compared to those with lower incomes because 
of criteria are related to source of permanent income. 
For example, in Brno-Zabovresky municipality, an 
applicant with permanent income from employment 
or business obtains twenty points, an applicant with 
income from a disability pension obtains ten points, 
an applicant with income from a pension obtains only 
ﬁ ve points, and an applicant living on social support 
(subsistence minimum) gets zero points. (An appli-
cant living in overcrowded conditions may obtain a 
maximum of three points). 
Some other municipalities (Brno-Middle, Brno-
North) introduced, however, additional criteria, in-
cluding the state of health of the applicant (approved 
by medical report) and/or the existence of serious rea-
son for needing separate housing. Some municipali-
ties decreased the weight given for criteria based upon 
the source of permanent income. Generally, with the 
exception of emergency situations (demolition, need 
for alternative housing), the criteria are not targeted 
exclusively to those in need. 
As in Prague, the City is responsible for the hous-
ing of those with special social or speciﬁ c housing 
needs. Th e main instruments/policies for accommo-
dating such groups are:
• A three-step model is used for single mothers 
with children: lodging housing, temporary 
housing, and “normal” long-term municipal 
rental housing.7 A temporary rental contract for 
the period of one year is signed which may be 
prolonged to the period of two years. Rent is set at 
a level of regulated rent. Long-term rental housing 
is then sought with the assistance of the Social 
Department of the City of Brno. Social workers 
help mothers apply for vacant dwellings in 
particular municipalities and stay in contact with 
the housing department of these municipalities.8 
• Th ere are several houses for abandoned children 
and youth. Th e main problem appears when 
they reach adulthood and must leave the house. 
A three-step program is applied: housing in “SOS 
villages” (alternative family care), testing ﬂ at with 
supervision (learning reactions on everyday situ-
ations) and long-term municipal rental housing. 
Th ere are two halfway houses for those coming 
from children houses or SOS villages. Th ey can 
stay there for a period of one year and during that 
time, social workers try to ﬁ nd them permanent 
housing. One house is managed directly by the 
City of Brno (Social Rehabilitation Department) 
and one by municipality Brno–Královo Pole. 
• Th e socially non-adapted include those returning 
from prison, the homeless, alcoholics and addicts. 
According to estimates, there are about 200-
300 homeless people in Brno (see deﬁ nition of 
homelessness in the Chapter 1). A three-step 
model is used to solve the acute housing crisis: 
night-shelter, lodging house and temporary 
housing. Th ere is one municipal night-shelter 
managed by the City Social Aid and Prevention 
Center with capacity of 31 beds only for men. 
Th e goal of service is to oﬀ er shelter together with 
intervention of social curators to minimize social 
and health risks. Th ere are two lodging houses: 
one under management of the City Social Aid 
and Prevention Center (in municipal ownership) 
with a capacity of 18 beds (twelve for men and six 
for women) and another in the ownership of the 
Salvation Army with total capacity of 112 beds.9 
• Th ere are several municipal non-barrier ﬂ ats 
(“protected housing”) for the handicapped (ﬁ ve 
municipal houses). Altogether, 34 houses with 
social care, comprising of 620 dwellings, were 
built by the City of Brno by late December 2001 
(at which time 348 applicants were waiting). 
Another 549 beds in pensions for the elderly 
(1,448 applicants in December 31, 2001) and 
1,229 beds in pensioner houses (2,185 applicants) 
are provided and managed by the City.
• According to the 2001 census, there are only 
1,497 Roma in Brno (forming 0.4 percent of 
the population). Experts, however, estimate that 
the number is much higher, suggesting as many 
as 8,000–13,000. Th ere are several citizen associa-
tions of Roma (IQ Roma Servis, Association of 
Roma people in Moravia) and one municipal 
cultural and educational center for Roma 
children and youth (Drom). Due to high levels 
of unemployment, many Roma require assistance 
in solving housing problems. Often, they reside 
in municipal rent-regulated housing. With the 
purpose of improving ethnic relations, the local 
government introduced a “community housing” 
project. Th e project was intended to involve Roma 
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in the reconstruction of two existing apartment 
houses (with 110 of ﬂ ats), followed by the creation 
of a tenant-cooperative administration.10 Th e 
buildings have been in particularly poor physical 
condition and were occupied mainly by Roma 
households, many of which were in rent arrears. 
Generally, the local housing policy in Brno is 
much better deﬁ ned and realized than in Prague. 
Th ere are clear rules for privatization and renting of 
municipal ﬂ ats, uniﬁ ed and transparent city hous-
ing policy. Th e “social” criteria, however, used for 
allocation of municipal ﬂ ats, are not well targeted to 
those in need. Cooperation between municipalities 
and organizations dealing with socially non-adapted 
people could be more eﬃ  cient. Th ere is no register of 
municipal dwellings, and the control of dwelling ex-
ploitation is still not suﬃ  cient. Income of households 
is not monitored when municipal ﬂ ats are assigned, 
and there are no special programs for low-income 
households or young families (“starting ﬂ ats”). Th e 
deﬁ ciencies, however, are often caused by the lack of 
appropriate national legislation on rent deregulation, 
social housing, non-for-proﬁ t housing associations of 
a new housing allowance model. 
3.4 Ostrava
Th e City of Ostrava is composed of 23 municipalities 
(districts), and municipal housing has been assigned 
to 20 municipalities (six of them have more than 
1,000 ﬂ ats and three municipalities have none). Th e 
housing policy of the City of Ostrava has a rather 
decentralized character. Ostrava districts have the 
exclusive right to sell municipal housing and prepare 
their own privatization strategies (scale of privatiza-
tion, price conditions, discounts). Th e City does not 
have a Council-approved housing policy or strategy. 
Although City representatives decided to create a 
committee with the responsibility to prepare a uniﬁ ed 
housing strategy before elections in 2002, at the time 
of writing, nothing had come of this initiative.
Ostrava and the surrounding region is aﬀ ected 
by structural unemployment caused mainly by the 
decline of heavy industry, which dominated this 
part of the country. Young people (under 30 years) 
comprised about 36 percent of total unemployed in 
2000. Th e high unemployment rate and large number 
of households living in relative poverty, combined 
with low foreign investment, have slowed the refur-
bishment process for housing and caused social seg-
regation. At the end of the year 2000, the municipal 
housing totaled about 35,000 ﬂ ats, or 27 percent of 
total housing stock. Approximately 16 percent of the 
housing stock is made up of private rental housing. 
Th e structure of the municipal housing stock is very 
close to that in Prague and Brno (Figure 4).
Privatization of public housing is the sole respons-
ibility of the municipalities and takes diﬀ erent 
forms, including the selling of individual ﬂ ats to 
condominiums (Act 72/1994) and whole buildings 
to tenant cooperatives. A total of 14,225 ﬂ ats were 
privatized through 2001, representing 29 percent of 
the supply of municipal housing in 1991. Th e scale of 
privatization and the conditions applied diﬀ er among 
the municipalities.11
 Th ere is no binding City decree on how vacant 
municipal ﬂ ats should be rented. Only recently has a 
central register of housing applicants been established. 
Some of vacant ﬂ ats are thus rented out for market 
rates (envelope method) and some for regulated rents, 
depending on a policy of the particular municipality. 
In Moravská Ostrava district, more than 6 percent of 
municipal ﬂ ats are currently rented out for market rates, 
compared to 0.03 percent in the Poruba district. New 
rental contracts are mostly for a limited time, most 
often for one year. If the new tenant meets his/her 
ﬁ nancial obligations, the contract is usually extended. 
Th e primary criteria used for allocating vacant ﬂ ats 
are: permanent residence in the district, time spent on 
the waiting list, family status, occupation, health con-
ditions and overcrowding. Th ough the criteria slightly 
diﬀ er among districts, they can hardly be called “so-
cial;” household income is never included. Moreover, 
those with permanent income are preferred due to 
relatively large rent arrears among current tenants. 
In January 2003, there were 11,026 applicants on the 
waiting lists of all Ostrava districts. Each year about 
1,200 of dwellings become vacant (thus, 10 percent 
of applicants can be satisﬁ ed each year). 
Rent arrears have become an acute problem in 
Ostrava municipal housing. Th e number of people 
in arrears reached more than 10,500 with accumu-
lated debt equal to more than CZK 153 million. Rent 
arrears (including those carried out from the past) 
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Table 7
General Characteristics of Ostrava
Area [km2] 214
Number of municipalities 23
Population 2001 316,744
Population density per km2 2001 1,505
Average monthly wage salary [CZK] 2001 15,422
Unemployment rate [%] 2000 16.6
Number of houses 2001 23,850
Number of apartments 2001 134,041
Dwelling area per unit [m2] 2001 41.4
Dwelling area per person [m2] 2001 17.0
Number of rooms per dwelling 2001 2.42
Permanently occupied dwellings 2001 128,388
Tenure [%] 2001
 • homeownership 2001 16.9
 • cooperative 2001 27.9
 • cooperative of tenants 2001 7.8
 • rental 2001 43.8
 • other 2001 3.3
Completed housing 1995 497
1996 338
1997 292
1998 407
1999 261
2000 231
Source: Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce.
Figure 4
Ostrava Municipal Housing Stock Structure, 2000
Source: Housing Department, City of Ostrava
2.77% 4+1 and higher40.15% 2+kk, 2+1
27.89% 1+kk
29.19% 3+1
46
T O O  P O O R  T O  M O V E ,  T O O  P O O R  T O  S T A Y
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
comprised 28.15 percent of the gross rent roll in 
2000. Th e process of eviction is very slow due to the 
long legal proceedings. Th ough some of districts have 
their own shelters for evicted persons, most of them 
are empty. For example, the Poruba District has 40 
new units in shelter house, but only two are occupied. 
Th e monthly rent for shelter is about CZK 2,000.
Th e City of Ostrava uses state subsidies to build 
new housing. Th e scale of new municipal housing 
construction is very low. In 2000, 153 municipal 
dwellings were ﬁ nished, 61 units in 2001, and 98 
in 2002. With only one exception (housing con-
struction in Ostrava-South), the construction is fully 
paid from public sources. Half of all new units are 
allocated by the district where new housing is built; 
other Ostrava districts cover the rest. Districts again 
exclusively prepare the allocation criteria. Th e rent is 
set as cost rent (maximum of three times the regulated 
rent), and the cooperative form with the ﬁ nancial 
participation of future “tenants” is not applied as in 
other cities.
As indicated earlier, the City did not have an ap-
proved housing policy strategy with clearly deﬁ ned 
goals and target groups in the time of writing this 
paper (though one is being prepared). Th e Social 
Department of the City of Ostrava deﬁ ned the fol-
lowing groups of people as having high social need: 
seniors, handicapped people, single mothers, the 
Roma minority and socially non-adapted persons 
(people coming from prison and the homeless): 
• More than 60 percent of seniors (older than 80 
years) need intensive social and health services. 
A large number of the elderly have low pensions 
to pay their housing expenditures. As in other 
cities there are pensioner houses, lodging houses 
for older people and houses with social care 
provided/managed by the City of Ostrava. Th ere 
is total of 1,437 beds in pensioner houses, but 
the number of applicants still exceeds the current 
capacity more than 2.7 times.12 
• Th ere is a special municipal “protection” housing 
center for the handicapped and mentally ill 
in Ostrava-Muglinov, with thirteen dwellings 
and non-stop assistance service. Social workers 
help those in need by arranging formalities and 
employment opportunities in workshops, gardens, 
kitchens, and so on. Another protection housing 
center is provided by the not-for-proﬁ t organiza-
tion Mens Sana, with a total capacity of ten 
dwellings. Asylum housing for ill or handicapped 
is provided also by the House of St. Veronica 
and Charity House of St. Elizabeth, with total 
capacity of 29 beds. 
• In Ostrava there are six houses especially for 
single mothers with total capacity of 108 dwell-
ings (in 1997, there was only one house with a 
capacity of ten dwellings).  In 2000, 218 single 
mothers found shelter there. Th e Catholic Char-
ity and FOIBE organization provides 27 beds in 
asylum housing for single mothers. Clients must 
pay roughly CZK 50 per night, which includes a 
meal. Another asylum housing is oﬀ ered by the 
Salvation Army.
• According to the 2001 census, around 600 Roma 
live within the city limits of Ostrava. Th is ﬁ gure, 
however, is not reliable: experts on the Roma 
estimate that there are from 20,000 to 40,000 
Roma permanently or temporarily living in the 
city. Th e process of migration (displacement) 
of the Roma minority from the town center is 
apparent, resulting in ghettoization. Th e main 
factor inﬂ uencing migration is rent arrears and 
the privatization of municipal houses to the own-
ership of a third person. In case of eviction, Roma 
most often ﬁ nd another host family and move into 
their ﬂ at; sometimes, they occupy ﬂ ats temporar-
ily left vacant by other Roma families. Th e City of 
Ostrava, with the help of state funds, a hous-
ing association from the Netherlands and the 
Catholic Charity, has initiated the special project, 
“Village of Cohabitation.” Th e goals is to con-
struct of 35 family-type rental houses for both 
Roma and majority households in the Slezská 
Ostrava district. A condition for obtaining the 
housing is participation in the construction 
works. All 35 houses are ﬁ nished, and ﬁ fteen 
families Roma, ﬁ fteen Czech and ﬁ fteen mixed 
families currently occupy the new dwellings; rent 
has been set at a level of cost rent. 
• “Non-adapted” persons refers to former prison 
inmates and the homeless. Th e former often face 
unemployment: only 58 people from total of 
615 former prisoners listed by the Ostrava Labor 
Oﬃ  ce found employment in 2001. According 
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to the Ostrava Social Aid Center, about 600 
former prisoners have acute housing problems, 
and very often become homeless. Th e municipal 
lodging house has, however, a capacity of only 17 
beds.13 Th e estimate of homeless persons made in 
November 2002 by the same institution showed 
that there are actually nearly 150 people without 
any shelter and another 61 people in night 
shelters. 
Housing policy from the point of view of the 
housing poor in Ostrava is rather poorly conceived. 
Th ere are no starting ﬂ ats for young people, no ap-
proved uniﬁ ed housing strategy, no central register 
of vacant municipal ﬂ ats or binding decree on rent-
ing out the vacant ﬂ ats. Th e cooperation between 
providers of asylum housing and municipal (district) 
authorities is also weak. Th e capacity of shelters for 
those in housing crisis is not suﬃ  cient. 
4. HOUSING POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
4.1 Central Government 
4.1.1  Introduction
Th is study shows that rent regulation itself (and, in 
combination with non-eﬀ ective housing allowance) 
belongs paradoxically hinders help for those labeled as 
housing poor. With respect to eﬃ  ciency, eﬀ ectiveness 
and the impact on social justice, “ﬁ rst generation” rent 
regulation should be abandoned. With the exception 
of limited municipal social housing, rents should be 
deregulated within the next few years, and a “second 
generation” rent control system should be introduced 
(as in the overwhelming majority of EU countries). 
A new, better-targeted housing allowance should be 
passed as well. Rent control in its current form does 
not serve the disadvantaged segment of the Czech 
population; rather, it deprives needy households of 
aﬀ ordable, regulated rental housing. With respect to 
economic eﬃ  ciency, rent control leads to an increase 
(sometimes, a manifold increase) in market rents 
in the market rental sector, thus again decreasing 
ﬁ nancial aﬀ ordability for those lacking permanent 
housing. 
Th e crucial question is thus: What is the equilibri-
um market rent in the Czech Republic? Current mar-
ket rents, which are sharply distorted by rent controls, 
are clearly not equilibrium market rents. To assess the 
actual equilibrium market rent in the Czech Republic, 
we have used a relatively complex method: simulat-
ing an increasing supply of rent-controlled housing 
for various levels of rent prices until an equilibrium 
market rent is achieved.
4.1.2 Rent Deregulation in Prague, Brno
  and Ostrava
In order to ascertain the actual equilibrium market 
rent level, we developed a simulation syntax model 
with the SPSS application of a “shock” deregulation, 
and used an actual data set, the Family Budget Survey 
2000 (FBS 2000). Th e goal of this model was to 
determine, in selected Czech towns, the rent level at 
which the supply of rental apartments to be vacated 
would be suﬃ  cient to meet the demands of households 
living in the current market rental housing sector. 
Based on consultations with housing policymakers 
in Prague, we estimated the number of apartments 
leased at market rents in Prague. Th en, using a special 
algorithm, we estimated the number of apartments 
leased at market rents in Brno and Ostrava.14 
For each household surveyed in FBS 2000 and 
living in the rent controlled housing sector in the 
selected towns, we further calculated user costs that 
a household would incur if it acquired ownership of 
housing of corresponding size and in a corresponding 
location. In the case of selective increases of the 
current regulated rent, we assumed that if a household 
met certain age and income criteria, and if the user 
costs of ownership housing were lower than the new 
regulated rent, such a household would then leave the 
rental sector for the ownership housing sector. Th e 
deregulation process in the area would stop when the 
number of vacated apartments was equal to the total 
number of apartments in the current market rental 
housing sector (including the black market). Such 
a new equilibrium market price would naturally be 
much lower than present overpriced market rents. 
We assumed that there were no “retained apart-
ments”—rental apartments not currently used by the 
person stated in the lease agreement, but which are 
“retained” for oﬀ spring, relatives or acquaintances—
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to whom the rights following from the lease agree-
ment could be transferred in the future. On the 
contrary, we assumed that all rental apartments were 
used by someone who pays a regulated or market rent 
for using the apartment (for example, that empty 
municipal apartments are illegally subleased by their 
tenants for market rent to other people). 
If we assume that the eﬀ ective demand for rental 
housing is exclusively constituted only by households 
currently living in the market rental sector, then rent 
deregulation would stop much sooner and the new 
equilibrium market rent level would be lower than 
the level simulated in our model. It is almost certain, 
however, that if the level of the current market rent 
fell, other households who are currently living with 
relatives, parents, in temporary housing, and so forth, 
would show interest. Th en, the eﬃ  cient demand for 
market housing would increase. As such, the deregula-
tion process would stop when the number of house-
holds leaving the current regulated rental housing 
sector came to equal the number of households living 
in the market rental housing sector. 
Originally, we presupposed that households, 
behaving rationally, would compare the current rent 
they are paying with the user costs of an equal size 
apartment in a completely new apartment building. 
Th e principal component used to determine user costs 
is naturally the acquisition (or purchase) price of equal 
size ownership housing in a given location. In order to 
ascertain average acquisition costs per square meter of 
total area in newly constructed apartment buildings 
in the selected cities, we started with data from the 
Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce (CSO) presented in Housing 
Constructions Completed in 2000. Th e acquisition 
prices stated by CSO, however, do not include the 
costs of a land plot. Based on cooperation with the 
Association for Housing Market Development, we 
ascertained the average prices of land plots in each size 
category of municipalities and in each region; we di-
vided the stated price of a land plot by the coeﬃ  cient 
3.8, which equals the average number of ﬂ oors in 
newly constructed apartment buildings in the Czech 
Republic. Th e resulting modiﬁ ed price per land plot 
was added to the acquisition price of new apartments 
based on the data of the Czech Statistical Oﬃ  ce.
In light of the fact that the presupposition that 
households would leave only for new ownership 
housing proved to have relatively far-reaching conse-
quences for determining the new equilibrium market 
rent (especially, for example, in Ostrava where direct 
acquisition costs of new construction are not that 
much lower than in Prague). Moreover, it is likely 
that this presupposition diﬀ ers from “reality;” we 
divided households living in rent-controlled apart-
ments in such a way that 50 percent of randomly 
selected households in the set of studied households 
in FBS 2000 would leave the rental sector only for 
new housing and the remaining 50 percent would 
leave the rental housing even for older housing. Th e 
size of newer or older ownership housing, however, 
always had to correspond to the size of the currently 
occupied rental apartment. Th e average prices of 
older housing per square meter of ﬂ oor space in in-
dividual municipalities were obtained through the 
KISEB database operated by the Institute of Regional 
Information in Brno. 
When calculating user costs, we assumed that 
all households would pay 70 percent of the purchase 
costs using mortgage credit and 30 percent using their 
own savings. We assumed that households would take 
advantage of the most proﬁ table oﬀ er on the mortgage 
credit market (Česká spořitelna). Under this premise, 
one-half of the credit (at maximum CZK 1,000,000) 
is burdened with the market interest rate reduced by 
3 percentage points (3.5 percent), and the other half 
by the regular market interest rate (6.9 percent). Th e 
credit maturity was set at 20 years. We also included 
the state-granted interest subsidy on mortgage credits 
(2 percentage points of the resulting weighted interest 
rate of Česká spořitelna based on a program valid in 
2001) and a tax relief following from the possibility 
of deducting construction credit interest from the 
tax assessment basis. In addition to the average inter-
est installment adjusted due to the tax relief, we also 
included opportunity costs and the depreciation rate. 
Th e former are paid using the household’s funds, 
covering 30 percent of the total purchase costs at 5 
percent; the latter at 2 percent of the total purchase 
costs per year in the case of new housing and 5 per-
cent of the purchase costs in the case of older hous-
ing. Furthermore, we deducted the expected capital 
proﬁ t following from the expected price appreciation 
of particular real estate in future. We diﬀ erentiated 
the appreciation coeﬃ  cient based on a comparison 
of time series of older housing price developments 
between 2000 and 2003 in the selected cities. In the 
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case of Prague and Brno, we assumed a real apprecia-
tion amounting to 40 percent of the original purchase 
costs over 20 years; for Ostrava, we assumed 20 per-
cent of the original purchase costs over 20 years. 
Based on the conditions concerning eligibility 
for mortgage credits, applicants who do not meet 
the criteria of client solvency of the given banking 
house are denied the possibility of receiving credit. 
Th erefore, households that failed to meet the client 
solvency criteria of Česká spořitelna were denied the 
possibility of acquiring ownership housing. Based on 
our additional assumption, we included households 
with heads over 45 years of age. Such households left 
the regulated rental housing sector as a consequence 
of rent increase. 
We then continued to increase the existing rent 
paid by the individual households surveyed in FBS 
2000 that are living in the rental housing sector in 
the selected cities. We did this until the number of 
households living in the market rental housing sector 
in a given city equaled the number of households that 
left the rent controlled housing sector. 
Table 8 provides a comparison of the average 
simulated equilibrium rent prices and the present 
bid market rent (KISEB database) for Prague, Brno 
and Ostrava. It is clear from the table that the proper 
value of the market rent in many regions is far below 
the current value.
Table 9 states the rent-to-income ratios for vari-
ous groups of households after the termination of the 
deregulation process and a price “jump” from the 
current regulated rent to the equilibrium market rent 
level. As is clear from the table, a price jump in the 
Table 8
Comparison of Simulated and Market Rent Levels
Municipality Average Monthly Rent 
According to FBS 2000 
[CZK/m2]
Average Monthly Rent 
After Deregulation 
[CZK/m2]
Average Monthly Bid Rent 
According to IRI* 
[CZK/m2]
Prague 30.24 50.15 128.0
Brno 21.80 32.92 84.0
Ostrava 22.49 24.53 32.0
*  Average values obtained from data concerning the average bid rent in 335 towns of the Czech Republic (situation as of 15 
November 2000) published by the Institute of Regional Information as part of the Comprehensive Information System of 
Economic Characteristics of Housing (KISEB).
Source: FBS 2000, Calculations by authors.
rent to the equilibrium level would result in a sharp 
increase in the rent-to-income ratios and a decrease in 
housing aﬀ ordability for many households (especially 
for one-member households and households of retired 
people). Th erefore, it is necessary, on the one hand, to 
distribute the deregulation process over a longer pe-
riod of time (ten years) and, on the other, to prepare 
new and (this time) more eﬃ  cient and more targeted 
housing policy tools that will ensure the aﬀ ordability 
of rental housing for Czech households of all social 
groups. In EU and other developed countries, these 
tools in particular include social housing and the 
housing allowance.
It is necessary to repeat that lifting of the non-tar-
geted ﬁ rst generation rent control itself would sharply 
increase aﬀ ordability of housing for young people 
paying current biased market rents as well as provide 
substantial help for people currently unemployed 
whose mobility is limited by existing rent controls.
In the sub-chapters that follow, we focus on the 
basic housing policy tools that would ensure the af-
fordability of rental housing for socially disadvantaged 
households (the housing poor) in the Czech Republic 
when ﬁ rst generation rent control is lifted. Although 
we recommend a gradual reform, for the purpose of 
examining the eﬃ  ciency and eﬀ ectiveness of selected 
targeted housing policy tools in the Czech environ-
ment, due to methodological reasons, we maintain 
the assumption that a shock increase of rents to the 
equilibrium market rent levels would occur. As we 
look at the tools to ensure greater housing aﬀ ordabil-
ity, we ﬁ rst examine “enlightened” state supply-side 
subsidies (creation of the social housing sector), after 
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Table 9
Rent-to-Income Ratios Before and After Deregulation to the Simulated Equilibrium Market Rent Level [%]
Average Actual 
Rent-to-Income Ratio 
Before Deregulation 
Average Actual 
Rent-to-Income Ratio 
After Deregulation 
Social group of the head of household
 Worker 9.76 14.47
 Self-employed 8.99 14.99
 Employee 10.10 16.71
 Retired 14.80 24.81
Size of household
 1-member household 14.38 23.58
 2-member household 10.54 17.73
 3-member household 9.05 14.04
 4-member household 8.11 13.76
 5-and more member household 8.20 13.66
Type of household
 complete family without children 10.11 16.86
 complete family with children 8.10 12.26
 single parent family with children 12.14 20.80
 one-member household–male 12.36 20.63
 one-member household–female 14.94 24.30
Age of the head of household
 18–25 years of age 14.78 16.70
 26–35 years of age 8.90 10.52
 36–45 years of age 9.36 16.19
 46–55 years of age 9.75 16.84
 Over 56 years of age 13.31 22.64
Tenure
 municipal rental apartment 11.44 18.97
 private rental apartment 10.18 16.75
Municipality
 Prague 11.57 20.45
 Brno 10.18 15.74
 Ostrava 10.01 11.03
Note: Th e ﬁ rst column states the rent-to-income ratio for all types households in the rental housing sector; the second, only the ratio for 
those households that would not leave for the ownership housing sector under the conditions deﬁ ned by the simulation model.
Source: FBS 2000, Calculations by authors.
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which we look into demand-side state subsidies (the 
housing allowance).
4.1.3  Introduction of Municipal Social Housing 
We believe that in the Czech Republic, the current, 
relatively large sector of municipal rental housing 
presents an opportunity for the development of a 
social housing system. We therefore recommend the 
creation of conditions that will motivate municipali-
ties to divide their rental stock into two parts: one to 
be leased at an equilibrium market rent, and the other 
to be leased as social housing. Th e division of apart-
ments should occur in such a way that no social hous-
ing ghettos are created (i.e., divide apartments evenly 
within individual apartment buildings). 
Th ere are, in principle, two ways to achieve an af-
fordable rent in the existing public apartments that will 
at the same time ensure that necessary costs are cov-
ered. Th e ﬁ rst model would not introduce a housing 
allowance at all; rather, the housing allowance would 
apply only to private rental housing. Th e rent in exist-
ing municipal apartments would be, in compliance 
with the income-related rent system, set according to 
household income. Th e state could compensate the 
diﬀ erences between the costs and social rent through 
revenue subsidies to municipalities. In the second ap-
proach, only two rent levels would be deﬁ ned: the cost 
rent in social apartments; in other municipal apart-
ments, the rent price would be set at the equilibrium 
market level. Th e annual cost rent would be, in com-
pliance with EU standards and taking into considera-
tion the fact that the current municipal housing stock 
is not burdened by construction credit repayments, 
deﬁ ned as 1 percent of the replacement value of the 
apartment. To ensure housing aﬀ ordability, a housing 
allowance would be introduced. We believe that, with 
respect to increased transparency (with only two rent 
levels and no revenue subsidies), and a lower risk of 
creating various price gaps between the social and pri-
vate rental housing, the second approach is currently 
more appropriate.
In light of the fact that in FBS 2000, rental apart-
ments owned by municipalities are not segregated 
from private rental apartments, we made this diﬀ er-
entiation using coeﬃ  cients of logistics regression on 
data from the Housing Attitudes 2001 survey (which 
does maintain this diﬀ erentiation). Th en, we divided 
this “additionally generated” municipal rental stock 
into a social housing (for socially disadvantaged 
households) and a stock of apartments leased for the 
equilibrium market rent. An objective of this step is 
also to preserve the existing social mix in all neighbor-
hoods. Th is means that municipalities would deﬁ ne a 
certain number of apartments per apartment building 
to be leased for the social rent, and a certain number 
of apartments leased for the equilibrium market rent. 
In this way, social segregation would be prevented: 
households with higher incomes would live in the 
same apartment buildings as socially disadvantaged 
households. 
As investment costs for housing construction 
have been covered with direct subsidies from the 
state budget in the past (it is not necessary to repay 
a mortgage or other construction credits), we set the 
social rent at the level of 1 percent of the replacement 
value of an apartment per year (one-twelfth of this 
value per month). Th e apartment replacement value 
is understood to be the cost of constructing an apart-
ment of equal size in the same location at the cur-
rent prices for construction work and materials. Th is 
would introduce into the social housing system a way 
of determining the rent at the level of “the cost rent,” 
an approach that is most frequent in EU countries. 
We believe that an annual rent at the level of 1 per-
cent of the apartment replacement value should cover 
all necessary costs related to repairs and maintenance. 
Th is assumption may (and almost deﬁ nitely will) be a 
subject of further debates and more detailed calcula-
tions.
We assumed that lease agreements for social 
rental apartments would not only be limited in time 
(temporary contracts), but also contingent upon the 
actual social need of each household. If the reasons 
for granting a social rent no longer apply (e.g., due 
to an increase in income or a transfer of the lease to 
oﬀ spring with a higher income), the apartment would 
simply lose its status as a social apartment and would 
be leased for the equilibrium market rent. Likewise, if 
the living standard of a household living in a munici-
pal housing stock fell to such an extent that it would 
meet the criteria for the introduction of a social rent, 
this household would then become entitled to the 
social cost rent.
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We developed the following criteria to determine 
whether a given apartment should be leased at market 
or social rent. Social rent should be applied to:
• households with a head over 60 years of age with a 
total net income below a 2.2 multiple of the living 
minimum of the household; and
• households with a head under 60 years of age with 
a total net income below a k-multiple of the living 
minimum of a given household in which:
 for households in Prague, k = 2.0;
 for households in Brno, k = 1.0; and
 for households in Ostrava, k = 1.64.
Th e objective of diﬀ erentiating the coeﬃ  cient 
k was, in particular, to reach a situation in which the 
social housing comprises approximately 30 percent of 
all municipal apartments in a given city. Th e proposed 
criteria privilege households with a head over 60, 
which would help elderly people for whom a potential 
move would be far more complicated. Table 10 states 
the percentage of households of the total number of 
households living in municipal rental housing that 
would be entitled to social housing.
In all the examined cities, the average social (cost) 
rent is lower than the corresponding equilibrium 
market rent. Th anks to the introduction of a social 
housing system in selected apartments of the muni-
cipal housing stock, the average rent-to-income 
ratio of individual groups of households also natur-
ally decreased. As Table 10 shows, households of 
pensioners would be the main beneﬁ ciaries of muni-
cipal social housing.
With respect to possibility that new private 
rental housing construction will not reappear in the 
Czech Republic soon, it would be desirable to adopt 
new legislation related to new social rental housing 
construction and to create a long-term ﬁ nance pro-
gram. (A long-term program is necessary for economic 
reasons.) With respect to economic eﬃ  ciency, creat-
ing independent non-proﬁ t housing associations 
seems to be particularly viable. Housing associations, 
as private legal entities, would be fully responsible for 
their ﬁ nancial activities and would be forced to ensure 
partial coverage of their costs from private resources 
(as in Poland, for example). Meanwhile, it would 
be possible for them to apply for preferential loans 
or grants from the state budget (or more precisely, 
from the State Housing Development Fund) to cover 
their main activity—the construction of social rental 
apartments. 
Th ere should be an independent executive and 
supervisory institution that would monitor and evalu-
ate the social and economic performance indicators 
of these housing associations, as is the case in the 
Netherlands and UK. Such supervision should ensure 
successful operations, and thus increase conﬁ dence 
among potential private creditors. Municipalities 
would exercise inﬂ uence on the activities of housing 
associations in that their consent would be required 
for a construction project in cases when the housing 
association is requesting state subsidies, and also 
through direct active cooperation at the local level. 
Such cooperation would most often take the form of 
free-of-charge transfers of land for the construction 
of new rental apartments; as compensation, the 
association would have an obligation to lease a portion 
of the new social housing stock to candidates proposed 
by the municipality. Support for the ﬁ ltration process 
(i.e., the movement of some households from muni-
cipal housing to the more expensive—but new—
social housing oﬀ ered by housing associations) would 
certainly help increase the supply of social municipal 
housing. 
If public funds are used for construction, law 
at the level of the cost rent should regulate rent in 
housing association apartments. In such cases—
because new and more expensive housing is involved, 
and because a signiﬁ cant portion of the costs will be 
paid through credit (either with standard or reduced 
interest rates)—the annual regulated rent could, in 
compliance with an analogous situation in Poland, 
be set at 4 percent of the replacement value of the 
apartment. 
Eligibility for social housing owned by housing 
associations should also be restricted by an income 
ceiling in order to ensure the desired social eﬃ  cacy of 
the program. In view of the fact that the cost rent in 
these apartments would be higher than the cost rent in 
municipal social housing, the income limits should be 
deﬁ ned in such a way so as to enable middle-income 
households to apply for this housing. Due to signiﬁ cant 
diﬀ erences between the current income level and the 
current price level of new construction, at least in 
the initial period, housing association apartments 
would thus serve households with an average income 
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Table 10
Social Housing Allocation According to Social Groups of Respondents
Percent of Households Living in Municipal Rental Housing 
That Would Be Entitled to Social Housing 
Social group of head of household
 Worker 14.1
 Self-employed 12.5
 Employee 6.7
 Retired 73.3
Size of household
 1-member household 38.8
 2-member household 32.3
 3-member household 19.6
 4-member household 14.3
 5-and more member household —
Type of household
 complete family without children 39.4
 complete family with children 16.4
 single parent family with children 26.1
 One-member household–male 40.0
 One-member household–female 39.8
Age of the head of household
 18–25 years of age —
 26–35 years of age 18.8
 36–45 years of age 20.9
 46–55 years of age 3.7
 Over 56 years of age 54.0
Municipality
 Prague 28.0
 Brno 35.1
 Ostrava 33.3
Source: FBS 2000, simulation model.
rather than low-income households. Th rough active 
cooperation with the municipality and by supporting 
the ﬁ ltration process, the new construction of rental 
apartments by housing associations could indirectly 
help increase the supply of existing municipal social 
apartments for the segment of the population with the 
lowest income.15
Th ere are many forms of state participation in the 
program of new housing construction conducted by 
housing associations. Lux (2001) oﬀ ers a plethora of 
inspirational information on social housing in the EU, 
including several examples of social housing ﬁ nancing 
schemes in individual countries. Table 11 states the 
average acquisition cost of a new, average apartment 
(50 square meters) in each of the three examined cities 
(as of 2000) and the recommended average maximum 
annual cost rent in an amount of 4 percent of the 
average acquisition cost of the apartment. 
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Th e solution of funding for new housing con-
struction will need to be the subject of a wide discus-
sion that should also take into account the potential 
involvement of municipalities and an increase of 
the cost rent level over time (following from future 
increases in acquisition costs of new housing). It is 
certain, however, that if the maturity of preferential 
credits is suﬃ  ciently long, it is possible to eliminate 
the need for grants during new housing construction. 
4.1.4 Introduction of a New Model 
  for Housing Allowances 
Th e housing allowance is a targeted subsidy paid from 
public budgets (state and municipal) to low-income 
and medium low-income households to cover part 
of necessary housing expenses—generally, the net 
rent. Based on housing policy reforms of the 1980s 
and 1990s, it has gradually become the preeminent 
housing policy tool for ensuring aﬀ ordable housing in 
most EU countries and the United States. Although 
there are signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in formulas used to 
calculate the allowance and the scope of the entitled 
applicants, the housing allowance is modeled in such a 
way that the amount of the potential allowance reﬂ ects 
the degree of social need of individual applicants. 
It is always targeted at the low-income portion of the 
population and the amount depends on the housing 
expenses and the total income of the applicant. 
Usually, the size of the household plays an important 
role, as the allowance generally helps families with 
children more than single-member households.16
Since 1996, a housing allowance has been pro-
vided in the Czech Republic (see above). In view of 
the fact that the expenses are deﬁ ned as tariﬀ s coun-
trywide (and thus do not reﬂ ect regional and local 
diﬀ erences in housing prices), that the entitlement to 
Table 11
Acquisition Cost of New Housing and the Cost Rent in New Social Housing
Municipality Average Acquisition Cost of a New Apartment 
Including Land Lot [CZK]
Four Percent of Average Acquisition 
Cost of a New Apartment [CZK]
Prague 1,213,060 48,522
Brno 824,454 32,978
Ostrava 986,213 39,448
Source: CSO, information provided by real estate agencies, Association of Housing Market Development. Calculations by authors.
the allowance is restricted by an absolute income level 
(and not ratio of expenses-to-income in combination 
with the maximum expenses), and that, regardless of 
the existence of the market rental sector, the model 
only takes into account the household income, the 
given model—with a view to social eﬀ ectiveness—is 
suitable only for environments with a ﬂ at-rate, 
regul-ated, undiﬀ erentiated rent. Th is allowance 
helps households that actually do not need any as-
sistance (households with a low rent-to-income ratio) 
and, meanwhile, denies eﬃ  cient help to households 
that clearly belong to the socially endangered group 
(retired people, households forced to live in non-
regulated market rental housing). If, in the future, the 
state decides to transfer to rent control of the “second 
generation,” then the existing allowance would be of 
very little use. 
Previously, we estimated the consequences of a 
“shock” transfer to the system of rent control of 
“second generation” (rent deregulation) and applica-
tion of municipal social housing. Even if the rent 
in social apartments were set at the level of the cost 
rent, the problem of rental housing aﬀ ordability 
would not disappear. It is necessary to develop a new 
housing allowance model that would correspond to 
the basic principles of continental models of housing 
allowances in EU countries and would reﬂ ect the 
speciﬁ c conditions in the Czech Republic. 
Sunega (2001) has studied the issue of the most 
appropriate model of a housing allowance in the 
Czech environment. For the purpose of our analysis, 
we used his slightly modiﬁ ed model, due to the more 
exact simulation of the equilibrium market rent level 
in this work.17
If the housing allowance were set at this level, 
slightly less than 86 percent of the total number of 
households living in rental housing would be entitled 
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Table 12
Percentage of Households Receiving a Housing Allowance
Percentage of Households in Rental Housing 
That Would Be Entitled to a Housing Allowance 
Social group of head of household
 Worker 85.9
 Self-employed 76.7
 Employee 77.8
 Retired 98.9
Size of household
 1-member household 97.3
 2-member household 86.8
 3-member household 81.8
 4-member household 57.9
 5-and more member household —
Type of household
 complete family without children 82.6
 complete family with children 71.7
 single parent family with children 95.8
 one-member household–male 95.7
 one-member household–female 96.6
Age of the head of household
 18–25 years of age —
 26–35 years of age 83.3
 36–45 years of age 87.5
 46–55 years of age 73.2
 over 56 years of age 92.7
Municipality
 Prague 85.0
 Brno 91.9
 Ostrava 85.4
Source: FBS 2000. Calculations by authors.
to a housing allowance of an average amount of CZK 
561 after deregulation to the equilibrium market level 
(approximately 25 percent of all Czech households).
However, due to the fact that new rent is currently 
reduced by the housing allowance, when introducing 
a new housing allowance model, several households 
that would leave the market rental sector in the case 
of no intervention by the government would remain 
in rental apartments. Th erefore, it was again necessary 
to increase the equilibrium market rents until the op-
timum number of rental apartments is vacated. Table 
13 provides the development of rent-to-income ratios 
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for particular groups of households, depending on the 
housing policy tool applied (social housing, housing 
allowance). Th is takes into account the introduction 
of a household allowance which would result in an 
increase in the equilibrium market rent. 
As Table 13 indicates, even after potential rent 
deregulation to the equilibrium level, the introduc-
tion of the recommended targeted housing policy 
tools will result in ensuring the suﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial 
aﬀ ordability of housing for the most disadvantaged 
groups of the population (young people, retired peo-
ple, single-member households). 
More important than the positive ﬁ nancial results 
of rental housing reform (both for the public sector 
and for the housing market in general) is the fact that 
as a consequence of lifting the existing discrepancies, 
the black market with municipal rental housing will 
disappear (because the motivation to participate in 
the black market will disappear). Furthermore, the 
existing non-equilibrium market rent will be reduced 
and the demand for new construction of ownership 
housing will increase. Last but not least, municipal as 
well as private landlords ensuring the growth of in-
vestments into the recovery of the housing stock will 
see their incomes increase. 
Th e housing shortage, a situation to a large extent 
artiﬁ cially maintained (and perceived by large por-
tions of the Czech population as a real social problem) 
could, in our opinion, fade in importance and become 
a problem only in selected locations or regions. On 
the other hand, in view of the large number of house-
holds claiming the housing allowance in the case of 
a “shock” increase in rent prices, it is important to 
distribute the deregulation process over an extended 
period of time and to take advantage of the gradual 
increase in household incomes. In our opinion, ten 
years is an adequate period to complete the deregula-
tion process.
4.2 Local Government
4.2.1 Introduction
Th e changes in legislation and central housing policy 
(rent deregulation, municipal social housing and 
housing allowances) would substantially improve the 
situation of the housing poor and thus help to solve 
the housing problem for young people, pensioners, 
low-income households (including single mothers) 
and the unemployed. Th e local housing policy is, 
however, crucial for accommodating others in need, 
such as the homeless and the Roma minority. As well, 
it is vital for the improvement of tenant participation, 
setting clear additional social criteria for “social” mu-
nicipal housing allocation, and enhancing community 
and institutional care for the elderly. 
We described the current situation in the selected 
three Czech cities in Chapter 1. Policies diﬀ er, with a 
more centralized policy applied by the City of Brno, 
and very decentralized policy in Prague and Ostrava. 
As the latter approach (decentralization) leads often 
to a large number of ineﬃ  ciencies and high level of 
uncertainty among inhabitants (with a low possibility 
of a uniﬁ ed, citywide policy strategy), we recommend 
the “Brno Approach.” Prague is a relatively small 
capital city; as such, the decentralization of the hous-
ing policy (including privatization, social housing al-
location, etc.) to more than 50 municipalities is quite 
unique and leads to many ineﬃ  ciencies:
• Housing policies between close neighborhoods 
diﬀ er signiﬁ cantly. It is common that in one 
municipality, a household in need does not have 
the opportunity to obtain social municipal hous-
ing with regulated rent (as there is none) while 
a household living one street away does. Th e 
structure of municipalities naturally prevents the 
allocation of ﬂ ats from other quarters (moving 
of low-income households from other neighbor-
hoods); many households in need thus ﬁ nd them-
selves in a very peculiar situation.
• Th e more centralized model assures the increased 
transparency of strategies and eﬃ  ciency of using 
income following from privatization. All muni-
cipalities may apply for funding for their own 
projects from a city fund, and the city council 
decides which projects are more acute. Otherwise, 
inequality between municipalities arises and the 
process of ghettoization can appear. Moreover, 
the “redistribution” of wealth among quarters is 
important for Czech cities with large panel hous-
ing estates. Th e regeneration of estates is a very 
expensive challenge and privatization of ﬂ ats has 
shown to not be a cure, due to the appearance of 
poor homeowners (Hungary).
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Table 13
Rent-to-Income Ratio Before and After Lifting Rent Control to the Equilibrium Market Rent Level, 
After the Introduction of Municipal Social Housing and Housing Allowance Systems [%]
Average Rent-to-
Income Ratio Before 
Deregulation
Average Rent-to-
Income Ratio After 
Deregulation 
Average Rent-to-
Income Ratio After 
State Intervention
Social group of head of household
 Worker 9.76 14.47 11.91
 Self-employed 8.99 14.99 13.32
 Employee 10.10 16.71 15.48
 Retired 14.80 24.81 9.45
Size of household
 1-member 14.38 23.58 13.02
 2-member 10.54 17.73 12.68
 3-member 9.05 14.04 11.27
 4-member 8.11 13.76 12.83
 5+ member 8.20 13.66 13.53
Type of household
 family, no children 10.11 16.86 11.05
 family with children 8.10 12.26 10.80
 single parent, with children 12.14 20.80 13.97
 single-member, male 12.36 20.63 12.59
 single-member, female 14.94 24.30 13.12
Age of the head of household
 18–25 years — — —
 26–35 years 8.90 10.52 8.32
 36–45 years 9.36 16.19 12.34
 46–55 years 9.75 16.84 16.25
 over 56 years 13.31 22.64 11.45
Municipality
 Prague 11.57 20.45 13.99
 Brno 10.18 15.74 9.16
 Ostrava 10.01 11.03 8.90
Note: Column 1 provides the rent-to-income ratio for all households of the rental housing sector. Column 2 lists only the ratio for those 
households that would not leave for the ownership housing sector under the conditions determined by the simulation model. 
Column 3 gives the ratio only for those households of the rental housing sector that would not leave the sector after deregulation. 
Th e model takes into account the increase of the rent due to an introduction of the housing allowance. For some households that 
would be interested in leaving after deregulation, the movement would not be rational because of the housing allowance; there-
fore, it was necessary to increase the equilibrium market rent level to a level when the originally required number of households 
in a given municipality leaves.
Source: FBS 2000. Calculations by authors.
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• Th e more central model is guarantees the success-
ful application of various grants distributed from 
the state budget or European (EU) funds. Many 
municipalities do not employ suﬃ  ciently quali-
ﬁ ed staﬀ  to prepare such application. 
• A city may be a more reliable partner for commer-
cial institutions, investors and banks, than (often) 
small and ﬁ nancially weak municipalities. For 
many projects on new housing construction or 
large-scale housing regeneration/refurbishment, 
loans and investments will be surely needed in the 
future.
Th e decentralization of policies is surely a trend 
that is apparent in many developed countries, often 
explained by societal changes. However, exaggerated 
decentralization may lead to the same mistakes as 
over-centralization. Th e central government should 
continue to hold several basic competencies in ﬁ elds, 
such as deﬁ ning social housing (together with rent 
regulation, non-for-proﬁ t housing association intro-
duction and control, elementary criteria on social 
housing allocation) and introducing and managing 
housing allowances. Similarly, cities should not de-
centralize some of their competencies to quarters 
(municipalities), and should retain their right to 
prepare and introduce basic citywide housing policy 
strategies. 
4.2.2 Municipal Housing Management
Th e uniﬁ cation of allocation criteria and higher tar-
geting in rent-regulated housing allocation is needed 
vitally. As we have seen, many municipalities favor 
higher (middle) income households more than lower 
income households (unemployed). Th is is mainly due 
to the fear of future rent arrears and cohabitation 
problems with other tenants in a building. Th e exclu-
sion of lower income households from allocation is 
not, it appears, a sustainable solution. 
Firstly, cooperation between courts municipalities 
should aim to decrease the duration of the eviction 
process of principal non-payers. Municipalities should 
access tenants immediately when such a problem 
occurs, oﬀ er them temporary solutions and uphold 
the right to take hold on housing allowances allocated 
for such families. Caretakers, together with social 
workers, should stay in contact with problematic 
households on a regular, even daily basis until the 
problem is fully solved. If a household refuses the 
cooperate, immediate action must follow: eviction 
to lower-standard shelter housing, or eviction with 
no right to shelter at all. Here, the speedy action of 
courts is needed. If there is an objective reason for 
breaching a contract (e.g., tenants are unable to aﬀ ord 
rent), the municipality should assist the household to 
move to cheaper accommodation or, if recommended 
by social workers, forgive temporarily some payments. 
An individual approach is vital. If problems with rent 
arrears are solved by “standard” bureaucratic tools, 
without any cooperation with social workers, nothing 
will change. Th is has been made evident by social 
landlords in Western Europe.
Secondly, all new contracts on “social” municipal 
housing, both in new and vacant dwellings, should be 
concluded only on limited time period with regular 
income inspections (rules may be set by central law, 
as suggested in the previous chapter). Widespread 
criteria on permanent residence should be abolished, 
and all Czech citizens should obtain the right to social 
dwelling in any municipality, if they have a working 
contract in a location (this model is successfully used 
in Germany). Th is would especially aid young people 
in regions with high unemployment rates, as well as 
many “starting” young households. Th e exceptionally 
low mobility rate may increase. 
Th e “Delft system” of allocation of vacant muni-
cipal dwellings should be tested and gradually replace 
the current system of waiting lists. Th e Delft system 
is based on higher consumer choice and leads to 
higher satisfaction with selected housing. Conceived 
in the Netherlands, it is currently used by many social 
landlords in Germany and the UK. All vacant ﬂ ats are 
oﬀ ered in special advertisement newspapers and each 
ad includes not only the basic information about the 
oﬀ ered dwelling (rent, size, location, other expenses) 
but also the characteristics of potential applicants 
(family size, maximum household income, belonging 
to priority groups). Households in acute housing 
crises generally obtain priority vouchers and occupy a 
prioritized position when the committee convenes to 
decide on future tenants. Anyone fulﬁ lling the criteria 
can ask for the allocation of a ﬂ at. 
Th irdly, municipalities should improve the 
management of housing, by cooperating with those 
management companies applying the “European” 
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standard housing management. Th is consists of 
clear and simple organizational hierarchy and a high 
degree of tenant participation in management. Th ere 
are only few administration companies that have 
changed their style of work towards higher economic 
eﬃ  ciency and close cooperation with tenants in the 
Czech Republic, one of which is the MRA company 
employed by the City of Havířov. Caretakers should 
have daily contact with tenants, and be responsible 
for the maintenance of maximum 100 dwellings. 
Regular meetings of managers with tenants should 
be organized, during which important issues on 
maintenance, regeneration, social problems and 
others should be discussed. Th ose companies that 
have already applied a more “user-friendly” approach 
contend that the solution of problems is now more 
simple (tenants feel a “co-responsibility” for housing 
management); tenant satisfaction, measured by regular 
satisfaction surveys, has risen. Various tools for tenant 
participation have been created under the SUREURO 
project (Sustainable Refurbishment Europe) and are 
presented online.18
Th e municipalities should prepare cooperation 
strategies with future non-for-proﬁ t housing associa-
tions (if central legislation is passed) on new social 
housing construction. (Inspiration can be derived 
from the Polish system of TBS). Th e transfer of several 
existing municipal buildings into the ownership of 
those associations may be also considered, as it might 
improve management and lower costs. (Inspiration 
may be found in Large Scale Voluntary Transfer, 
applied in the United Kingdom). However, even when 
new legislation on housing associations is not passed, 
municipalities can strengthen their cooperation with 
existing non-for-proﬁ t organizations in ﬁ elds like 
tenant participation and community care, especially 
for those in need (the elderly, handicapped). Th e 
current level of cooperation is far from ideal. We 
noted that many pensioners over-consume their 
housing. As housing allowances are always limited by 
standard ﬂ oor area, calculated according to the size 
of household, some of pensioners will need to move 
to smaller dwellings. However, the elderly need 
assistance in ﬁ nding smaller dwellings, in administer-
ing formalities, and in moving. Here, several 
opportunities for the involvement of non-for-proﬁ t 
associations appear. 
4.2.3 Homelessness
Similarly, regarding the homeless, there is a low level 
of mutual cooperation, even among municipal de-
partments (such as social and housing departments). 
Th e number of homeless who have obtained perma-
nent municipal rental housing has been close to zero. 
Th e successful work of social workers in temporary 
housing options (lodging houses, night shelters, etc.) 
should be awarded by way of allocating vacant mu-
nicipal ﬂ ats among actively participating clients. Th e 
same applies for assisting single mothers and clients 
leaving halfway houses, children’s homes and prisons 
to ﬁ nd temporary accommodation. Th ough such a 
solution increases the power of social workers and 
curators over the future of their clients, the special 
training and regular inspection of their work may be 
protect from abuse. It is necessary to change current 
bureaucratic conditions to apply for a social support 
in the place of permanent residence. Many homeless 
are caught in a trap when they are asked to return 
to their previous residences to ask for social beneﬁ ts, 
but lack the ﬁ nancial capacity to return. Each Czech 
citizen should obtain the right to social support in any 
relevant oﬃ  ce in a country.
4.2.4  Active Retirement
Community care and participation in social life is 
especially needed for the elderly. Th e introduction of 
municipal social housing and new housing allowances 
would increase housing aﬀ ordability, but further ac-
tions at the local level may improve the conditions of 
retirement. As in many developed countries, “many 
older people have developed lifestyles which are very 
diﬀ erent from those of their parents and show a strong 
link to contemporary youth culture” (Clapham 2003, 
3). “Middle age is no longer the beginning of the end 
but the beginning of a thirty-year period of personal 
enjoyment and self-indulgence” (Scase 1999, cited in 
Clapham 2003, 3). Current policy options prefer in-
stitutional care (building of special houses with social 
care) before the improvement of direct community 
care for elderly in their homes. However, many older 
people would prefer to stay in their current dwellings, 
rather than move to pensioner houses or houses with 
social care. 
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Careful cost-beneﬁ t analysis and a discussion with 
potential partners (non-for-proﬁ t organizations, social 
workers) should precede decision making by munici-
pal councils concerning the construction of new hous-
es with social care. However, if a demand for such 
an option is high (often objective, as many older or 
handicapped people need non-stop care service), new 
houses should be opened. Th e criteria for allocating 
dwellings in houses with social care should include the 
request to vacate currently inhabited municipal hous-
ing, if a household lives in such a dwelling. Th e reverse 
mortgages extended by banks may also substantially 
improve the general welfare of this group of a society. 
Th e situation of “low income, high equity” appears 
often in many Central and Eastern European coun-
tries and inherited parent attitudes (social norms) may 
change gradually in the future.
4.2.5 Th e Roma 
Housing for the Roma minority should also be dealt 
by combining non-discriminatory, responsive muni-
cipal actions, and individual approach strategies 
realized by ﬁ eld workers. Some experts contend that 
some natural ghettos (socially segregated housing) 
will always appear. However, ethnic ghettoization is 
of considerably more risk that neighborhoods char-
acterized low income or poor households. If ethnic 
ghettoization occurs, experts recommend the follow-
ing local policy steps (Frištenská 2002):
• ﬁ nd and deﬁ ne all aspects of ethnic or race dis-
crimination, and strive to eliminate them;
• develop solutions that will assure the participa-
tion of Roma (e.g. in the reconstruction of their 
homes, working oﬀ  their rent arrears);
• ﬁ nd and engage with “interpreters” between 
Roma and the municipality;
• help not-for-proﬁ t independent organizations to 
operate within the ghetto, and seek to ally with 
organizations (citizen associations) in which 
Roma people participate;
• encourage “openness,” such that the ghetto is not 
a “trap;” 
• perform personal, detailed analyses and individual 
work with needy families (individual ﬁ eld social 
work, social and juridical consultancy services);
• inform and discuss relevant plans and concerns 
with citizens, in order to assess and acquire inter-
est and support;
• bring social, health, consultancy services as well as 
services for children-care to the ghetto; and
• consistently apply all legislative possibilities to de-
crease the debt of ghetto residents (e.g. via social 
support payments).
Concerning the problem of rent arrears in case 
of the Roma, Niederle recommends the following 
(2000):
• initiate a meeting of all aﬀ ected by arrears (elec-
tricity companies, gas companies, water manage-
ment companies, waste management companies, 
etc.), to prepare the strategic plan. Th is plan 
should be discussed in city councils as well as with 
other citizens;
• apply the method of individual social work with 
particular clients and non-payers. Social workers 
should deﬁ ne and draw up an overview of the 
community. Th rough personal interviews and 
everyday contact with members, they should 
distinguish those who have some motivation to 
improve the situation from those who are not 
interested in cooperation;
• ﬁ nd such possibilities that would allow Roma to 
“work oﬀ ” their debt (e.g. in the reconstruction of 
their house) and establish some kind of coopera-
tive administration;
• utilize these services of not-for-proﬁ t organizations 
(particularly in regard to work with children and 
youth and labor re-qualiﬁ cation programs); and
• in the case of future arrears, take action, im-
mediately, before the debt grows. In accordance 
with Law 100/1998, it is possible to set a special 
recipient of social support in case of rent arrears 
of the beneﬁ ciary. Such a recipient may be the 
municipality.
Special programs for young people are not gen-
erally needed. If the above mentioned reforms in 
the rental sector on the central level are realized, 
there should be enough market rental ﬂ ats with low 
rents, and a limited number of social dwellings for 
those with low incomes. A new model for housing 
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allowances would help them much more eﬃ  ciently 
than does the current system. Targeting in interest 
subsidies when taking a mortgage would assist them 
to become homeowners and to leave the rental sector 
once they can aﬀ ord it. 
4.3 Conclusions and Recommendations
Th e recommendations of future housing policy steps 
follow directly from Chapters 4 and 5. We provide a 
brief list of the main changes needed to improve the 
housing situation of the housing poor in major urban 
centers of the Czech Republic.
4.3.1 Central Level
• Gradually transfer to a system of “second gen-
eration” rent control in all rental housing, both 
private and municipal housing (from the current 
system of “ﬁ rst generation” rent control). Ac-
cording to the results of econometric modeling 
presented here, the real equal market rents after 
deregulation process would be much lower than 
current “market” rent prices.
• Establish a basic legal framework for municipal 
social housing, including rent setting/regulation 
(cost rent) and basic allocation criteria (regional 
income ceilings, regular income inspection, time-
limited rental contract, etc.).
• Fundamentally change the housing allowance 
model to assist more eﬃ  ciently those in dire need. 
(Th e recommended formula is described above.)
• Introduce housing associations as non-for-proﬁ t 
organizations with the goal of new social housing 
construction. Th e legal framework should include 
rent setting/regulation, construction conditions 
(maximum regional price per square meter), al-
location criteria (similar criteria as in the case of 
municipal rental housing, but introducing higher 
income ceilings to allow also middle-income 
households to apply), and ﬁ nancial conditions 
(grant/preferential loans from the state budget or 
the State Fund for Housing Development). Hous-
ing associations should preferably construct pure 
rental housing though some kind of support of 
cooperative housing may be discussed, too. 
• Introduce reverse mortgages for older homeown-
ers who would like to raise their income through 
this relatively popular form of housing ﬁ nance, 
along with mortgage and universal banks.
• Allow for adopting social support beneﬁ ts coun-
trywide, and not only in the place of former per-
manent residence.
4.3.2 Local Level
• Apply a more central housing policy in some cit-
ies (Prague, Ostrava). Th e best practice is found 
in Brno, with a relatively uniﬁ ed city housing 
policy strategy. Rushed or extreme decentraliza-
tion naturally leads to deﬁ ciencies and low policy 
eﬃ  ciency.
• Introduce higher targeting in rent-regulated or 
municipal social housing. Household income 
should be included in the allocation criteria and 
lower income households should be preferred. 
Th e contract should be concluded only on limited 
time period with regular income inspections. As 
well, conditions for permanent residency in the 
place of application should be abolished. Th e 
Delft system of housing allocation (advertising of 
vacant ﬂ ats) could be tested to increase the con-
sumer choice of future tenants.
• Improve management of municipal housing by 
employing those management companies using 
new, more “user-friendly” standards (caretakers in 
buildings, tenant participation, clear and simple 
responsibility division). Similar improvements 
can be made in cooperation with several existing 
non-for-proﬁ t organizations that could organize 
tenant participation and help the elderly to ar-
range formalities in case of relocation. Th e con-
cept of active retirement and community care for 
the elderly (compensating for institutional care 
in houses with social care) should be carefully 
discussed and analyzed, taking into account the 
ﬁ nancial possibilities of municipalities. If demand 
for institutional care is still high, it is necessary 
to continue constructing new pensioner houses 
and houses with social care. Th e allocation of 
new dwellings should be based on vacating an 
occupied municipal ﬂ at if moving to a home with 
social care. 
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• React immediately when the problem with rent 
arrears appears, in cooperation with social ﬁ eld 
workers and housing caretakers. It is necessary 
to apply a more individualistic approach for 
particular households by employing qualiﬁ ed 
social workers/curators. Th is is mainly the case for 
Roma households, as the policy of ghettoization 
can never be sustainable in a long run. City coun-
cils should design such solutions that will insure 
the direct participation of the Roma (working 
oﬀ  rent arrears, self-made reconstruction). Th e 
former bureaucratic “standard” methods will only 
increase tensions between majority and minority 
communities, and even within ghettos. 
• Cooperation with non-for-proﬁ t organizations, as 
well as between diﬀ erent municipal departments 
(housing and social) should be substantially im-
proved. Th e number of accommodated homeless 
people or single mothers in municipal rental 
housing is very low. Th e allocation of ﬂ ats should 
correspond to the expressed commitment of those 
in a housing crisis to solve their own housing/
employment problems. Th e level of participation 
should be evaluated by social workers/curators, 
and a speciﬁ c simple system of control should be 
introduced to prevent from abuse.
• Prepare a uniﬁ ed housing policy strategy with 
deadlines and procedures for evaluating its ful-
ﬁ llment (the Prague strategy remains, in fact, 
only on paper). Th e strategy of cooperation with 
potential new partners (housing associations) in 
new social housing construction should also be 
discussed (provision of land plots, ﬁ nancing the 
infrastructure).
NOTES
1 We put “market” in brackets, as the market rental sector is too small to generate optimal outcomes. Due to rent regulation, the real market rents 
(market equilibrium) would be much lower than they are now.
2 Th e project “Regional Diﬀ erences in Housing Prices,” conducted by teams from the Institute of Sociology of the Academy of Sciences in the Czech 
Republic between 1995 and 1998.
3 Th e non-existence of a transparently deﬁ ned social sector of housing and the de facto non-social status of municipal ﬂ ats together have serious con-
sequences for poor households. Th e allocation of vacant municipal ﬂ ats is very sporadic (partly because tenants try to “keep” their ﬂ ats, even if they 
do not actually use them). It usually occurs only in completely unavoidable cases. Current market rents are quite high, mainly due to rent regulation 
and to the low incentive of higher income households to buy their housing on the open market. Th us, rent regulation paradoxically decreases the 
ﬁ nancial aﬀ ordability of rental housing for those that in need (the housing poor). It is a common case that lower income young people live together in 
overcrowded ﬂ ats after leaving parents or school dormitories to aﬀ ord to pay current biased market rent.
4 CZK 30 = USD 1.
5 Th e amount of allowance is calculated according to the following: 
 Allowance = household costs – household costs * net household income 
 (subsistence minimum * 1.6)
 Household costs are ﬁ xed (they do not reﬂ ect real housing or other household expenditures) on the level of the minimum amount to cover all necessary 
household expenditures (common expenditures, such as housing expenditures). Th is amount is set by law, and, with the minimum amount on personal 
costs (mainly on food), forms the subsistence minimum. Th e subsistence minimum (and household costs, too) varies according to the size of household 
and is valorized when the increase in consumption prices exceeds ﬁ ve percent from the last valorization. It is possible to rewrite the equation:
 Allowance = NC [(MI–RI)/ MI]
 where NC are normative costs; RI is real income; MI is maximum income.
6 Th e term “municipality” will refer to the 57 independent city quarters, although the City of Prague is the municipality according to central legisla-
tion.
7 Th ere are two lodging houses for single mothers in Brno, with a total capacity of 41 dwellings (another 81 applicants were waiting in late December 
2001). Th e City of Brno (managed by the City Social Aid and Prevention Center) owns one; the other is owned by Catholic Charity (Brno district). 
Another municipal lodging house with ﬁ fteen dwelling units was opened in September 2002. Th e temporary housing is provided in one house owned 
by the City of Brno (the capacity serving for this purpose is 49 of dwellings and another 60 applicants were waiting in late December 2001).
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8 Th e number of clients (around ten) that obtain municipal dwellings annually exempliﬁ es cooperation in the municipality of Brno-Middle. Asylum 
housing for victims of domestic violence (women) with a capacity of beds is also provided by the non-for-proﬁ t association, Magdalenium.
9 Th e lodging house of the Salvation Army combines temporary housing with night shelter. Th e complex service is also provided by Asylum House, 
which is managed by the muncipality’s City Social Aid and Prevention Center (capacity of 81 to 89 beds for women and men, partners, families). Th e 
asylum house oﬀ ers night-shelter, lodging and even temporary housing. Social workers try to motivate people to participate actively in solving their 
housing problems to minimize their dependence on social aid. Altogether, about 250 beds are provided (the Catholic Charity oﬀ ers the only daily 
center). Several other organizations, mostly private non-for-proﬁ ts oﬀ er daily services for alcoholics and addicts. In municipal night-shelters, clients can 
stay only three nights without permission of a social worker. If permission is issued, they can stay longer, but they may pay up to CZK 100 per night. 
Stay in municipal lodging house is not limited, but again is paid; in case of temporary housing, the clients must pay the regulated rent. If they refuse 
to pay, or if they refuse to cooperate with social workers, they must leave. Social workers help to arrange social support and housing allowances. About 
four families move into normal municipal rental housing from temporary or lodging houses annually. Cooperation with municipalities and with the 
City of Brno concerning the ﬁ nal solution of this problem is not, however, optimal.
10 Housing reconstruction was accompanied by several cultural-educational activities. Th e residence of the association Drom was moved a selected house, 
where it established an educational center for youth, a traditional craft workshop and an art agency. Drom also oﬀ ers juridical consultancy, programs 
on prevention from criminal behavior and strengthening community ethos, and has introduced a new cooperative form of house administration. 
Similarly, the IQ Roma Servis association will combine the work of caretakers, education for children and youth, collectors of traditional arts, cleaners, 
lawyers and so on. Moreover, a large part of reconstruction works will be realized directly by Roma tenants. After reconstruction, tenants are to become 
cooperative shareholders. Each household must pay for the share in the new housing cooperative the amount of CZK 1,000 per square meter of ﬂ oor 
area of his/her ﬂ at. Th is amount can be “worked oﬀ ” during the reconstruction works; compensation has been set at a level of CZK 50 per hour. If a 
household is in rent arrears, it must pay or work oﬀ  the debt; by way of reconstruction work, it can receive CZK 30 per hour. Otherwise, the household 
cannot become a member of the future cooperative. Reconstruction of Drom and IQ Roma Servis houses were ﬁ nanced by a combination of state 
subsidies, subsidies from Brno-Middle, and a loan from the Council of Europe. Th ough this is an exceptional example of eﬃ  cient public-private 
partnership and good community project, there are several critics of the program too. Th e criticism ﬂ ew from those activists who try to prevent from 
social segregation, as this project will not lead to the creation of social mix with majority population.
11 Th e Slezská Ostrava district privatized only about 150 dwellings, while the Poruba district privatized 10,036 dwellings. In the Moravská Ostrava 
district, buildings were sold only when a tenant cooperative or condominium is made up of at least 50 percent sitting tenants. In Mariánské Hory 
district, 100 percent of sitting tenants are required, but the Ostrava-South and Poruba districts do not impose this condition at all, and buildings 
can be sold to a third person. Th e privatization price repayment period is ten years in the Poruba district, with a 25 percent discount for immediate 
payment, and ﬁ ve years in the Slezská Ostrava district. In the Mariánské Hory district, 50 percent of price must be paid immediately and the remainder 
within six months of purchase. Municipalities can freely decide how income from housing privatization will be used. 
12 Th e total capacity of lodging houses for older people has not changed since 1997 (328 beds). Th e number of applicants exceeds the capacity by more 
than four-times. On the other hand, there are seventeen houses with social care with total of 947 dwellings (in 2001 three houses with 94 dwellings 
were opened). In 2000, 214 applicants were waiting on the list; another 100 dwellings opened in 2001. Asylum housing for seniors is provided also by 
the Salvation Army, the Charity House of St. Agnes and the House of Peaceful Age of St. Venceslas with a total capacity of 105 beds.
13 Th ere is only one municipal lodging house with seventeen beds for homeless, managed by the Ostrava Social Aid Center. Th is house oﬀ ers accommo-
dation for men only; the stay is not limited in time (it is, however, recommended that a client should not stay more than three years there). According 
to the employees of the lodging house, there is no direct link with municipal housing departments, and there is no cooperation with municipalities to 
ﬁ nd permanent housing for those people. In 2001m they found accommodation only for two clients in a halfway house. Th e monthly payment for 
lodging is CZK 800 and clients must actively cooperate with social curators on the solution of their housing problem (movement to commercial lodg-
ing house). Th e Catholic Charity provides another service for homeless people including night-shelter and lodging house with total capacity of 70 beds. 
Th e clients must pay for services: CZK 25 per night in night-shelter, and CZK 59 in the lodging house (they may also work oﬀ  the price). Th e Salvation 
Army provides another 120 beds in its asylum house. Th e night-shelter for men (45 beds) costs CZK 10 per night, the monthly fee for lodging-house 
for men (60 beds) is equal to the actual level of living minimum part designed to cover housing expenditures. Another four beds in night-shelter and 
ten beds in the lodging house are reserved for women or single mothers. Several commercial lodging houses oﬀ er also the accommodation for quite low 
prices. For young people coming from children houses or victims of domestic violence the City of Ostrava provides temporary housing in the halfway 
house with total capacity of 43 dwellings (maximum of 92 persons). Th e house is managed by the Social Aid Center and clients pay regulated rent.
14 Th e ﬁ rst step in determining the size of the market rental sector in the Czech Republic was to assess the number of market rental apartments in Prague. 
Th e assessment procedure is shown in Table A1.
 When making the assessment, we assumed that, starting in 1991, 0.7 percent of the total of Prague’s municipal rental apartments have been vacated 
each year, of which on average 25 percent have been re-leased again by the municipality for a contractual (market) rent. According to available infor-
mation, the municipal rental housing stock in Prague in 1991 amounted to a total of 194,500 apartments. As we knew the total number of privatized 
municipal apartments as of March 2001, we simply distributed the privatization over the individual years (thus, 8,300 privatized apartments were 
allocated for each year); the vacated and privatized apartments were then deducted from the total remaining number of municipal apartments. Th e 
number of vacated municipal apartments leased for market rent in other years was estimated using the same methodology. Th us, for example, in 1992 
a total of 1,303 apartments (0.7 percent of the 194,500 apartments less 8,300 for privatized apartments) were vacated in the sector of municipal rental 
housing, of which 326 (25 percent) were leased for market rent. As of 2001, then, a total 2,516 municipal apartments would have been vacated for the 
market rental housing sector.
64
T O O  P O O R  T O  M O V E ,  T O O  P O O R  T O  S T A Y
L O C A L  G O V E R N M E N T  A N D  P U B L I C  S E R V I C E  R E F O R M  I N I T I A T I V E
Table A1
Assessment of the Number of Market Rental Apartments in Prague 
Year Vacated 
Municipal 
Market 
Municipal 
Privatized Market Private Market Private 
Rental 
Total Total with 
Black Market
1991 0 0 0 0 0
1992 1,303 326 8,300 75 1,080
1993 1,236 309 8,300 75 1,070
1994 1,169 292 8,300 75 1,061
1995 1,103 276 8,300 75 1,051
1996 1,037 259 8,300 75 1,042
1997 972 243 8,300 75 1,032
1998 907 227 8,300 75 1,023
1999 843 211 8,300 75 1,014
2000 779 195 8,300 75 1,005
2001 715 179 8,300 75 996
Total — 2,516 — 747 10,373 13,636 27,272
 We also assumed that a portion of the privatized apartments were leased on the free market by their new owners (to be exact, 0.9 percent of privatized 
apartments per year). We also constructed the same speed for the vacating of apartments (0.9 percent per year) for the restituted private rental housing 
stock, which we estimated at 120,000 in 1991 in Prague based on the data of the Czech Statistics Oﬃ  ce. In view of the fact that private owners would 
hardly lease their apartments at regulated rent prices, we assumed that all the vacated apartments were leased at market rent prices. Private rental and 
privatized housing stock thus increased the number of market rental apartments by more than 11,000 apartments, to a total of 13,636 apartments. 
 Due to the existence of an extensive black market, which—in eﬀ ect—also constitutes a market rental housing sector, we doubled the resulting number 
(to 27,272 apartments). We believe that doubling the number of apartments due to the existence of a black market is justiﬁ ed, and this is also con-
ﬁ rmed by the ﬁ ndings of the survey Attitudes to Housing 2001—Market conducted in 2001 by the Socioeconomics of Housing Team of the Institute of 
Sociology among households living in the market rental housing sector (data collecting using the “snowballing” method was conducted by the Gallup 
Organization). 
 Th en, we ascertained the number of apartments leased at market rents in Brno and Ostrava using the algorithm below. 
Table A2
Assessment of the number of market rental apartments in Brno and Ostrava
Zone Weight of market 
difference
Population Apartments with Market Rent 
Weighted by Population 
Apartments with Market Rent Weighted by 
Population and Market Rent Difference
Prague 1 1,169,106 27,272 27,272
Brno 0.677 376,172 8,775 5,940
Ostrava 0.511 316,744 7,389 3,779
Total — 1,862,022 — 36,991
 Th e weight of market diﬀ erence was constructed as a ratio of the current average bid prices of market rent in Brno and Ostrava to the average market 
rent prices in Prague; this ratio was obtained from a set of data collected by the Institute of Regional Information in these towns during 2001. Data 
collection was done using bid rental and ownership housing prices recorded in the main advertising newspapers in the three cities. In Prague and Brno, 
the resulting set contained 1,000 cases and in Ostrava, 200 cases. 
 Based on the steps described above, we estimated the size of the market rental housing in Prague to be 27,272 apartments. By dividing this number 
into the population of Prague, we obtained the average number of market rental apartments per inhabitant in Prague; by multiplying this ﬁ gure and 
the population of the other cities, we get the number of market rental apartments in Brno and Ostrava. It is, however, natural that the number of 
market rental apartments is not determined only by the population of individual locations but also by many other conditions (housing demand). Th ese 
factors, inﬂ uencing the size of the market rental housing sector, are naturally reﬂ ected especially in the current market rent prices in a given location 
(the higher the prices in an environment where the supply is proportionally approximately the same, the clearer it is that a larger portion of households 
have not found housing in the regulated rental housing sector and are seeking housing on the free market). We used the weight of market diﬀ erence to 
make further modiﬁ cations to our ﬁ gures. By multiplying the data obtained so far by the weight of market diﬀ erence, we obtained the ﬁ nal estimate 
of the number of market rental apartments in Brno and Ostrava. 
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15 If then, for example, a housing association in Prague received a zero-interest credit, with a 30-year maturity, from the State Housing Fund to con-
struct a given type of apartment, it would have to pay approximately CZK 40,045 in annuity repayments annually for the construction of the given 
apartment. Th e collected annual rent amounting to CZK 48,522 (a monthly rent of CZK 4,043 is certainly an adequate rent for a new two-bedroom 
apartment; households would, moreover, be entitled to a housing allowance) would also cover other expenses related to repairs or housing stock man-
agement. If the credit with the same maturity were burdened with one percent interest rate, the annuity installments would amount to CZK 46,820 
(at two percent interest rate it would be CZK 53,804), which would signiﬁ cantly decrease the ability of the association to meet its ﬁ nancial liabilities 
(due to the maximum amount of the regulated rent). 
 Similarly, a shorter maturity would have a great inﬂ uence on the amount of the annual installments. In the case of a credit with a zero interest and 
25-year maturity, the annual installments would logically amount to four percent of the acquisition value of the apartment, i.e., CZK 48,522. In such 
a case, the preferential credit granted by the Fund would have to be accompanied by a grant, and it is clear that when the economic eﬃ  ciency of public 
expenditures and the opportunity costs are also considered, the grant is always “more expensive” and less advantageous for the state treasury than a 
credit. 
16 Th e basic variables used to calculate the allowance are the income and housing expenses of the household. In some countries, the income before 
taxation is used, in others it is the income after taxation (net income). Th e deﬁ nition of housing expenses of a household varies from country to 
country: while in the Netherlands and Germany only the net rent is included in the calculation, in Finland some other basic housing expenses are 
included (heating charges). In most cases, the income ceiling is not explicitly deﬁ ned but it follows implicitly from the manner of comparing household 
expenses and income. Th e level of maximum costs, however, is very often explicitly deﬁ ned, and any further housing expenses above this amount must 
be paid by the household from its own resources. Th us, no matter how great the housing expenses are, expenses above a certain maximum level deﬁ ned 
by the given model are not included in the housing allowance calculation, even if such very high housing expenses are incurred by a socially weaker 
household.
 With the exception of Italy and Spain, a housing allowance has been introduced in all EU countries (in Belgium, however, only as a special contribu-
tion under the social aid system). In some countries, the allowance is paid only to households in the rental housing sector (Great Britain, the Neth-
erlands). In others, it is also paid to households entering the ownership sector and repaying mortgage credits (France); elsewhere the allowance is not 
restricted to any household and theoretically may also be granted to homeowners that have already repaid mortgage credits (Finland). Th e percentage 
of households receiving a housing allowance varies: in France, 27%; in the Netherlands, 14%; and in Germany, 8%. Because in most countries, the 
housing allowance is restricted to the rental housing sector, the percent of households in the rental housing sector collecting the allowance is important: 
Finland, 61%; France, 59%; Great Britain, 58%; the Netherlands, 26%; and in Germany, 12%. 
17 Th e ﬁ nal model (normative rate of burden of equation, NRB) has following form (see Sunega 2001): 
 NRB = 4 + 0.0751445 * (rank of the expenditure interval – 1) 
 Expenditure intervals were in increments of CZK 50. Th e minimum NRB and the NRB curvature were determined in view of the average real rate of 
burden by basic housing expenditures after receiving the allowance. At the level of a minimum NRB amounting to seven percent (the original proposal 
following the study by Sunega 2001), the average real rate of burden by household basic housing expenditures (real housing expenditures-to-income 
ratio after allowance) would reach almost 30 percent; therefore, it has been reduced to four percent. By changing parameters, the average real rate of 
burden by basic housing expenditures after the allowance would be just 23 percent. 
18 See CZ Sureurowww.sureuro.cz.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Th e twelve years since the decline of state socialism 
in Hungary have been marked by a rapid increase 
in poverty and sharp increases in income diﬀ erences 
between the upper and lower socioeconomic strata of 
society. In addition, income diﬀ erences have become 
suddenly perceptible; poverty is now socially and po-
litically accepted in a society previously inexperienced 
in these matters. Oﬃ  cials and opinion leaders in the 
national and municipal welfare systems have been 
unprepared to manage such a change.  In short, the 
1990s brought new approaches, methods, and ideas 
for dealing with the social problems that developed 
during the transition.
Th e housing problems of the lower socioeconomic 
strata are, in many ways, at the very center of change. 
Although the housing problem is acute in some rural 
and economically deprived areas, this paper will focus 
primarily on major urban centers, and particularly 
Budapest. 
Th e subject of urban poverty includes a variety 
of subject areas that are interconnected, but also have 
distinctive characteristics and strong connections to 
other social phenomena. In general, the Roma gener-
ally occupy a low socioeconomic status, typiﬁ ed by 
their below average incomes. Moreover, the housing 
problems of this group are, in large part, the result of 
government and societal discrimination; as such, they 
will not be dealt with here.
Other groups that make up the housing poor, 
such as those with medical, mental and psychiatric 
problems, also have distinct characteristics that con-
tribute to their housing problems. Th e situation of 
such groups will be discussed only brieﬂ y.
2. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Housing conditions have for long comprised key is-
sues in national and local politics, and policies target-
ed to address these conditions have existed for many 
years. Broadly speaking, the housing situation and the 
processes for building and distributing housing have 
two primary political eﬀ ects: 
1) they are key components of the total national 
economy, which inﬂ uence other areas of the 
economy, and state and private revenues; and 
2) the populace’s opinion of housing as one of the 
most important and basic human needs is a ma-
jor factor in local and national politics (Hegedűs 
1998, 49). 
In addition, housing construction and mainte-
nance require large sums of money that are not always 
available for all individuals and groups in society. 
In the last ﬁ fty years, the political system has 
attempted to deal with the housing situation prima-
rily  through: 
1) communal, centralized government programs 
(prominent in the early socialist period, and 
gradually replaced by private and market forces); 
and 
2)  private and market forces, with the government 
relegated to a mainly a regulatory and supportive 
role.
Housing policies have proven to be relatively suc-
cessful in Hungary in terms of the quantity of dwell-
ings produced.  It can be argued that no increase in the 
housing stock in absolute terms in Budapest is neces-
sary in the short run, whereas approximately 100,000 
new dwelling units will be needed in the next twenty 
years (Tosics 2000, 136). Meanwhile, the quality 
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of the units has often been low, and the units have 
sometimes been poorly allocated (Locsmándi 2000, 
76). Th ese problems persist. Recently, skyrocketing 
housing costs and a lack of resources has worsened the 
overall housing situation of the population in general, 
and of the poor in particular. Th ese problems have 
been aggravated by the ineﬀ ective housing policies of 
the last decade (Hegedűs 1998, 49–50).
2.1 The Housing Situation
Th ree principal forms, which can be distinguished ac-
cording to their primary actors, historically characterize 
the housing market in Central and Eastern European 
states: 1) the private sector sphere for private (indi-
vidual) house construction, operated through non-
monetary relationships and arrangements; 2) the pri-
vate sector market sphere, requiring ﬁ nancial means 
and market demand; and 3) the state sphere, control-
led by the central and municipal government, which 
receives feedback only through political mechanisms. 
All three spheres have existed to some extent over time, 
but the private sector sphere, which now prevails, has 
changed quickly since strict state control softened in 
the 1960s (Hegedűs and Tosics 1994/1, 125).
Under state socialism, state authorities control-
led the entire process of housing construction in the 
public sphere. Th e construction of large-scale housing 
blocks predominated. In the early 1950s, through 
the nationalization of the housing stock of structures 
above a certain size (mainly in the densely-built, inner 
urban areas), the stock of state-owned and controlled 
housing expanded signiﬁ cantly.  
Upon acquisition, or completion of construc-
tion, central or municipal authorities would designate 
occupants, thus keeping the housing in state owner-
ship. Or, housing would be sold for a given amount 
through various methods. State-owned and control-
led housing was predominantly located in the central, 
dense, urban areas. 
In the private sphere, market-oriented develop-
ments were very rare until 1989. Single-family houses 
were commonly built in rural areas and occasionally 
in urban areas as well. Th ese houses were constructed 
by families working, often manually, with relatives, 
friends and acquaintances (Hegedűs and Tosics 1994/
1, 125–127).
Th e attitudes of the authorities towards the pri-
vate and the state sectors diﬀ ered from what was ex-
pressed through state support and subsidies. Th e state 
subsidized construction and maintenance in the state 
sphere, but restricted (and later neglected) the private 
sphere until the 1980s.
2.1.1 Socialist Housing Policies
According to a basic tenet of the socialist housing 
model, wages did not include the costs of housing, 
for either purchase or maintenance. Housing was 
the state’s obligation, to be provided through central 
distribution. Th e central state agencies, nationalized 
companies and, to an even greater extent, local (but 
centrally-controlled) municipalities were the principal 
actors. Th e state subsidized construction only in the 
state sphere and legally restricted private construction 
through such methods as the granting of building 
permits, allowing purchase, assigning loans, and so 
on. Th e demand for housing was anticipated to be in 
urban centers, old and new, and housing policy thus 
focused on supply in these areas. Th e nationalization 
of privately-owned housing and former tenement 
houses, especially in the cores of cities, also served to 
increase the supply of publicly-owned and controlled 
housing. Housing in rural and more marginal ar-
eas was left for private initiatives and signiﬁ cant state 
resources were transferred from rural and other less 
signiﬁ cant areas to construction in the urban areas 
that was to be developed by central authorities. 
Policies along the ideal socialist model described 
above were applied nationally before 1956, but 
their imperfections soon became apparent. A lack of 
resources in the economy pushed housing and other 
infrastructure investments into a secondary role 
behind rapid industrialization. On the demand side, 
rapid industrialization and the forced reconstruction 
of the economy created a huge demand for housing 
in new industrial centers and in Budapest, as 
thousands of former peasants and artisans relocated 
to ﬁ nd work. After 1960, elements of a housing 
“market” appeared with the development of trading 
in housing stock, both private and tenement. Th e 
state could theoretically have thwarted these proc-
esses, as it attempted to increase the supply of housing 
through mass construction, but gradually it became 
apparent that the cost of massive intervention would 
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have been very high, and regulations were relaxed. 
Although there was success in some areas in sup-
plying suﬃ  cient housing for the immigrant masses, 
especially the new urban centers, the housing short-
age in Budapest became permanent despite the huge 
number of new ﬂ ats constructed in the state sphere. 
As a result, migration to the city was restricted until 
1989.
Signs of shifts in the housing situation coincided 
with changes in the course of political events. After the 
repression of the 1956 revolution, housing became a 
top priority and the state decided to provide suﬃ  cient 
housing through mass construction. At the same time, 
it restricted private development in urban areas while 
warily allowing private family house construction in 
rural areas (Hegedűs and Tosics 1994/2, 140).   After 
1956, ﬂ ats and family houses were virtually the only 
investments in which extra income, legal and semi-
legal could be placed. Th is created an additional and 
diﬀ erent demand for housing in the non-subsidized, 
rural areas.
Th e introduction of the New Economic Mecha-
nism in 1968 brought fresh resources, mainly from 
“second,” non-state economic activities, like second-
ary agricultural production, service, and small indus-
trial or commercial businesses into diﬀ erent forms of 
state housing development, both central and munici-
pal. Th is became the era of concrete housing estates, 
which ﬂ ourished along the edges of cities; meanwhile, 
central parts of urban areas, especially in Budapest, 
were neglected (Tosics 2000,133). Private construc-
tion of better quality houses increased in certain rural 
areas and small towns. As the economic crisis deep-
ened in the 1980s, the housing output of the state sec-
tor signiﬁ cantly decreased and housing policy tended 
to direct subsidies towards the private sector.  Th is was 
done in the form of subsidized loans, as the role of the 
market sphere became more important.
In 1990 in Budapest, 46.6 percent of the housing 
stock (396,000 units) was state-owned in the form 
of municipal and cooperative tenement ﬂ ats, com-
pared to 18.7 percent (721,000 units) in the rest of 
the country (Dániel 1996, 204). A secondary market 
for tenement ﬂ ats evolved in Hungary from the late 
1970s, in which the occupants “sold” their rental 
rights at approximately half the price of comparable 
ﬂ ats on the private market (Tomay 2002, 72-73). 
Th e exchange of rental rights was oﬃ  cially allowed 
during the transaction, while purchase was not: the 
distribution of tenement homes was by rights run by 
the municipalities. Th e actual method varied, but in 
general, private lawyers collected, through newspaper 
advertisements, the names of interested “buyers” and 
“sellers’” and attempted to match them. Th is led to 
a chain of exchanges until the desired outcome was 
attained. 
Th e emergence of the “gray” market of tenement 
ﬂ ats resulted from the bureaucratic, sluggish operation 
Table 1
Housing Construction According to the Type of Owner (or Builder) Percentage in the Given Period
State Built Municipally Built Cooperatively 
Built
Family Home
Tenement Cooperatively 
Sold1
Sold2
1961–65 9.8 14.4 9.4 1.8 0.0 64.7
1966–70 8.5 14.7 9.5 5.4 0.0 62.0
1971–75 4.5 17.1 12.8 12.5 1,6 51.5
1976–80 4.1 20.1 10.9 15.3 4.5 45.1
1981–85 2.7 13.1 6.2 24.6 4.5 49.1
1986–87 2.9 9.8 0.0 25.6 3.4 58.4
1 Sold through a cooperative.
2 Sold through OTP (National Savings Bank), the (virtually) sole popular bank under state socialism.
Source: Hegedűs and Tosics 1994, 132.
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of the municipal housing authorities and from the lack 
of suﬃ  cient private housing especially in the urban 
centers. Th e actual allocation of a municipal tenement 
ﬂ at was run bureaucratically and ineﬀ ectively; the lack 
of housing was a usual phenomenon in more desired 
areas throughout the period. Th e housing authorities 
could not properly manage the sector and the laws 
were also inadequate. Th is “semi-privatization” 
of the tenement housing stock partially led to the 
compulsory privatization of the entire sector in the 
1990s (see below) that was advantageous ﬁ nancially 
for the buyers.
Th e ﬁ nancing system for housing was part of the 
general subsidy system and was subordinated under 
the central government system for resource allocation 
during state socialism (Hegedűs and Tosics 1994/1, 
131). Th e forms of housings were diﬀ erentiated 
according to available resources and subsidies. In the 
state sector, resources were relatively plentiful. Th is 
was especially true for state-sponsored construction 
where rents were also heavily subsidized. It is estim-
ated that in 1989, HUF 275 of direct and another 
HUF 402 of indirect1 rent subsidy was added to 
each HUF 100 of rent, irrespective of a household’s 
ﬁ nancial status (Dániel 1996, 205). 
In general, housing available to the private sector 
was scarce under state socialism, but grew from the 
early 1970s. Shortages (as with other commodities) 
led to a double market: prices of scarce state housing 
in urban centers were much lower than that of private 
housing as a consequence of the mass subsidies in the 
state sphere. Th e quality of new ﬂ ats in the state sphere 
was better than in the old, neglected central neighbor-
hoods and ﬂ ats built privately in the outer areas. Th e 
cost of maintenance and other related expenses (e.g. 
interests) for state housing was also low for the ten-
ants compared to the price of accommodation in the 
private sector. Th ese factors led to a mass demand for 
state housing in the 1970s.
Th e centralized allocation of housing was contra-
dictory from the early stages. Th eoretically, housing 
was allocated according to the needs of the families, 
with the intent of selecting a mixture of social and 
economic groups. In fact, inﬂ uential individuals and 
groups were always able to get preferential treatment. 
Up to the mid-1970s, the state-owned ﬂ ats were usu-
ally the best quality and most desired, especially the 
nationalized, centrally located ﬂ ats. Members of the 
upper class almost always occupied these units. Th e 
state thus subsidized the “well oﬀ ,” while the poor 
had to ﬁ nd accommodations in the expensive private 
housing market. 
Later, from the early 1980s, as the quality of 
the privately built houses increased, the upper strata 
started to move to certain suburban areas—by buying 
dwellings in the private market, while retaining their 
municipal tenement housing in the desirable central 
areas. During these years, the less fortunate entered 
the subsidized sector by moving into the new hous-
ing estates, but they were more likely to be located 
in remote, less desirable, areas (Hegedűs and Tosics 
1994/1,134–137). Despite all these changes, the 
number of poor in tenement ﬂ ats in 1990 was lower 
than the number of those with average incomes. Th is 
was especially the case for retired households (Salamin 
1992,169).
Th e socialist housing policy subsidized new 
construction and neglected the existing stock. Th e 
cost of utilities, which were heavily subsidized, was 
low for families and did not necessitate general state 
intervention to assist the poorer strata ﬁ nancially. At 
the same time, virtually no money was spent on the 
maintenance of tenement buildings, which led to 
their gradual abandonment by the upper classes.
Table 2
Ratio of Tenement Flats in Hungary, 1990
Active Inactive
Households in 
tenement ﬂ ats [%]
Average Income Under Living Wage Average Income Under Living Wage
17.6 19.0 28.0 19.1
Source: Salamin 1992, 167.
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Table 3
Quality of the Tenement Houses in Budapest
in 1990 [%]
Bad Average Good
28 50 22
Source: Dániel 1996, 226.
2.1.2 Transition
Th e transition in housing ﬁ nance and development 
began in the mid-1980s and continued well into the 
1990s. During the 1980s, the interests on deposits in 
banks were lower than the rate of inﬂ ation that led to 
placing the savings in more durable goods. Th is eﬀ ect 
was further strengthened by the fear of hyperinﬂ ation 
(Tóth and Árvai 2001, 1016). As a consequence of the 
capacity to enforce interests of major business actors, 
the interest rates on credits for companies, ﬁ xed cen-
trally, were also low, sometimes negative in real terms 
that led to general scarcity of ﬁ nancial resources. In-
terests on bank credits for citizens were usually much 
higher and loans were hard to get, but certain forms of 
credit (mortgage loans, e.g.) were more advantageous; 
the populace thus attempted to draw proﬁ t from low 
rates and signiﬁ cantly increased such loans in quan-
tity. Th e demand for loans constantly exceeded the 
potential of banks, which also led to the bureaucratic 
allocation of loans along non-economic interests 
(Kornai 1993, 567). Under state socialism, housing 
was virtually the only area of allowed consumption 
that could be reached within a short period (the mo-
torcar, as another major form of invest, was centrally 
redistributed and would-be buyers had to wait for 
many years). Investment in housing increased in both 
governmental and private sectors that were both pro-
ducing housing for purchase to housing consumers. 
Th is demand led to an “over-consumption” of hous-
ing and a relatively good housing situation, in which 
the rate of housing construction and the condition of 
national housing were better than the economic state 
of the country at the time might suggest (Hegedűs 
and Várhegyi 1999, 101–102, Tosics 2000, 134). 
Meanwhile, composition and territorial allocation of 
the housing stock were less than desirable (Hörcher 
1994, 63–64). 
Other than the artiﬁ cially low loan interest rates, 
various subsidies became the main channels of state 
intervention, in both the public and the private sec-
tors during the 1980s.  Subsidies for new construction 
took two main forms: 1) young families obtained a cer-
tain sum for their ﬁ rst home according to the number 
of children in the family; and 2) interests on loans 
for new construction were ﬁ xed at very low rates (1.5 
– 3%), lower than other loans on the “virtual market” 
(Kornai 1993, 565–568).  Th e diﬀ erence between the 
loan rates and the “market” rate was paid by the state 
(Hegedűs and Várhegyi 1999, 117). In addition to 
low interest rates, loans were given for periods of up 
to 25 years (while the customary period for a loan was 
usually three years) and were diﬃ  cult to get because of 
Table 4
Number of dwellings, 1949-1996
Year Total Number of Dwellings Growth of the Number of Dwellings
Absolute Number Percent
Thousands
1949 2,467 — —
1960 2,758 291 11.8
1970 3,122 365 13.2
1980 3,542 420 13.5
1990 3,853 311 8.8
1996 3,992 138 3.6
Source: Gratzl and  Szűcs 1997, 669.
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the lack of resources at banks (see above). Moreover, 
the standard interest rates on non-subsidized loans for 
citizens were quite high, between 17 and 20 percent. 
Other forms of subsidized loans for citizens included 
loans for developing utilities (usually water structures 
and gas system) that were given for ten years. Loans 
for housing construction, theoretically established as 
a mortgage, were oﬃ  cially registered but could not be 
foreclosed because the laws at the time did not permit 
families to be evicted unless they had another home 
into which they could move.  Litigation was also very 
slow. Despite all the subsidies, a large part of the cost 
of construction or purchase price of private housing 
originated from private resources.
During these years, state-ﬁ nanced and directed 
construction fell, the importance of the private sector 
grew, and market oriented private and semi-private 
initiatives appeared. Social inequities grew quickly, as 
it was mostly those who were better oﬀ  and able to 
take advantage of subsidies and new ﬁ nancing pos-
sibilities.
Th e ﬁ rst eﬀ orts at inner city rehabilitation date 
back to the late 1970s, but the rehabilitation was 
slow and involved only small areas. Th e quality of 
the inner city housing stock, mostly tenement blocks, 
thus continued to worsen.  Th e total cost of deferred 
maintenance in 1989 was estimated to be as much as 
HUF 200 billion (USD 3.3 billion) (Dániel 1996, 
205).2 
Very limited privatization of ﬂ ats was allowed 
from 1969 until 1982, when the privatization of all 
ﬂ ats in buildings with a maximum of twelve units 
was permitted.  In 1988, most restrictions were lifted 
and mass privatization started, with very favorable 
prices for the occupants. Th e rate of privatization was 
highest among the better oﬀ : 20 percent of the 1980 
tenement housing stock had been privatized by 1990 
in the three richest districts in Budapest (I, II, XII) 
compared to 4 to 6 percent in the inner Pest districts 
(Tomay 2002, 69–70).
Inﬂ ation was ﬁ rst felt in the 1970s, but became 
serious in the mid-1980s, reaching 17 percent in 1989 
Table 5
Housing Situation Between, 1970–1996
Year
1970 1980 1990 1996
Inhabitants per hundred dwellings 318 292 263 250
Inhabitants per hundred rooms 193 146 110 104
Number of households, thousand 3,328 3,719 3,890 3,867
Households per hundred dwellings 108 105 101 97
 Source: Hegedűs and Várhegyi 1999, 115.
Table 6
Housing Construction, 1988–1992
Year Total Number of 
New Units
Average Floor Space 
[m2]
Ratio of 
Family Homes [%]
Construction Cost 
per Unit
Number of 
Holiday Homes
1988 50,566 85 64.2 961,900 3,115
1989 51,487 88 67.6 1,182,400 2,308
1990 43,771 90 72.3 1,367,800 2,285
1991 33,164 90 63.3 1,627,800 1,752
1992 25,807 93 81.0 — 2,081
Source: Hegedűs and Tosics 1994/2, 144.
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and reaching its peak of approximately 35 percent in 
the mid-1990s (Tomay 2002, 69). Prices in the hous-
ing sector grew along with inﬂ ation in the 1980s, but 
then lagged behind inﬂ ation a decade later, as other 
forms of investment brought more proﬁ t (Tomay 
2002, 77). Other than fast growing maintenance 
expenditures, the high rate of inﬂ ation caused the 
subsidy of ﬁ xed rate loans for home construction and 
purchase to grow quickly, which became a huge bur-
den on the state budget. Housing expenditures grew 
fourfold in the state budget between 1985 and 1990 
(Szántó 1994, 70). Th e subsidy for ﬁ xed-rate loans 
for home construction and purchase were, therefore, 
gradually cancelled between 1989 and 1991, and in-
terest rates increased to market levels. Families able to 
pay back immediately half the sum they owed did not 
have to return the rest. Th ree-quarters of the families 
paid back their loans, but the situation of the poorer 
families who could not repay their loans remained 
problematic for many years, both for the families and 
for the state-owned bank that was to be privatized.
Th e monthly installments of outstanding loans 
were subsidized until 1994, according to the number 
of the children in the family, after which the subsidies 
were eliminated (Tomay 2002, 74–75). In 1998, the 
central government made numerous attempts to re-
duce the number of families who did not pay monthly 
interests of their pre-1989 housing loans, and oﬀ ered 
to pay, together with the local authorities, 70 percent 
of the backlog.  However, the attempts failed as a con-
sequence of the lack of the ﬁ nancial resources both 
of the local municipalities and the debtors, and the 
reluctance of the various parties to participate in the 
program. In 2000, the government estimated that ap-
proximately 20,000 families had outstanding housing 
loans while the aﬀ ected bank, OTP, put the number 
at roughly 68,000. Finally, OTP started to auction 
oﬀ , to register encumbrances on the dwellings, or ex-
tend the run of the loans, thus reducing the monthly 
payment of those who were able and willing to pay.
In the early 1990s, the state withdrew quickly 
from the housing market, and due to economic 
problems and the higher proﬁ tability of other forms 
of investment, the amount of new construction fell 
dramatically (Gratzl and Szűcs 1997, 669).
An important feature of the change in the housing 
system was the transformation of the municipal sys-
tem.  While strictly controlled socialist municipalities 
carried out the directions of central government, the 
municipalities elected after 1990 have enjoyed a high 
level of freedom and are restricted only by the law. 
Moreover, they are ﬁ nancially free to act, although the 
great majority of their revenue comes from the central 
budget. Th e middle level of government has virtually 
disappeared, as counties have few entitlements and 
little revenue.
Th e transformation of the Budapest municipal 
system into 22 (later 23) largely independent dis-
tricts diﬀ ered from that of the rest of the country. 
Independent district municipalities and the capital 
municipality legally have the same rights, although 
they carrying out speciﬁ c tasks.  Housing issues are 
managed exclusively by districts, which has led to a 
multitude of housing policies, with diﬀ erent regula-
tions often being applied on either side of the same 
street.
2.1.3 Changes in Housing in the 1990s
Th e output of the economy fell sharply after 1989. 
Performance fell 3.5 percent in 1990, and then to 
12 percent the following year. Th e ﬁ rst year of slow 
recovery was 1994, which sped up after 1997. Do-
mestic consumption has grown since the second half 
of the 1990s. Th e level of employment fell 26 percent 
between 1990 and 1994. Net income fell 10 percent 
in the same period, and 15 percent between 1995 and 
1996 (Tomay 2002, 69). Since then, dynamic growth 
has been observed, although the economic output and 
the standard of living reached the 1989 level only in 
2000.
In general, the price of housing lagged behind 
inﬂ ation for much of the 1990s. Th e general decrease 
only slightly aﬀ ected the up-market properties, if at 
all. In the upper sector of the real estate market, rela-
tively high and constant demand stemmed from the 
newly expanding, local, upper classes (or “nouveaux 
riches”) and from foreign managers of international 
corporations moving into the Hungarian market or 
buying local ﬁ rms. Th e shrunken building industry, 
now mostly private, “niched” this demand; this area 
was virtually the only one that developed in the 
1990s. 
Th e relative general decline resulted from the weak 
ﬁ nancial situation of the middle and lower socio-
economic strata, such that the ﬁ ltration eﬀ ects from 
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Table 7
Growth of Property Prices in Budapest, 1996–2003
First Quarter 
of Year
Average Advertised 
Price of 1,000 HUF/m2
Growth of Dwelling Prices
Previous Year = 100
Growth of Consumer Prices
Previous Year = 100
Net Growth of Real 
Estate Prices [%]
2003 233 109.4 105.3 4.1
2002 213 99.5 109.2 –9.7
2001 214 157.4 109.8 47.6
2000 136 140.2 110.0 30.2
1999 97 119.8 114.3 5.5
1998 81 112.5 118.3 –5.8
1997 72 110.7 123.6 –12.9
1996 65 — 128.2 —
Source: Hungarian National Bank (www.mnb.hu) and Térinfo Ingatlan-monitoring 
(quoted at www.ingatlan-online.com/origo030401.htm and www.origo.hu/uzletinegyed/ingatlan/20020419tovabb.html).
Table 8
Number of Privatized Municipal Tenement Dwellings [Th ousand Units]
Year Country Total Budapest
1988 8.7 1.6
1989 18.7 5.6
1990 54.0 22.2
1991 82.1 47.0
1992 74.1 47.3
1993 58.4 40.1
1994 92.0 61.0
Total 388.0 224.8
Source: Dániel 1996, 205.
Table 9
Market Value of Privatized Dwellings in Budapest [Th ousand HUF, Valorized]
Periods Average of Total Price of Dwelling Average Price per Square Meter
1980–89 6.724 97.1
1990–92 5.195 83.6
1993–95 4.670 82.3
1996–99 4.134 86.8
Unknown 5.475 93.2
Total 5.050 97.6
Source: Tomay 2002, 71.
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the upper sector of the real estate market could not 
evolve. Th e situation changed in 1998 when the 
collapse of the East and Central European stock 
exchanges (as a consequence of economic problems 
in Russia) boosted investment in the real estate mar-
ket.  Th e housing market has been “rediscovered” by 
investors since then. Th is turn fruitfully paralleled the 
improvement of the ﬁ nancial situation of the middle 
classes. Housing prices grew rapidly until the end of 
2000, and after a brief decline, they have since grown 
slowly, but steadily. Today, the increase in housing 
prices is moderate.
Th e country’s quick adaptation to a market 
economy brought a signiﬁ cant increase in previously 
subsidized prices of utilities and other housing related 
costs. Th e state could not aﬀ ord to continue subsidiz-
ing energy, water, or gas—or, at least, it was not keen 
to do so. Furthermore, it wanted to create conditions 
for the privatization of utility companies. Th e ratio of 
housing related expenses therefore grew sharply with-
in family budgets.  Meanwhile, the rapid privatization 
of the major part of the tenement stock aﬀ ected the 
housing market. (Table 8)
Th e rate of privatization sped up in 1991, as mu-
nicipal authorities became the owners of the tenement 
blocks in their territories.  At that time, municipalities 
still had the right to decide whether dwellings would 
be privatized or not; after 1993, they had to privatize 
almost every ﬂ at that a renter wanted to purchase ac-
cording to a law approved by the Parliament that year. 
Th e new regulations met little opposition at the time 
because they beneﬁ ted large parts of the populace, 
and they reduced the ﬁ nancial burden of maintain-
ing tenement houses for municipalities (Tomay 2002, 
71). (Table 9)
Th e ﬁ nancial conditions of privatization were very 
advantageous for the occupants of state-owned hous-
ing at the time. Only a fraction of the actual value 
of the housing had to be paid, and those who could 
pay the entire sale price enjoyed further reductions 
(Tomay 2002, 70). As mentioned earlier, the better 
oﬀ  were the ﬁ rst to take advantage of privatization: 
the market value of the municipal housing stock 
nationally fell to one-quarter after the privatization of 
half of the stock, and to one-sixth in Budapest (Dániel 
1996, 204–205). As privatization advanced, the value 
of the dwellings being privatized dropped even more. 
Th e number of privatized dwellings was highest in the 
housing estates built in the 1970s and 1980s farther 
from the center, because municipalities could exclude 
blocks of housing in the central areas due to their spe-
cial characteristics (see above). (Table 10)
Th ere were many reasons for rapid privatization, 
as mentioned earlier. Th e national government want-
ed to protect the troubled national budget from the 
huge burden of subsidies going to the public housing 
sector.  Th e national government also expected that 
new private owners would be willing to rehabilitate 
their dwellings.  In addition, the advantageous pur-
chase prices were popular among the voters. 
Wanting to avoid unpopular steps, the mu-
nicipalities privatized the tenement blocks instead of 
increasing the rent.  Moreover, the tenement stock 
was a sort of “gift,” and the municipalities received 
relatively huge sums from privatization—no matter 
how low the price of the housing that was privatized 
Table 10
Ratio of Small Flats and Average Foot Space of Privatized Tenement Dwellings in Budapest
Periods Ratio of Dwellings Under 50 m2 [%] Average Foot Space [m2]
1980–89 16.4 71
1990–92 29.3 64 
1993–95 37.8 58
1996–99 62.4 49
Unknown 39.1 59
Total 38.1 59
Source: Tomay 2002, 72.
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(Dániel 1996, 205). In fact, the municipalities got far 
less than they had expected, but they no longer had 
responsibility for the privatized stock, which turned 
out to be a great advantage (Dániel 1996, 222).
 Th e majority of households sought material ad-
vantage and security from privatization (Dániel 1996, 
205–206). Th e fear of abrupt increases in rents is 
often mentioned (Tomay 2002, 72), although the 
rents were theoretically frozen in 1993–94 (Hegedűs 
and Tosics 1994/2, 141).  During a time of sharply 
increasing prices and economic decline, new owners 
sought to check expenditures on maintenance and to 
reduce housing-related costs. Th is often led to avoid-
ing the rehabilitation of ﬂ ats and blocks in privatized 
areas. Rents had covered only about half the actual 
maintenance costs; the true monthly payment, includ-
ing rehabilitation costs, could rise to approximately 
half of the net monthly income (Ernst 1994, 46).
Many new owners soon regretted their house 
purchases, while others were very content. Better oﬀ  
households felt the advantages of privatization, while 
higher costs (which reached only 25 percent of the 
household budget) aﬀ ected them little. Poorer new 
owners, on the other hand, had to confront household 
maintenance costs that grew quickly from an average 
of 9 to an unbearable 50 percent of the household 
income (Dániel 1996, 213–215). Due to the mass 
subsidization of rents and energy prices, several poorer 
groups had been able to aﬀ ord relatively large dwell-
ings that could not be maintained and supported un-
der market circumstances (Dániel 1996, 213–215). 
Table 11
Ratio of Household Maintenance Cost and Income 
by Income Quintiles, 1992
Income Quintiles Ratio of Maintenance Costs
1st (lowest) 49.2
2nd 30.9
3rd 26.7
4th 22.8
5th (highest) 15.1 
Total 29.0
Source: Hegedűs and Tosics 1994/2, 148.
Th e value of the dwellings of the richest quintile of 
the society rose to 8.5 times that of the lowest quintile 
in 1993, and those in the richest quintile earned seven 
times as much as those in the lowest.  Meanwhile, the 
income of occupants of the most expensive dwellings 
was only two times as much as that of the occupants 
of the least expensive dwellings (Hegedűs 1998, 52).
Th e privatization of the public housing stock has 
been heavily criticized. Critics primarily argue that 
low privatization prices further subsidized an already 
heavily subsidized group. Th e equivalent of eight to 
ten years of average income is estimated to have been 
given away to the occupants of better quality dwell-
ings through privatization (Dániel 1996, 212). Th is 
argument, however, disregards the fact that a great 
deal of the rental rights in the state sphere during the 
socialist epoch was bought on the gray “market” and 
not granted (see above). Moreover, proﬁ t could only 
be realized through sale of the dwellings, and only 18 
to 20 percent of the privatized stock was sold by 1999 
(Tomay 2002, 72). Th is is not to say that there was 
no privatization gain, or that the gain was evenly split 
between social strata. Without doubt, the better oﬀ  
received much more, whereas and households remain-
ing in the communal system were clear losers (Dániel 
1996, 217–221).
Other critics stress the social disadvantages of the 
almost total loss of the communal housing sector 
(Tosics 2000, 138–139). First, the development of new 
housing communities was abrupt and forced, limit-
ing the cooperation among owners.  (Th at is, families 
of diﬀ erent needs and ﬁ nancial means need to co-
operate.) Th is now causes problems as some families 
cannot accept the suggestions and requests for main-
tenance and improvement put forth by others, or 
simply cannot ﬁ nance the higher monthly payments 
required to ﬁ nance those improvements. Under 
present laws, the poorest and the least ambitious fami-
lies can generally block any renovation or rehabilita-
tion. Th e mass privatization virtually thwarted the 
grand scale rehabilitation of the deprived, especially 
inner areas; this remains one of the major housing 
problems (Hegedűs et al. 1994, 59).
Second, although the number of those who would 
prefer tenure to home ownership is not clear, the de-
mand of the households that would prefer to rent and 
not possess their own dwellings remains unfulﬁ lled. 
From a political point of view, the disappointment of the 
privatization “losers,” as well as those who gained less 
than expected, is problematic (Dániel 1996, 222–223). 
T H E  H O U S I N G  P O O R  I N  B U D A P E S T,  H U N G A R Y:  S I T U A T I O N  A N D  P E R S P E C T I V E S
79
Th e prices of dwellings have been high compared 
to average incomes. In 1994, the purchase price of 
the average dwelling was six to nine years of the total 
income of an average household (Hegedűs et al. 1994, 
64; Ernst 1994, 47) where an equivalent of three years 
income would be regarded as ideal (Szántó 1994, 67) 
as applied to the richest strata (Hegedűs and Tosics 
1994/2, 147).3
Table 12
Ratio of Average Dwelling Price and Annual Average 
Income by Income Quintiles, 1992
Income quintiles Ratio
1st (lowest) 12.0
2nd 7.1
3rd 5.4
4th 4.3
5th (highest) 3.1
Total 6.4
Source: Hegedűs and Tosics 1994/2, 147.
Th e quantity of housing was widely regarded as 
suﬃ  cient among policymakers and experts until re-
cently, and subsidizing new housing construction was 
seen as unnecessary. Many experts still hold this view 
(Locsmándi 2000, 76). But, the low level of new con-
struction has been regarded recently by some as one of 
the major housing problems, although other experts 
stress the role the poor allocation of the existing hous-
ing stock plays in the problems in housing sector. 
Th ey emphasize, furthermore, the diﬃ  culties of pur-
chasing their ﬁ rst dwelling, since entering the housing 
market is a major problem for many (Hegedűs and 
Tosics 1996).
In the early 1990s, the purchase or construction 
of a dwelling required 40 percent of individual re-
sources; an average of 20 percent of the construction 
or purchase price was given by the state as a direct 
subsidy (see above).  As an average, the total sum of 
loans made up merely 40 percent of the total cost 
of housing construction. In 1995, the entire sum of 
mortgage loans was only 15 percent of its 1990 value 
(Hegedűs 1998, 53). Th at later fell in value to 7 per-
cent in 1997 (Hegedűs and Várhegyi 1999, 104). Th e 
Table 13
Total Loans of Households at Banks by Type [Billion HUF]
End of Period [Year, Month] Property Loans Consumption and Other Loans, Excluding Property Loans
1990 December 289.5 84.5
1991 December 166.7 96.7
1992 December 173.1 112.2
1993 December 192.4 133.0
1994 December 186.1 176.9
1995 December 169.4 156.0
1996 December 149.1 147.5
1997 December 137.4 138.0
1998 December 127.7 184.5
1999 December 129.2 286.9
2000 December 190.8 409.1
2001 December 330.1 551.0
2002 January 337.7 557.2
2002 November 739.4 694.3
Source: Magyar Bankszövetség 2002. IV. negyedévi jelentése. http://www.bankszovetseg.hu/jelentesek_4negyed_2002.htm.
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system of ﬁ nance had to be modernized (Hegedűs 
et al. 1994, 60–63) and the virtual monopoly over 
mortgage credits by OTP had to be broken (Hegedűs 
and Várhegyi 1999, 107–108). Others stress that 
under such bad economic circumstances, no ﬁ nancial 
system could ease the housing situation of the poorest 
strata; economic recovery was needed (Szántó 1994, 
68–69). (Table 13)
Th e construction of state-owned housing stopped 
during the transition years, which was regarded as a 
major obstacle in the development of a sound hous-
ing market (Hegedűs et al. 1994, 62). Th e state began 
to assist municipal social tenement construction in 
2000, but the process has been slow and the majority 
of municipalities are not eager to be involved, fearing 
a negative response from voters. (Table 14)
Th e number of mortgage loans was low until the 
year 2000. Banks were not keen to give mortgage 
credit due to the diﬃ  culties in enforcing mortgages 
(see above).  Views on the necessity of a quantitative 
increase in the housing stock were revised in 1999, and 
subsidizing new construction became a focal point of 
governmental policies.  Large amounts of new con-
struction were seen by many as a major contributor to 
economic growth. Laws have since been adopted, and 
new forms of interest subsidies have been introduced 
that increase both the number of loans available for 
ﬁ nancing construction and for purchasing new and 
existing ﬂ ats and houses.
Four main forms of aid are available in the present 
system of housing ﬁ nance. In the ﬁ rst (called the so-
cial-political subsidy), a sum of money is given to 
a family according to the number of children. Th e 
subsidy can be used for the building or purchasing 
of a family’s ﬁ rst home, but cannot be more than 65 
percent of the home’s market value in case of new 
Table 14
Housing Conditions in Budapest and in Hungary in 1996
Number of Number of Inhabitants 
per Hundred
Total Inhabited Uninhabited Inhabitants in
Dwellings [Thousands] Dwellings Rooms
Budapest 815 777 38 1,855 239 105
Country 3,991 3,767 224 9,978 281 109
Source: Gratzl and Szűcs 1997, 670.
construction. Earlier, such subsidies were given only 
for newly built dwellings (see earlier) but today some 
forms of this aid can be used -to buy existing homes 
as well.  Th is is perhaps the most widely used form of 
subsidy, especially among the lower socioeconomic 
strata of society (Tomay 2002, 73-74).
Second, the government subsidizes a form of 
deposit in building societies that appeared after the 
repealing of the Law on Building Societies in 1996 
(Act 1996/LXII). It has very low interest rates, and a 
large extra sum can be received after a certain period if 
used for construction of reconstruction of a dwelling 
(Tomay 2002, 75).
Th ird, the central government subsidizes interests 
on mortgage loans. Th is subsidy initially applied only 
to the construction or purchase of new homes. Later, 
it was extended to the purchase of existing homes, 
with modiﬁ cations to balance the housing market in 
those situations where the market for new dwellings 
had ﬂ ourished, while the market for existing houses 
had stagnated. Basically, the central government 
provides a long-term loan for an amount that heavily 
depends upon whether the family has children or not. 
Th e purpose of this subsidy is to reduce the amount 
of monthly installment payments.  (Hegedűs and 
Várhegyi 1999, 117). Th e requirements for taking 
that loan (such as ﬁ nancial status) were further eased 
and the subsidy was raised in 2000. Th e OTP bank 
has had a near monopoly in mortgage lending, and 
remains prominent.  Since 2000, other banks have 
made great eﬀ orts to enter this market.
Fourth, since 1993, the state has given tax relief 
for the installment payments on mortgage loans. 
Th ese credits are for up to 20 percent of the total 
amount of annual installment payments (Hegedűs 
and Várhegyi 1999, 117).
T H E  H O U S I N G  P O O R  I N  B U D A P E S T,  H U N G A R Y:  S I T U A T I O N  A N D  P E R S P E C T I V E S
81
Th ese diﬀ erent forms of subsidies favor the upper 
socioeconomic strata of society, except for the social-
political subsidy. Th e construction of houses abruptly 
increased from 1999–2000, the consequences of 
which cannot be determined at the time of writing. It 
can be argued that the sheer increase of homes built 
annually has not eased tensions among members of 
the lower socioeconomic strata of the society, who are 
still seeking adequate and aﬀ ordable housing. 
2.2 Housing the Poor
Th e situation of a large stratum of the Hungarian 
society worsened quickly in the years preceding and 
following transition. Housing expenditures have 
increased and take up a larger portion of the family 
budget. Th e following section deals brieﬂ y with the 
special situation of those comprising the bottom of the 
housing poor—the homeless—and then with wider 
aspects of the lower sections of the housing market.
2.2.1 Th e Homeless
Th e sudden appearance of large numbers of home-
less in major cities was a clear sign of social change 
for many Hungarian citizens. State socialism did not 
acknowledge the homeless or unemployed; moreover, 
it criminalized them. Homelessness was regarded as 
a legal oﬀ ence. Only a certain group of homeless—
runaway children—was oﬃ  cially mentioned before 
1989 (Dávid and Snijders 2000, 60). Words such as 
“poverty” and “homelessness” were taboo; they were 
banned in the oﬃ  cial media and in political discus-
sions. Th ere was only one shelter in Budapest with 
sixteen beds:  “Th e House of Lords.” Th e number of 
homeless was undoubtedly higher than 16, but no 
oﬃ  cial estimates exist—either because those in urban 
areas without a residence lived in workers’ hostels, or 
because they had been arrested or warned oﬀ  by the 
police and thus were not visible (Bognár and Udvari 
1998, 241–242).
Transition in 1989 brought about many changes 
in homelessness in a very short period of time. 
Factories that had run workers’ hostels were priva-
tized, and new owners soon shut them down.  Second, 
laws were changed and the oﬀ ense of “vagrancy” was 
repealed, thus releasing thousands of prison inmates 
who immediately became rooﬂ ess. Th ird, the police 
no longer had the authority to deter the homeless. As 
a result, thousands arrived in cities where there had 
previously been “none.”
Th ere is no clear deﬁ nition of homelessness in 
Hungary, and the law on the subject operates with 
two diﬀ erent deﬁ nitions. Th e ﬁ rst widely refers to any 
person lacking a permanent reported residence, or 
residing in a homeless shelter. Th e second, narrower 
deﬁ nition, commonly accepted in Hungarian public 
narratives, refers to those who spend nights in public 
areas or in places unsuitable for habitation (Dávid and 
Snijders 2000, 63). Recent studies attempt to redeﬁ ne 
the term, and bring it in line with the British concep-
tualization—thereby introducing the term “rooﬂ ess” 
instead of homeless.  “Homeless,” rather, is used in a 
wider sense, in reference to  those who lack appropri-
ate housing of any sort;  it is regarded as an integral 
part of the housing system. (Bényei et al. 2000). 
Despite eﬀ orts by supporters of the latter deﬁ nition, 
the narrower, older deﬁ nition is commonly used.
Estimates of the number of homeless are uncer-
tain, and vary between 10,000 and 60,000 on the 
national level (Dávid and Snijders 2000, 66). Several 
features of homelessness make any estimation diﬃ  -
cult. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, deﬁ nitions of 
“homeless” and “homelessness” are not clear; the hidden 
and ﬂ uctuating nature of this phenomenon further 
complicates and encumbers assessments (Bényei et al. 
2000, 67 and Dávid and Snijders 2000, 61). None-
theless, the number of Budapest homeless is widely 
accepted to be between 8,000–15,000 (Bognár and 
Udvari 1998, 242, Dávid and Snijders 2000, 69).  It is 
commonly believed that the number of homeless is 
stable, that approximately half of all homeless in 
Hungary live in the capital city, and approximately 
80 percent of the homeless in the capital arrive from 
provinces.
Two new sets of circumstances aﬀ ect homeless-
ness in Hungary. First, youth from state foster homes 
(approximately 2000 a year) leave without suﬃ  cient 
resources for accommodation; many become home-
less. Second, about half of all divorcees (10,000–
15,000 people) terminate their relationships without 
the ﬁ nancial means to buy or rent a ﬂ at (Bognár 
and Udvari 1998, 242). A recent study found that: 
two-thirds of Budapest’s homeless mention individ-
ual problems, including divorce, as the cause of their 
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homelessness; one-ﬁ fth mention troubles directly 
connected with accommodation (eviction, deteriora-
tion of accommodation); and one-seventh mention 
“economic-institutional” problems (related to hospi-
tal, prison or foster homes) (Bényei et al. 2000, 70).
Concerning the social composition of the home-
less, most (55 percent) are between 30 and 49 years 
old; this age range comprises only 36.5 percent of 
Hungarian society as a whole. Older generations 
of homeless are well educated, while those under 
30 years of age have comparatively little education. 
Th e majority of the homeless is male (70–80%), and 
does not use the various oﬃ  cial homeless shelters. 
Approximately half of the homeless overall, and only a 
quarter of all male homeless, have taken advantage of 
such facilities.  Slightly less than half of female home-
less have spent more than one consecutive night in a 
hostel (Bényei et al. 2000, 76–84).
As a rule, governments allocate certain sums ac-
cording to established guidelines to organizations 
such as schools that provide agreed upon services for 
the homeless.  In general, municipalities in Hungary 
are responsible for social aﬀ airs in their territory, but 
other organizations may also run social services. Th e 
central government grants municipalities an amount 
to perform certain tasks or run particular programs. In 
1998, central government resources ﬁ nanced 90 per-
cent of municipal government programs. Other, non-
governmental organizations, especially ecclesiastical 
ones, have played a minor role, but their importance 
is gradually increasing.  Th eir ﬁ nancial resources, 
however, usually come from the state through chan-
nels independent of local authorities. Th ese organiza-
tions receive the same per capita grants from the cen-
tral budget as do municipal organizations, channeled 
either directly or through the local budget (Bognár 
and Udvari 1998, 243).
Various programs have been introduced since 
1989, which are based on three main forms. Th e ﬁ rst 
form is aimed at supplying temporal shelter for a short 
period during the cold seasons. Institutions oﬀ ering 
shelter for the night is the major type of such shelters, 
in which the possibility to wash is usually available. 
In addition, designated rooms oﬀ er a place for a short 
stay to warm during the daytime. Secondly, free meals 
are given at various locations around the city on a 
“ﬁ rst come, ﬁ rst serve” basis for all who arrive, home-
less or not. Th irdly, interim hostels provide shelter 
for up to six months, some of which are reserved for 
mothers and their children.
Th ere are four thousand spaces in homeless shel-
ters countrywide, with two thousand in Budapest. 
Many critics, especially social workers, ﬁ nd the 
number insuﬃ  cient; however, the small number of 
homeless (some hundreds) left in the streets at night 
indicates that a quantitative increase in beds is not 
urgent (Bognár and Udvari 1998, 243). Others warn 
against the over-institutionalization of the problem, 
and stress the role of individual care (Bényei et al. 
2000).
Two major reasons for the dramatic increase in 
homelessness can be found in the relevant literature. 
Th e ﬁ rst approach stresses the negative eﬀ ects of the 
conversion of housing from socialist to capitalist pat-
terns, and disparages the role of social and mental 
factors in the individuals’ life course. Th is macro-
economic approach assumes that the primary reason 
for homelessness is the shortage in housing, the ces-
sation of social housing construction and high rents. 
As mentioned, the construction of new houses fell 
signiﬁ cantly during transition; the socioeconomically 
better oﬀ  built the majority of new homes. Th e aver-
age monthly rent for a ﬂ at was HUF 500–600 per 
square meter in Budapest in 1996 in the informal, 
or gray, sector (Erdõsi 2000, 76–77).  By 2003, Th is 
grew to HUF 1000 per square meter in less desired 
places, and to HUF 2000 per square meter in more 
desired places (informal source). Th is has presented 
a signiﬁ cant burden when the average gross monthly 
income is HUF 162,000 in Budapest and HUF 
129,000 countrywide (Magyar Hírlap, 21 May 2003). 
Th e massive construction of social tenement houses 
appears to be one logical solution (Bognár and Udvari 
1998, 242).
Th e second approach stresses the role of social and 
individual factors (anomie) in creating homelessness, 
and blames the present system for alienation and over-
institutionalization. As mentioned earlier, it places the 
situation of the homeless in the wider context of the 
housing poor, and regards homelessness not as an 
isolated phenomenon but as a stage in housing pov-
erty that can be passed through (Bényei et al. 2000, 
68). In this context, a much more complex program 
is required to ease the situation that arises from the 
general problems of the housing poor (Bognár and 
Udvari, 70).
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2.2.2 Situation of the Housing Poor 
  and Related Programs
Th e cost of housing maintenance in the country has 
grown rapidly, in absolute as well as in relative terms. 
On average, housing maintenance comprised one-
third of total household incomes in 1998, compared 
to one-ﬁ fth in 1992 (Monostori 2000, 67). Both the 
price of housing equipment and the expenditure on 
loans increased (Dóra 1999, 109-110). By 1995, a 
stratum of permanent poverty emerged that included 
12 percent of all households (Hegedűs 1998, 52).
Th e following section describes the characteristics 
and circumstances of the social stratum that are of-
ﬁ cially described as housing poor in Hungary, and 
entitled to receive a housing maintenance subsidy.  A 
diﬀ erent deﬁ nition of housing poor might be more 
accurate, as the oﬃ  cial deﬁ nition considers certain 
aspects of poverty and disregards others. Nevertheless, 
it can be said that the general composition of those 
who receive this type of subsidy, or some other social 
subsidy, follow analogous patterns compared with the 
stricter deﬁ nition of housing poor. Th e use of this 
data is therefore advantageous for the purpose of this 
study (Harcsa 1999).
Social subsidies are distributed in Hungary by 
municipalities within the general national frame-
work. Th ere are three major types of subsidies in 
the Hungarian social system according, to function. 
Th e ﬁ rst type is primarily meant to compensate for 
arrears of income. It includes unemployment relief, 
child protection subsidy and regular social help. Th e 
second consists of subsidies that are targeted to those 
households whose expenses in certain categories are 
high compared to their income. Th e use of the sub-
sidies of this type is ﬁ xed. Housing maintenance sub-
sidy, public medical service and support of disabled 
fall in this category. Th e third type includes interim 
subsidies that can be given if a need for money arises 
that is beyond the family’s ﬁ nancial abilities. Th is sort 
of subsidy is not given on a regular basis (Monostori 
2000, 85).
Municipalities are relatively free to alter the frame-
work of some central government laws. Most munici-
pal income comes from the central government, which 
allocates amounts (“normatives”) according to several 
indicators to accomplish certain social goals—such 
as to provide housing maintenance subsidies. Local 
authorities have the right to reallocate, complement 
or reduce this sum within a range, provided that the 
adjustment does not endanger accomplishment of the 
subsidy program’s objectives.
Families that are in need of housing assistance can 
receive a subsidy within the framework established by 
the national social law.  Municipal authorities provide 
aid, the conditions of which they can modify through 
by-laws. According to the general law, municipali-
ties may grant maintenance aid to families when: 1) 
monthly net income per person does not exceed the 
amount of the minimal pension; 2) the ﬂ at ﬁ ts within 
the size and quality of the local average; and 3) main-
tenance costs exceed 35 percent of the total income or 
the cost of heating exceeds 20 percent of total income. 
Th e income threshold is more than twice as much as 
the statistical poverty line, and much higher than the 
thresholds for other social help. Th e social policy thus 
subsidizes not only the poor but the lower middle class 
as well. Th e system may, meanwhile, require the high 
consumption of utilities, especially for the middle 
class, which may fall within the subsidized category 
because of what they spend on utilities, not because of 
their poor ﬁ nancial status (Monostori 2000, 67–69).
Municipalities do not usually change the basic 
conditions of the general social law; rather, in vari-
ous respects, they amend them. Th e most common 
modiﬁ cation that occurs with housing maintenance 
subsidies is the establishment of the maximum size 
of a ﬂ at that can be subsidized. Instead of ﬂ at size, 
the municipality may correlate a subsidy with the size 
of a household (Monostori 2000, 75). Th e types of 
expenses that are included in maintenance costs are 
strictly deﬁ ned in the general social law.  Although 
not legally authorized, municipalities often include 
additional expenses (such as local residential taxes, ca-
ble television subscription, and so on) as maintenance 
costs (Monostori 1999, 60). In practice, however, 
the authorities usually use a family’s income as the 
threshold for granting a subsidy (Dóra 1999, 114). 
(Table 15)
A signiﬁ cant percent of households are entitled to 
these subsidies.  In 1997, a quarter of all households 
received a maintenance subsidy; 81 percent of 
these also received other forms of social subsidies 
(Monostori 1999, 61). Th e maintenance subsidy 
comprises only small part of all social subsidies.  Just 
over 7 percent of households in Budapest and 12.5 
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percent of households in the country that receive 
one kind of subsidy receive the maintenance subsidy, 
as well (Monostori 1999, 65). Over 10 percent of 
households in Budapest and 14 percent of households 
countrywide that receive two kinds of social subsidy 
receive interim subsidy in addition to the maintenance 
subsidy. Just over 8 percent of households in 
Budapest and 6 percent across the country received 
public medical service. Subsidized households can 
be characterized as small, single-member, and elderly 
(Monostori 1999, 70–73).
Households receiving two or more forms of social 
subsidy (other than the maintenance subsidy) are the 
poorest of the subsidized groups. Th ey tend to be 
young; many receive child-protection subsidies and 
income supplements.  Seventy percent have young 
Table 15
Expenditures of Accommodation Maintenance as a Ratio of Household Income by Settlement Size, 1998
Settlement 
Size
Quintile of per Capita Annual Income
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
<2000 31.1 31.6 29.2 23.6 23.3 29.0
2,001–10,000 38.7 34.7 31.9 27.7 23.4 32.2
10,000–50,000 43.8 31.3 35.1 33.0 28.7 34.1
>50,000 43.0 39.4 39.2 34.5 24.2 34.6
Budapest 47.7 37.8 41.2 33.6 25.4 33.6
Total 38.6 34.5 34.5 30.7 25.5 32.6
Source: Monostori 2000, 71.
Table 16
Distribution of Households by Size and Number of Received Social Subsidies in Hungary and Budapest, 
1997/1998 [%]
Size of the 
Household, Persons
Hungary Budapest
1 Sort 2 Sorts 3 or More Sorts 1 Sort 2 Sorts 3 or More Sorts
1 40.6 26.6 10.4 65.9 29.1 14.9
2 28.4 21.6 13.9 20.7 19.3 16.1
3 14.5 20.1 20.7 7.4 22.0 24.5
4 11.0 19.0 25.6 3.7 16.9 24.2
5 and more 5.5 14.7 29.4 2.2 12.6 20.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Monostori 1999, 70.
children (usually two), and 20 percent are one-parent 
households. Th ose that receive assistance other than 
the child-protection subsidy are also primarily young 
families with one or two children; this group includes 
small households above sixty years of age, as well. Th is 
group receives a maintenance subsidy and income 
supplements. Th e last group that receives child-pro-
tection subsidy, maintenance subsidy plus some other 
subsidies, not yet mentioned, is made up of single par-
ent households that usually have more than one child 
(Monostori 1999, 74–80). (Table 16)
Sources suggest that two-thirds of households in 
the lowest income quintile, nearly half in both the 
second and third quintiles, and a quarter in the fourth 
quintile, are entitled to the maintenance subsidy 
(Monostori 2000, 69). 
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High maintenance costs have a signiﬁ cant im-
pact on the urban poor, especially in Budapest. 
Municipalities have the right to alter the terms and the 
amount of maintenance subsidies.  In urban areas, it is 
typical for assigned amounts to be higher than in rural 
municipalities—which are generally poorer, and tend 
to assign diﬀ erent forms of subsidy. In major urban 
centers, the maintenance subsidy takes approximately 
10 percent of the overall central government subsidy 
normative (Monostori 2000, 72–73). (Table 17)
Th e increase in expenses has been particularly 
detrimental to single-member and one-parent fami-
lies; in such cases, overhead takes up half the house-
hold income (Dóra 1999,110). Th e largest portion 
of subsidized urban families (43 percent) lives in 
housing estates, which contain less than one-third of 
the urban housing stock.  Th e maintenance costs of 
ﬂ ats in housing estates are high, and the population 
tends to be poor. Consumption of utilities cannot be 
regulated. Single-member subsidized households are 
typical in housing estates—an indication of both the 
aﬀ ordability and the low social status of such hous-
ing. Th e number of subsidized families is also high 
(17 percent) in centrally located municipal tenement 
blocks than overall (less than 10 percent).  As ex-
pected, the number of subsidized families is smaller 
in neighborhood of family homes, and average in 
central, densely populated areas. Subsidized families 
occupy 30 percent of ﬂ ats that have been privatized 
since 1990, compared to 5 percent of the urban hous-
Table 17
Subsidized Households and Amount of Subsidy by Settlement Size, 1997
Settlement Size Subsidized Families per 1,000 Amount of Annual Subsidy per Flat [HUF]
<500 51 5,972
501–1,000 50 4,993
1,001–3,000 49 6,215
3,001–5,000 61 7,494
5,001–10,000 72 9,218
10,001–20,000 118 13,604
20,001–50,000 95 14,768
>50,001 81 16,563
Budapest 70 12,715
Source: Monostory 2000, 72.
ing stock in general. It appears as though low rents 
have been succeeded by maintenance subsidies since 
privatization; as a result of this processes, families of 
low socioeconomic status tend to predominate in the 
remaining tenement sector (Monostory 2000, 74–75, 
79, 82).
Th e cost of heating, approximately 46 percent of 
wintertime household related expenses for subsidized 
families, comprises the major element in maintenance 
costs. (Székely 1999, 95).  Dwellings with commu-
nal central heating, whether in housing estates or in 
older central areas, are over-represented among sub-
sidized households, due to the high cost of heating. 
(Monostori 2000, 78). Moreover, communal central 
heating cannot be regulated. Households are not able 
to reduce the amount of heat received through pipes 
from the central distributive centers, while one-third 
of subsidized families do not heat the entire dwelling, 
especially those with independently heated rooms 
(Székely 1999, 96). (Table 18)
Subsidized families are usually small (one person), 
with relatively high income and high housing expendi-
tures; less often, they are large (more than ﬁ ve people) 
with low per capita income and relatively low housing 
expenditures (Monostori 2000, 79 and 84). Single-
member households tend to be pensioners, while large 
families are usually young adults with many children 
(Monostori 2000, 87 and Harcsa 1999, 28). Single, 
middle-aged men with low and unstable incomes, 
who are under- or unqualiﬁ ed for any subsidy, are 
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Table 18
Annual Price of Heating by Heating Method in Subsidized Households, 1998 [HUF/m2]
Method of Heating Budapest and County Centers Hungary
Communal central 145 134
Dependent central 96 102
Independent room with gas 94 94
Independent room with other material 95 97
Total 109 104
Source: Székely 1999, 95.
Table 19
Index of quality of Flats by Dwelling Types in Urban Areas, 1996 and 1998
Indicator of Quality Type of Dwelling
Family House Flat in Condominium 
or Tenement Building
Flat in Housing Estate
Subsidized Total Subsidized Total Subsidized Total
Individual central heating 35.3 47.7 11.3 21.7 7.2 9.9
Communal central heating * 0.3 30.9 16.8 79.3 66.3
Gas heating and bathroom 19.0 22.6 31.2 49.0 8.3 20.9
Other sort of heating and bathroom 23.7 11.6 16.9 2.1 3.8 0.1
Other sort of heating, no bathroom 20.3 17.8 9.6 10.5 * 2.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Insuﬃ  cient amount of cases.
Source: Monostori 2000, 78.
in danger of falling out of the housing market and of 
becoming homeless (Dóra 1999, 110). (Table 19)
Concerning the quality of dwellings of house-
holds receiving maintenance subsidy, and measured 
by type of heating and the existence of bathroom, 
subsidized families are over-represented in ﬂ ats with 
a bathroom and with communal, central heating or 
other, disadvantageous, non-gas types of heating. 
Th ey are, however, slightly underrepresented within 
the strata living in tenement buildings without bath-
room facilities or proper heating. As such, a fragment 
of the population is part of a system in which a certain 
level of maintenance cost is needed for subsidiza-
tion. Th e inability to enter the system is likely due 
to the low ratio of maintenance costs that result from 
minimal usage or the virtual lack of utilities (such as 
heating and bathroom facilities) as a consequence of 
poor equipment in the dwellings of the lower socio-
economic strata (Monostori 2000, 76–79). Data also 
reveal that the undereducated are generally under-
represented nationally among the subsidized, but the 
inverse is true in Budapest, which indicates that social 
programs are not reaching the lowest classes except in 
the capital city (Harcsa 1999, 37–38).
Th e general housing conditions of households 
receiving housing maintenance subsidies are not 
signiﬁ cantly worse than the national average. As 
mentioned earlier, the income threshold is relatively 
high; in addition, many households have remained in 
larger dwellings than they are able to maintain (as a 
result of the low mobility rate in Hungary) and are 
therefore entitled to subsidization (Dóra 1999, 107, 
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110; Tosics and Hegedűs 1994/2, 145). Th e rate of 
mobility is low within all strata of society: in 1993, 
approximately 8 percent planned to move in the fol-
lowing year (Hegedűs 1998, 53). (Table 20)
Th e number of ﬂ ats owned by the municipality is 
higher among subsidized households, and the size of 
their dwellings tends to be smaller. When smaller ﬂ ats 
are combined with a larger household size, the subsi-
dized housing environment becomes quite crowded. 
(Table 21)
Table 20
Distribution of Households by the Sort of Ownership and by the Number of Rooms in Hungary 1998 [%]
Dwellings in Subsidized Households All Households*
Private ownership Total 86.8 92.4
one room 15.6 12.8
two rooms 44.8 45.9
three or more rooms 26.4 33.7
Municipal ownership total 10.9 6.1
one room 4.6 2.5
two rooms 5.7 2.8
three or more rooms 0.6 0.8
Other forms of ownership 2.4 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0
* In 1996.
Source: Székely 1999, 88.
Table 21
Ownership and Type of Dwellings in Budapest and Hungary, 1998 [%]
Dwellings Subsidized Households All Households (1996)
Budapest Hungary Budapest Hungary
Pre-1960 family house 7.6 24.9 12.5 28.3
Post-1960 family house 5.6 36.0 10.0 33.5
Private ﬂ at in tenement block 39.6 11.3 31.7 13.2
Private ﬂ at in housing estate 5.9 14.6 28.5 17.5
Municipal tenement dwelling in housing estate 1.2 2.3 3.4 1.7
municipal tenement dwelling elsewhere and other 40.1 11.0 13.9 5.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Székely 1999, 89.
Th e major group of subsidized households in 
Budapest lives in municipally-owned or recently 
privatized ﬂ ats. Th e number in need is high among 
those who have not been able to buy their dwellings, 
or in which the municipality has not been able to pri-
vatize—in many cases due to the poor condition of 
the housing block. On the other hand, many of the 
less wealthy bought their ﬂ ats during privatization: 15 
percent of those receiving subsidies live in privatized 
tenement ﬂ ats while the national average is 13 percent 
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(Székely 1999, 91). Overall, in urban areas, the hous-
ing poor are concentrated in the municipal tenement 
houses (Székely 1999, 99) and in certain, economi-
cally deprived, privatized areas. (Table 22, Table 23)
Th e quality of dwellings in regard to ﬂ oor space 
of subsidized families is worse in Budapest than the 
national average. It can, however, be argued that the 
diﬀ erence between subsidized households and house-
holds overall is not signiﬁ cant in Budapest.
In 1998, among subsidized families, 17 percent 
had one or more bills and fees in arrears and eleven 
Table 22
Ratio of Self-contained Dwellings by the Type in Budapest and in Hungary, 1998 [%]
Dwellings Subsidized households All households (1996)
Budapest Hungary Budapest Hungary
Pre-1960 family house 84.6 46.2 82.5 52.2
Post-1960 family house 78.9 72.8 94.8 85.2
Private ﬂ at in tenement block 85.3 89.0 92.6 94.4
Private ﬂ at in housing estate 91.9 92.4 98.8 99.0
Municipal tenement dwelling in housing estate 100.0 88.9 94.7 96.0
Municipal tenement dwelling elsewhere & other 57.8 53.2 66.3 68.0
Total 74.4 69.1 89.7 78.6
Source: Székely 1999, 90.
Table 23
Average Floor Space by the Type of Dwelling in Budapest and Hungary, 1998[m2]
Dwellings Subsidized households All households (1996)
Budapest Hungary Budapest Hungary
Pre-1960 family house 53 65 69 70
Post-1960 family house 69 84 98 93
Private ﬂ at in tenement block 54 55 64 63
Private ﬂ at in housing estate 56 54 53 54
Municipal tenement dwelling in housing estate 40 49 49 49
Municipal tenement dwelling elsewhere & other 44 46 50 53
Total 51 67 63 73
Source: Székely 1999, 91.
percent had unpaid household maintenance bills. 
More than half of those with debts had at least two 
unpaid bills. Water, electricity and heating costs 
were most frequently not paid in time (Dóra 1999, 
115).  Th e same year, subsidized households listed 
the increasing cost of maintenance, unemployment 
and problems related to the upbringing of children 
as major factors behind their present problems; di-
vorce, illnesses and medical costs were also mentioned 
(Monostori 2000, 80-81). Several surveys reveal such 
patterns (see Table 13). (Table 24)
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Table 24
Causes of Material Hardship Amongst the Subsidized Families in 1998 [%]
Causes of hardship Ratio of households
Drop-out of the wage-earner Total 71.9
due to Unemployment 41.9
serious illness, disablement 21.7
child care 8.3
Increase of maintenance costs Total 60.5
due to increasing overhead 52.3
increasing interest rates 8.2
Increasing cost of child nursing 29.6
Increasing medical expenditures 23.8
Superannuation 15.5
Decease 11.3
Divorce 9.8
Other 1.6
Source:  Dóra 1999, 110.
3. POLICY OPTIONS
Policies regarding housing in general and the hous-
ing poor in particular have been on the agenda in 
Hungary for a number of years; problems have been 
discussed both in academic and political circles. Th is 
paper largely relies upon the present housing dis-
course, but also provides a wider perspective on the 
subject. Th e policy alternatives suggested are intended 
to be realistic and ﬁ nancially feasible. Th e advantages, 
disadvantages and the limiting factors of the proposed 
policies are addressed. Th e policy options for the 
homeless are dealt with brieﬂ y, as this paper does not 
focus on their situation.
Th e subject of housing is closely related to other 
societal phenomena. Th e quality of housing is of 
principal importance to the well being of individuals 
and of society as a whole. Construction and related 
industries are fundamental to the general economy, 
and contribute a signiﬁ cant amount of income to 
the national budget through taxation.  Any changes 
in housing policies will therefore invoke intense 
responses from citizens, the economy, and the state. 
On the other hand, any change in the conditions of 
the economy, and of the national budget, will generate 
a shift in housing and in housing policies. Th e present 
political debate on these issues and rapid changes of 
conditions, as mentioned in previous chapters, com-
plicate an accurate, up-to-date description of the situ-
ation. Policy options, however, can be examined.
Housing in general is part of the political dis-
course in Hungary on the national level, but the 
problems of the housing poor are little discussed or 
debated. Generally speaking, the discussion focuses 
on the housing problems of the middle class. It is local 
municipalities, and mostly the poorer, less inﬂ uential 
ones, that are aﬀ ected by, and must face the problems 
of, housing poverty.
Housing conditions are an important aspect of 
urban politics as well. Th e rapid suburbanization of 
Budapest, and the impoverishment and social and 
physical decay of certain central areas, has evoked a 
response among experts and policymakers in the city. 
Retaining the middle classes in central areas, promot-
ing the youth to seek housing in these neighborhoods, 
renewing the housing stock and easing the situation 
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of housing poor have been set as priorities (Tosics 
2000, 135).
Th ere is no “perfect” solution to housing poverty. 
Such a solution would impose too great a ﬁ nancial 
burden upon society as a whole. Furthermore, hous-
ing poverty is a phenomenon with causes that exist 
ubiquitously; proposing one or more “ultimate” solu-
tions would be an unproductive oversimpliﬁ cation. 
Various tools and methods have been fashioned to 
ease the problem, each of which is strictly constrained 
by available ﬁ nancial resources.
In Hungary, the lack of suﬃ  cient ﬁ nancial re-
sources to implement housing policies is particularly 
acute. Poor families cannot aﬀ ord to pay for basic, es-
sential housing costs, but a large potion of the middle 
class is hardly able to maintain their present housing 
or secure decent, safe and sanitary housing conditions. 
Local authorities, responsible for dealing with almost 
all the social problems within their jurisdiction, have 
very limited resources, especially those with large poor 
populations. Recently, the national economy has 
worsened, and budget deﬁ cits have soared compared 
to conditions two or three years ago. Governmental 
resources that were spent on housing have been 
among the ﬁ rst to be sharply reduced.
Th e following policy options are divided into three 
major groups: 1) policies relating to those who already 
have housing; 2) policies relating to those who do not 
have housing, but do not fall within the category of 
homeless; and 3) policies relating to the condition of 
the housing stock and the housing market.
3.1 Policies Relating to Those
  with Housing
More accurate targeting of the housing subsidy system 
is necessary in general. Many argue that the present 
system subsidizes those who are not really in need, 
and excludes those who require help. Other than a 
need for accurate targeting, subsidies should not be 
attractive to members of the upper classes, whose 
involvement would deplete the ﬁ nancial resources of 
programs and misdirect the system. As for targeted 
groups, the information provided should be in a user-
friendly, comprehensible form.
Th e category of those who have housing is made 
up of owners and tenants, and their problems dif-
fer by nature. Rental housing can be in private or 
municipal possession. Th e number of tenants in the 
private market is uncertain. Th e number of tenants 
in the municipal sphere, although it has decreased 
signiﬁ cantly, is still relatively high. In the 8th District 
in Budapest (severely aﬀ ected by poverty), the mu-
nicipality still owns 8,000 dwelling units, many of 
them substandard. As a consequence of privatization, 
much of the municipalities’ stock of rental dwellings 
is substandard. During transition, municipalities had 
the right to deny privatization of dwellings in blocks 
that were determined to need rehabilitation or were 
otherwise in bad shape. Municipalities were reluctant 
to sell these dwelling units for fear of having to pay 
future possible compensation to the purchasers if 
problems occurred.
Th e mass redevelopment of poverty-aﬀ ected areas 
cannot be carried out without the intervention of the 
central government. Th is subject is beyond the scope 
of this paper; redevelopment, however, would often 
be the appropriate answer to poor living conditions. 
Th e condition of a great deal of municipal tenement 
blocks, and of privatized blocks, is so poor that demo-
lition may be the only viable solution. Th e present 
academic discourse does not promote demolition as 
a solution, but in many cases, it could be a workable 
solution when other means of improving conditions 
do not work or are too costly. Any large-scale redevel-
opment presumes an existing housing stock to which 
families could temporarily or permanently relocate. At 
present, families are often moved to cheap, blighted 
neighborhoods during the redevelopment of remote 
areas of the city, further diminishing their quality of 
life. Aﬀ ected municipalities object to the redevelop-
ment process, but with little success, as organizations 
and other municipalities carrying out redevelopment 
are not legally obligated to move relocated families 
into nearby neighborhoods, only to dwellings of simi-
lar quality. As for small-case intervention, a targeted 
subsidy system could be an option in cases in which 
certain improvements would signiﬁ cantly upgrade the 
conditions of families, and even reduce maintenance 
costs—for example, new heating methods, improved 
insulation, and so on. Th e poor quality of housing and 
lack of utilities is problematic for both homeowners 
and tenants.
High maintenance fees appear in two major 
forms. First, the monthly condominium mainte-
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nance and operation fees often do not cover actual 
maintenance, operation, and capital costs. Th is results 
in deferred maintenance and capital improvements 
and the need for substantial fee increases or special 
assessments to pay for essential rehabilitation. Th e 
community of the condominium, if it is willing, may 
use existing ﬁ nancial and legal tools to address this 
problem, such as increasing the fees and attempting 
to collect them from those who are not willing or 
able to pay, and if it proves insuﬃ  cient, or encum-
brance could legally be registered on the particular 
ﬂ at. Families in need may also ask for subsidies from 
the local authorities (as described in earlier chapters). 
Furthermore, municipalities can provide support for 
needed rehabilitation, although the support of the 
process and of organizing the rehabilitation could be 
a municipal task. Now, condominiums of at least six 
ﬂ ats may apply for grants from a fund managed by the 
central Budapest municipality for certain a of the total 
cost of the reconstruction that could further be com-
plemented with grants and interest-free loans from the 
local authorities in Budapest the conditions of which 
are set in bylaws of the particular municipality. Local 
municipalities also run such programs independently 
from the central municipality, and local municipali-
ties may apply for the central grant for the renovation 
of the municipal tenement blocks. Th e actual rates of 
subsidies depend on the location and the purpose of 
the renovation and are set annually. Th e utilization of 
the above system often fails because the condomini-
ums lack the suitable and agile person(s) who could 
organize the project. Th e municipalities could help 
by setting up supporting services and informing the 
homeowners.
High maintenance fees also arise when families, 
either owners or tenants, are unable to pay their ac-
tual housing expenses. Th e present subsidy system 
attempts to tackle the problem by granting mainte-
nance subsidies but often fails to locate those in need 
because it basically takes the ratio of maintenance 
costs within the family income as a condition, while 
the cost of maintenance is low where basic utilities 
are lacking and thus the ratio will be too low for the 
subsidy. Th e income threshold is too high—higher 
than poverty thresholds calculated through any other 
method—and includes a large portion of the middle 
class (Monostori, 2000, 68). Moreover, the system fa-
vors those who have the necessary information on the 
existence and the conditions of subsidies and have the 
competence to complete the necessary papers; there 
are few attempts to reach those not part of the system. 
Meanwhile, since the subsidy fund is limited, broad-
ening signiﬁ cantly the range of the subsidized would 
soon deplete resources. By subsidizing those who are 
not in arrears, the subsidy system excludes many fami-
lies who are in need. Whereas the system should award 
those not in arrears and should act towards hindering 
from becoming in arrears, a signiﬁ cant proportion of 
the poor cannot emerge from arrears.  A well targeted 
system could improve their situation and help them 
by-pass continuous arrears. 
In addition to the previously mentioned system 
reﬁ nements, there are various other options for help-
ing families in need. Re-nationalization of dwelling 
units has been suggested as a viable option, but for 
reasons expressed below, this is not a viable solution. 
Providing families support in ﬁ nding another, more 
aﬀ ordable dwelling is another option, but this would 
also require relaxation of the existing taxation system 
to allow greater mobility (see below).
Th e reverse mortgage, which has been intro-
duced in some municipalities (like in 13th district in 
Budapest in 1998), could be made available in other 
areas. In this district, people above the age of 62 may 
participate in the program as annuitants, and would-
be buyers as reversioners. For the transmission of the 
ownership, the annuitants receive a monthly install-
ment depending on the age of the annuitant and the 
actual value of the ﬂ at.   Th e annuitants can occupy 
the ﬂ at until the end of their lives or until they move 
to a retirement home. Th e installments are annu-
ally adjusted to the inﬂ ation rate.  Reversioners pay 
a monthly fee to the organizer (which, in the case 
of 13th district, is the local municipality) for a given 
period of time (four to twelve years). Th e actual sum 
of monthly installment depends on the length of the 
time the reversioners undertook. Reversioners have 
right of possession of the dwellings of the deceased an-
nuitants if they are able to pay the diﬀ erence between 
the sum they have already paid and the value of the 
particular dwelling. Furthermore, the municipality 
covenants that reversioners obtain dwellings within 
one year after the time upon which they agreed to 
pay is over. Th e reverse mortgage provides retirees a 
reliable source of income for housing expenses, can 
guarantee utility companies that utility charges will be 
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paid, and assures the lender that the investment will 
not be lost if problems arise. By involving reversion-
ers, the necessary ﬁ nancial resources can be kept low. 
It is disadvantageous for the heirs of the annuitant 
who may attempt to thwart the process. Resistance 
by relatives occurs many cases in a country where ac-
commodations are a precious asset, and often diﬃ  cult 
to obtain.
A traditional method of preserving a home in 
Hungary has been through “maintenance,” where a 
person or family agrees to support an elderly person 
or family at a predetermined level, possibly live in 
part of the dwelling, and take ownership of the home 
when the owner (or in some cases the renter) dies. 
Th is method can be considered a primitive form of 
reverse mortgage.
3.2 Policies Relating to Those 
  Who Lack Housing
In addition to subsidized mortgage loans, a func-
tioning rental housing market is essential to provide 
housing for those who do not own housing and who 
either do not qualify for, or cannot gain entry into 
publicly-owned housing. In spite of the subsidies, the 
purchase of a dwelling requires large sums of money, 
and is therefore not an option for the majority of 
the housing poor. Th e small number of municipally 
owned tenement units is an obstacle to housing the 
poor in Hungary, but a large-scale increase seems very 
unlikely in the near future. Th e re-purchase of priva-
tized dwellings would require huge sums, and the pur-
chase of dwelling units at present market prices would 
hardly be justiﬁ able given the low prices at which 
they were sold when during privatization. Purchase of 
units at a reduced price would be possible only from a 
small, economically deprived minority. On the other 
hand, municipalities are unwilling to purchase units 
because of the high cost of maintenance. In fact, mu-
nicipalities still in possession of signiﬁ cant numbers of 
dwelling units are considering further privatization. 
Th e eighth district of Budapest is planning to 
reduce its 11,000 unit housing stock to 4,000 from 
6,000 by 2006, because it lacks the ﬁ nancial resources 
to maintain such a large number of units. Current 
municipal rents—HUF 55 per square meter for sub-
standard and HUF 100 per square meter for standard 
(market rent is approximately HUF 1000 per square 
meters)—do not provide suﬃ  cient revenue for opera-
tions and maintenance, which makes the municipal 
tenement stock a huge burden. According to the plan, 
the remaining tenement stock will be divided into two 
groups. Th e ﬁ rst group will consist of better quality 
dwellings that will be rented for a regulated rent that 
will cover maintenance and a small proﬁ t. Th e second 
group will include social housing that will be partly 
subsidized by revenues from better quality dwellings. 
Such a division of the municipal tenement stock, 
on the level of the entire urban area, is suggested by 
many experts.  It is advocated as a feasible means for 
the expansion of the municipal tenement sector, and 
thus it could abet the reconstruction, and stem the 
further loss of population in the central areas (Tosics 
2000, 139).
Government policies have promoted the con-
struction of municipal tenement blocks, and subsidies 
have been provided for this purpose. Th e number of 
dwellings built or planned, however, has been small, 
partly because municipalities (for reasons expressed 
above) are reluctant to take on new units. Moreover, 
the construction of social housing is unpopular with 
large segments of the public who fear having the poor 
and deprived in their neighborhoods.  Despite the op-
position, the construction of new municipal tenement 
blocks could be an attractive option if municipalities 
are no longer interested in further privatization. Th e 
equal treatment of the private and the municipal ten-
ement spheres within the central subsidy system on 
the governmental side could be a possible means of 
preventing municipalities from selling their housing 
stock. Th is would allow the municipalities to raise 
rents to cover the costs and thus to subsidize those in 
really need.
Th e current administration, acknowledging the 
lack of governmental resources, has been consider-
ing assigning the responsibility for addressing the 
country’s housing needs to the private sector. Th e 
investment of private resources could produce a huge 
amount of rental housing if a large number of tenants 
have enough wealth to pay market rents, and if the 
taxation of tenure were advantageous. According to 
the existing plans, vouchers would be given to cover 
certain portions of the rent for families determined 
to need subsidized housing; provided that the private 
landlords agree to a regulated, oﬃ  cial rent. 
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Regulated rent would be at about the level of the 
present private rent. Currently, the vast majority of 
private rentals are unoﬃ  cial, to evade high rental tax-
es. Th ese unoﬃ  cial rental agreements are ﬁ nancially 
advantageous for both landlords and tenants. Th e 
establishment of a large, oﬃ  cial, private rental market 
thus requires multiple eﬀ orts by diverse authorities. 
Th is includes the amendment of the laws related to 
taxation and the regulation of the rental sphere, in ad-
dition to establishment of a voucher program. On the 
other hand, the arrival of a new and plentiful demand 
on the rental sector would result in increasing rents, a 
disadvantageous side-eﬀ ect for those who do not fall 
into the subsidized category. Although the present 
plan targets proﬁ t-oriented developers, its expansion 
to other, non-proﬁ t forms of developers and public-
private-partnership schemes that involve private ﬁ -
nancial resources in public programs through various 
sorts of subsidies seems beneﬁ cial. Moreover, the in-
corporation of the municipal tenement sphere in the 
voucher system could relieve the present reluctance of 
municipalities to developing and owning tenement 
units. Th is option requires large governmental action 
and resources, but it could be a viable alternative if 
the voucher system included the municipal tenement 
sector, too.
Th e homeless form a distinct portion of those 
who do not currently have housing.  Th eir problems 
are speciﬁ c, and relate to other ﬁ elds far from housing 
(such as health or psychiatric support).  Concerning 
the present system of homeless care in Budapest, the 
quantity of beds in diﬀ erent shelters appears to be ad-
equate, but the quality and the spatial allocation need 
to develop. Th e present system treats all homeless 
equally, regardless of their diﬀ erent needs; thus, diver-
siﬁ cation of the system is necessary. Th e total capacity 
of permanent shelters is small, and that of temporary 
shelters is comparatively high. Th e homeless are thus 
forced to use temporary shelters for longer periods 
than intended; as a result, the overuse of temporary 
shelters leads to their dysfunctional operation. Th e 
present system is inadequate in terms of helping the 
homeless permanently change their situation. Special 
organizations are needed, not only to provide hous-
ing, but also to help the homeless sustain their recov-
ery. (Tosics 2000, 141). 
Th e spatial segregation of the shelters does not 
directly aﬀ ect the homeless, but as the shelters tend to 
be concentrated in poor areas of the city, the cost of 
maintenance of the system weighs on the poorer mu-
nicipalities. Th e spatial dispersion of the shelters and 
a sort of compensatory system would be advantageous 
for the entire system of homeless care.
3.3 Policies Regarding the Conditions 
  of the Housing Stock
Th e unfavorable distribution of the housing stock is 
considered to be a major obstacle in Hungary. Th e 
mobility rate is very low compared with western 
societies, and the possession of a dwelling, which is 
a precious asset, often hinders the movement of in-
dividuals and families to another location where they 
could earn more income, or to a diﬀ erent dwelling 
where maintenance costs might be lower. Hungarian 
transfer taxes correspond to those in other European 
nations with higher rates of mobility, and they do not 
even apply to the diﬀ erence between the selling and 
the purchase price if the new purchase is within one 
year of the sale.  Th e low mobility rate thus seems to 
be a speciﬁ c feature that is changing slowly. Legaliza-
tion of the private rental sector has been attempted 
several times with little success; subsequent steps are 
needed. Furthermore, the equal treatment of diﬀ erent 
forms of the rental sphere could prevent the erosion of 
the municipal rental sector.
Th e present restrictive ﬁ scal situation does not 
favor large-scale interventions; on the other hand, it 
may promote better targeting of the subsidiary system.
POSTSCRIPT
Because of the economic hardships during the com-
pletion of this paper in the summer of 2003, the 
government has revised some of the policies and 
subsidies relating to the housing sector, and many of 
the conditioned have toughened. It is not yet clear to 
what extent these restrictions will aﬀ ect the system of 
diverse subsidies. It seems likely that mortgage loans 
subsidies will be reduced, and tax credit for such loans 
will be lowered. On the other hand, it does not seem 
presumptive that subsidies related to housing poor 
will be aﬀ ected signiﬁ cantly, but the current poor 
economic situation of municipalities that carry out 
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the social tasks in Hungary will no doubt negatively 
aﬀ ect their housing policies. Th e net growth of money 
spent on programs designed for housing poor seems 
NOTES
1 Th is pertains to the diﬀ erence between actual rents and market rents.
2 In 1989, 1 USD  = 60.06 HUF 
3 Sources vary.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, the impoverishment of the 
Serbian population, coupled with the government’s 
withdrawal from the business of providing and 
regulating housing, has resulted in increased hous-
ing poverty and the general deterioration of the 
housing stock. At the same time, the privatization of 
publicly-owned housing has led to an exceptionally 
skewed tenure structure of the housing stock in urban 
centers. As a result, Serbia has become a society of 
poor homeowners, with 98 percent of the housing 
stock privately-owned. 
Th ough the poverty and disorder that has recently 
become characteristic of the urban structure of Serbian 
cities has been widely recognized, housing policy has 
not been a priority for the ﬁ rst reform government 
that came to power in 2000. Th e purpose of this paper 
is to describe and analyze housing poverty in the city 
of Belgrade, and to present policy options that can 
also be applied to smaller urban centers in Serbia.1 
Based on the analysis, the paper concludes that the 
development of an eﬃ  cient housing market on the 
one hand, and the reduction of housing poverty on 
the other, should receive the full attention of central 
and local governments in Serbia.
In describing and analyzing the housing poor 
in Belgrade, housing poverty is deﬁ ned as: 1) living 
in substandard housing; 2) living in overcrowded 
conditions; 3) a high housing expenditures-to-income 
ratio; 4) inability to make utility payments; and 5) 
homelessness. All current publicly available data 
sources and estimations have been used, including the 
unoﬃ  cial preliminary 2002 national census data on 
the housing stock. Nevertheless, the lack of statistical 
deﬁ nitions and data sources has imposed signiﬁ cant 
limitations on describing, understanding and analyz-
ing of some aspects of housing poverty. In such cir-
cumstances, alternative methods for estimating the 
size and the character of the housing problem are 
suggested, and indirect indicators used.
Th is paper begins by providing the background 
of the problem of housing poverty in Belgrade, fo-
cusing on: mass privatization of the housing stock 
and deregulation in the 1990s, and its consequences 
for the Belgrade housing sector. Characteristics of 
the Belgrade housing stock, drawn from the 2002 
national census, are also presented. Th en, several as-
pects of housing poverty in Belgrade are analyzed and 
discussed. Th is is followed by an assessment of and 
recommendations for policy solutions for reducing 
housing poverty in Belgrade and in other urban cent-
ers. Finally, the paper concludes with practical policy 
options, with the goal to facilitate policy implementa-
tion and the reduction of poverty in housing.
2. HOUSING POVERTY IN SERBIA: 
 PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
2.1 Background: The Housing Sector 
  Post-Socialism 
2.1.1 Privatization of the Public Housing Stock, 
  Deregulation and the Lack of a National 
  Housing Policy
Apart from the introduction of a multi-party system 
in the 1990s, it is impossible to talk about substantial 
systemic reforms, from state socialism to a democratic 
and market-based system. Th ere was, under Milosević, 
a proclaimed intention to privatize publicly-owned 
enterprises, but the process was very slow and the 
economic eﬀ ects minor. A rare case of radical change 
was brought about, however, in the housing sector. Th e 
introduction of the 1990 Law on Housing Relations 
(Zakon o stambenim odnosima) and subsequently the 
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1992 Law on Housing (Zakon o stanovanju) formed 
a legal framework for the mass privatization of public 
housing units. From 1990 to the end of 1993, nearly 
98 percent of the publicly-owned housing stock in 
Serbia (approximately 95 percent in Belgrade) was 
privatized (Petrović 2001; Petrović 2002).2 Prelimi-
nary 2002 national census data supports this: there 
are 43,727 public rental units out of 2,513,804 in-
habited ﬂ ats in Serbia. Th e rest are housing units in 
private ownership (preliminary 2002 national census 
data in Republički zavod za informatiku i statistiku, 
October 2002). Consequently, Serbia became almost 
exclusively a nation of homeowners.3
No new housing legislation has been enacted 
since 1992. Th e 1992 housing law is the last and 
only legal act regulating the operation of market 
mechanisms in the housing sector. No new legal or 
ﬁ nancial principles, or other measures for regulating 
the new market-oriented system for providing 
housing, have been introduced; there has been no 
further developments toward a state housing policy. 
No ﬁ nancial or other incentives—such as cheap 
housing loans, mortgage-type of loans or housing 
allowances—have been created to stimulate either 
supply or demand.
Th e 1992 housing law granted municipal autho-
rities responsibility for the housing needs of: 1) indi-
viduals who are unable to work, or who are 
members of households in which no one is able to 
work; 2) tenants in denationalized ﬂ ats;4 3) citizens 
living in “non-hygienic” conditions (slums); and 
4) individuals who have been recognized for their 
special contribution to the social life of their com-
munities—such as scientists, sportsmen, and artists. 
Municipalities, however, have been given no ﬁ nancial 
resources to solve the housing problems of these 
groups. Th e only ﬂ ats that municipalities own are 
those very few that were not privatized. However, 
these ﬂ ats are not available for distribution because 
they are mostly occupied by tenants who possess a 
life-long right to rent them. Th us, due to the near 
total privatization of the housing stock, municipalities 
do not have ﬂ ats that can be distributed to the groups 
of people they are mandated to serve, let alone to 
other socially and economically deprived citizens in 
need of housing not listed in the 1992 law. 
Th e 1990 and 1992 housing acts created the 
opportunity for the deregulation of public sector rents; 
regardless, rent levels remained very low. According to 
data from 2000, household expenditures for rent in 
public housing were about 1.7 percent of the average 
household income in Serbia, and 2.5 percent in 
Belgrade (Petrović 2002; Belgrade Statistical Yearbook 
2001). Unlike public rental housing, the 1992 law left 
private rental housing completely to market forces. As 
such, there is now no control over the level of rents in 
private rentals. Likewise, there is no deﬁ nition of the 
contractual relationships and responsibilities of the 
actors involved, including the security of the rental 
relationship, responsibilities for the maintenance of 
the ﬂ at and the deﬁ nition of the minimum standards 
that the ﬂ ats in the private rental sector must meet to 
be rentable. 
A severe economic crisis, along with negligible 
transformations in all policy sectors, the withdrawal 
of the state from providing housing, and the lack of a 
housing policy under Milosević, led to a considerable 
fall in overall housing investment and production 
as compared with the socialist period.5 According 
to the latest available data (Table 5), over 27,000 
new housing units have been built since 1996 in the 
Belgrade metropolitan area.
Th e decline in legal housing construction, the 
state’s withdrawal from housing development, and 
the lack of development of new legal and institutional 
framework that would support new housing pro-
duction of any type, provoked an escalation of 
alternative (and) individual strategies for satisfying 
housing needs. Th ese individual strategies concerned 
primarily self-help and illegal construction. Illegal 
construction—constructing a building without ob-
taining the required permits—as a housing strategy 
was, in fact, inherited from the socialist regime, but 
experienced a dramatic increase in the 1990s. One 
estimate suggests that, since 1996,6 for every 100 
legally constructed dwellings, there at least 80 illegally 
constructed dwellings in the Belgrade metropolitan 
area (Petrović 2002, 157).7
Th e introduction of a multi-party parliamentary 
system and the mass privatization of housing were the 
only substantial steps taken towards transforming 
the previous socialist regime to a democratic market 
based system. Th e current system has perpetuated, 
if not increased, the social inequalities in housing 
it inherited. Th e role that mass privatization played 
under Milosević was both practical and symbolic, 
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especially in light of the absence of regulatory 
measures that would help increase housing production 
and improve housing maintenance in the new market-
based conditions. From the practical side, housing 
privatization served as a means of converting public/
social capital into private capital. Th is conversion 
served mostly the members of the socialist political 
elite, but also put some property into the hands of the 
middle class. Housing privatization acted as a shock 
absorber for impoverished middle class households by 
giving them the impression that they were not among 
the “losers” in the transformation. Th e symbolic role 
of housing privatization, therefore, was to preserve 
social peace against the odds while enabling some 
market mechanisms to function—especially in the 
secondary housing market. 
2.1.2 Characteristics of the Belgrade Housing Stock
According to the unoﬃ  cial, preliminary 2002 national 
census data,8 about 97.2 percent of all inhabited ﬂ ats 
for permanent habitation (nastanjeni stanovi za stalno 
stanovanje)9 are privately-owned in the metropolitan 
area of the City of Belgrade, and only about 2.8 
percent are public sector rentals (Table 1). However, 
there is a sub-group of ﬂ ats that are privately-owned 
but inhabited by other-than-owner users: a) those 
inhabited by private tenants; b) relatives of the owner’s 
family; and c) other types of users. All together, there 
are nearly 60,000 inhabited ﬂ ats in this group, about 
14 percent of all inhabited ﬂ ats. In the absence 
of any oﬃ  cial register of the private rental sector, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the ﬂ ats under 
Table 1
Tenure Structure of Inhabited Flats for Permanent Habitation in Belgrade Metropolitan Area, 200210
Number Percent
Total 403,254 100.0
Private ownership 382,277 97.2
Inhabited by the owner 323,321
Inhabited by private tenants (a) 23,404
Inhabited by cousins (b) 30,763
Inhabited by other users (c) 4,789
Public sector 11,436 2.8
Source: Unoﬃ  cial preliminary 2002 national census data (Republički zavod za informatiku i statistiku, 2002).
Table 2
Selection of Housing Indicators for Belgrade and Serbia, 200211
Belgrade Metropolitan Area Serbia12
Average number of households per ﬂ at 0.93* 0.88
Average size of a ﬂ at [m2] 58.9
Square meter per person 21.7 25
Average household size 2.7* 2.9
* Calculated for the City of Belgrade.
Source: Calculations for Belgrade by author, the basis of unoﬃ  cial preliminary national census 2002 data (Republički zavod za informa-
tiku i statistiku 2002); for Serbia: UN Habitat (2003a).
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sub-groups a) and c) are all private rentals (together, 
7 percent of all inhabited ﬂ ats). It is also reasonable 
to assume that a signiﬁ cant part of ﬂ ats for which 
relatives of the owners’ family are registered are also 
private rentals—that is, rented according to diﬀ erent 
unoﬃ  cial arrangements between ﬂ at owners and users 
(be they registered in the census as tenants, cousins, 
or others).13 It follows that about 82 percent of all 
inhabited ﬂ ats in the Belgrade metropolitan area are 
inhabited by their owners and their families, between 
7 and 10 percent are private rentals,14 about 3 to 4 
percent are inhabited by the children of the owner 
or other relatives who do not pay rent, and almost 3 
percent are non-privatized public rentals.
Table 3 shows the structure of inhabited ﬂ ats for 
permanent habitation according to the number of 
rooms in a ﬂ at in Belgrade metropolitan area. Two-
room ﬂ ats are the most common (about 42 percent), 
and one-room ﬂ ats of both types cover 22 percent of 
all inhabited ﬂ ats.
In terms of the average surface area per person, 
Table 4 reveals that about 32 percent of all inhabited 
ﬂ ats have less than ﬁ fteen square meters per person, 
and even 13 percent have less than ten square meters 
per person. About 43 percent of inhabited ﬂ ats have 
between 15–30 square meters per person, and around 
25 percent of inhabited ﬂ ats have more than 30 
square meters per household member. 
Table 3
Room-structure of Inhabited Flats in Belgrade Metropolitan Area, 2002 
Total inhabited ﬂ ats for permanent habitation 403,254
Individual rooms 1,312
One-room ﬂ ats (without separate kitchen, with separate bathroom) 31,876
One-room ﬂ at (with separate kitchen and bathroom) 60,803
Two-room 170,446
Th ree-room 99,647
Four-room 27,181
Five and more rooms 10,279
Source: Unoﬃ  cial preliminary 2002 national census data (Republički zavod za informatiku i statistiku 2002).
Table 4
Structure of Inhabited Flats for Permanent Habitation According to the Average Surface Area per Person 
in Belgrade Metropolitan Area, 2002
Surface Area Number of Inhabited Flats
0–6 m2 16,209
6.1–10 m2 36,269
10.1–15 m2 75,677
15.1–20 m2 80,462
20,1–30 m2 93,716
30.1–40 m2 45,482
Over 40 m2 55,439
Total inhabited fl ats for permanent habitation 403,254
Source: Unoﬃ  cial preliminary 2002 national census data (Republički zavod za informatiku i statistiku 2002).
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Table 5 supplies data on the structure of all ﬂ ats 
for permanent habitation (both inhabited and vacant) 
by the age of residential buildings. According to this 
data, the housing stock of Belgrade metropolitan 
area is not very old: only about 2.2 percent was built 
before 1918, and altogether 85 percent of all ﬂ ats for 
permanent habitation were built since 1946. 
Th e following section discusses the eﬀ ects that 
the privatization process and the lack of a housing 
policy have had on the housing situation in Belgrade.
2.2 Housing Poverty 
  in Its Current Environment: 
  Post-2000 Developments
In the September and December elections of 2000, 
the political landscape in Serbia changed dramatically. 
Milosević and his coalition was ousted after being in 
power for thirteen years, and a diverse political block, 
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, came to power. 
Th ey inherited an impoverished population and a 
devastating situation in virtually all areas of political 
and economic life. Th us, real systemic economic and 
political transformation in Serbia started in 2001.
Table 5
Structure of All Flats for Permanent Habitation According to the Age of the Building 
in Belgrade Metropolitan Area, 2002
Construction year Number of Flats for Permanent Habitation
Before 1918 9,590
1919–1945 49,957
1946–1960 42,787
1961–1975 157,704
1976–1980 43,005
1981–1990 71,470
1991–1995 22,054
1996–2000 21,861
after 2000 5,949
Total 429,109
Source: Unoﬃ  cial preliminary 2002 national census data (Republički zavod za informatiku i statistiku 2002).
2.2.1 Housing Poor in Belgrade: 
  Th e Current Situation
According to the already mentioned working deﬁ ni-
tion of the housing poor, the following categories and 
related housing problems will be dealt with in detail 
below:
• those living in substandard housing (in the way it 
is statistically deﬁ ned);
• those living in overcrowded conditions;
• households with high total housing expenditures-
to-household income ratio; 
• those who cannot pay for utilities and mainte-
nance for the ﬂ at they live in; and
• the homeless.
2.2.1.1. Substandard Housing
Th e oﬃ  cial statistical deﬁ nition of a ﬂ at calls for cau-
tion in interpreting the oﬃ  cial statistical data because 
a “ﬂ at” as a housing unit is not precisely deﬁ ned. 
Any covered space with walls can be registered as a 
ﬂ at regardless of the type and quality of the build-
ing material, the existing facilities, and the available 
infrastructure (Petovar 1999, 133). As a consequence, 
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deﬁ nitions and statistical records may hide the actual 
number of households in inadequate/substandard 
housing, and the number of homeless people.
According to the methodology of data 
collection for oﬃ  cial Serbian statistics, two types of 
substandard living conditions can be observed: 1) 
substandard living conditions of those who do not 
live in the oﬃ  cially recognized housing stock, and 
2) substandard housing as a part of the oﬃ  cially 
recognized housing stock (statistically called “ﬂ ats”). 
Th e ﬁ rst type of substandard living conditions can 
be treated as a local version of homelessness, though 
oﬃ  cially not recognized as such. It covers those 
who live in so-called “other-than-ﬂ at” premises 
(druge prostorije), such as those living in oﬃ  ce space 
(nastanjene poslovne prostorije) and those living in 
other premises “out of necessity” (prostorije nastanjene 
iz nužde). Th e available unpublished preliminary 
analysis of the 2002 national census data shows that 
in Belgrade metropolitan area, 6,668 “other-than 
ﬂ at” premises are used for housing, in addition to 
433,697 housing units recognized as the housing 
stock. Just under 20,000 persons out of over one 
million who live in the Belgrade metropolitan area 
live in “other-than-ﬂ at” premises. In other words, 
approximately 1.7 percent of all inhabitants of the 
Belgrade metropolitan area live in spaces other than 
ﬂ ats/housing units.15 
Th e second type of substandard living conditions 
refers to the oﬃ  cially recognized housing stock. It 
can be only indirectly analyzed, category by cat-
egory, since the statistical analysis does not refer to 
substandard housing units as an oﬃ  cially deﬁ ned in-
tegrated category. According to the unpublished pre-
liminary 2002 national census data, out of 429,109 
ﬂ ats for permanent living in Belgrade metropolitan 
area, 29,517 ﬂ ats (about 6.9 percent) do not have at 
least one of the following: kitchen, bathroom or water 
closet (among these, 1,932 ﬂ ats have none of these 
three). Th is indicates a signiﬁ cant need for upgrading 
existing ﬂ ats. 
In terms of infrastructural equipment, such as 
electricity, water supply, wastewater disposal, and 
central heating, there are only 320 out of 429,109 
ﬂ ats used for permanent habitation in the Belgrade 
metropolitan area that lack such equipment. An 
additional 1,369 ﬂ ats have only electricity, without 
water supply, waste water disposal, and central heat-
ing. However, 173,034 ﬂ ats (about 40 percent) have 
all installations, with the exception of central heating. 
Th us, the overall condition of infrastructural equip-
ment is adequate.
Regarding the quality of the construction 
material of residential buildings, there are 396,127 
units (98 percent) of 403,254 inhabited ﬂ ats for 
permanent habitation made of solid material in 
Belgrade metropolitan area. In addition, considering 
the year of construction of residential buildings, only 
8,691 inhabited housing units were built before 1918 
(or 2.1 percent), and additional 45,215 units (11 
percent) between 1919–1945.
According to a study on substandard living in 
Belgrade from 1995, about 15 percent of city dwellers 
were living in very poor housing conditions (Macura 
et al. 1995). It is clear that the categories of homeless 
and those living in substandard housing overlap 
signiﬁ cantly, though the latter do possess an oﬃ  cial 
address (discussed below).
2.2.1.2 Overcrowding
Overcrowded housing conditions can be described 
using the following indicators: 1) number of square 
meters per person; 2) number of persons per room; 
and 3) number of households per housing unit. 
Another serious caveat is necessary to note when 
dealing with the available statistical data. Oﬃ  cial 
Serbian statistics are based upon the circumstances of 
individual households, and not of individual families. 
A household is deﬁ ned as a consumption unit—in 
other words, all people living and spending their 
income together. Th ere can, therefore, be one multiple 
families per housing unit; there can be one family 
or more than one family registered as a household. 
Moreover, a household can be single-person or consist 
of several generations living and spending together. In 
many situations, parents live in a ﬂ at with their adult 
children and their grandchildren; when interviewed 
during the national census, they reported that they 
spend all available resources together. But, it is 
nowhere indicated or recorded that there are actually 
two families living together. In short, if there is more 
than one family in a household, statistics do not 
oﬃ  cially recognize it. Th e oﬃ  cial statistics record 
only the number of households in relation to the size 
and quality of the housing stock. Th e invisibility of 
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families vis-à-vis their housing conditions is a serious 
shortcoming of the available data on housing poor in 
Belgrade and Serbia. 
According to unoﬃ  cial preliminary 2002 national 
census data, there are 29,386 ﬂ ats (about 8 percent) 
with two and more households out of 403,254 
inhabited ﬂ ats for permanent habitation. A shortage 
of ﬂ ats was evident in 1991 (the time of the previous 
national census) as a consequence of the insuﬃ  cient 
production of publicly-owned ﬂ ats and the state’s 
failure to enact regulations to encourage private 
housing construction during the socialist regime. Th is 
shortage led to overcrowding even in 1991, before the 
forced migration of people to Serbia, but the national 
census 2002 data show that the situation remaines 
unchanged until today. In terms of the surface area 
of ﬂ ats per person, in the Belgrade metropolitan area, 
approximately 13 percent of all inhabited ﬂ ats have 
less than ten square meters per person and 32 percent 
of inhabited ﬂ ats have less than ﬁ fteen square meters 
per person (Table 4). Th e situation was the same in 
1991 (Petrović 2002, 82).
Regarding the relationship between the number 
of rooms in a ﬂ at and the number of household 
members, there is critical overcrowding16 in about 23 
percent of inhabited ﬂ ats in Belgrade metropolitan 
are (91,804 units), and partial overcrowding17 in an 
additional 19 percent of inhabited ﬂ ats (76,166 units). 
Taken together, about 42 percent of inhabited ﬂ ats 
have some degree of overcrowding.18
Yet another indicator of overcrowding can be seen 
from the opinions of household members concerning 
the quality of the housing units they occupy, as 
shown in a survey on living standard in Serbia in 
2002 (Ministry for Social Aﬀ airs). In Belgrade, 58 
percent of households were not satisﬁ ed with the ﬂ at 
they lived in for various reasons, but about 50 percent 
of these households complained that there was not 
enough space for them in the ﬂ at. Th is means that 
about 30 percent of Belgrade households felt they do 
not have enough space in the ﬂ at they occupy.
2.2.1.3 Housing Expenditures
Th ose whose total housing expenditures exceed a cer-
tain percentage of available income (average income 
per person in June 2003 was 11,346 dinars or about 
EUR 185) can also be included among the hous-
ing poor. Th is widely used indicator—total housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio—has not, however, 
been in use in Serbia. It is not calculated and used 
as an indicator of housing consumption and poverty. 
Th ere is also no agreed upon upper limit of housing 
expenditures, established by housing oﬃ  cials and 
experts in order to correspond with the poverty and 
consumption patterns for the country in general. Th e 
number of people who fall into this category can, 
therefore, only be estimated.
Taking into account that today more than 97 
percent of all housing units are privately-owned, 
the overwhelming majority of the population does 
not pay rent. For those who live in ﬂ ats they own, 
only costs for utilities count as housing expenditures. 
Utility costs cover about 11 percent of the total 
household income in Belgrade in 2000 (Table 6).19 
For the small number of citizens in Belgrade who 
are tenants in public rental housing, the level of 
rents is still 6 percent. But, for those who rent a ﬂ at 
in the private rental sector, expenditures for rent 
are very high. Petrović (2002, 151–152) estimates 
that in the year 2000 it took 58 percent of average 
household income to rent a private rental unit in 
Belgrade.20 
In conclusion, for those living in their own ﬂ ats, 
total housing expenditures have been low: between 
10 to 12 percent of total average household income 
in 2000. For those renting in the public sector, total 
housing expenditures were about 13 percent of total 
average household income in 2000. For those who 
were renting privately-owned ﬂ ats, total housing 
expenditures were the highest at about 70 percent 
of total average household income.21 However, one 
caveat should be noted here. Th e price of electricity 
has increased 3.5 times since 2001 (Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper, 2003), and especially for those 
households who use electricity for heating (ﬂ ats 
without central heating) there has been a dramatic 
increase in electricity bills. Th is tendency will 
continue. Th e price of central heating has increased 
as well, but less dramatically. Th e only recent 
indicator of total housing costs (without considering 
expenditure sub-categories) comes from the Survey on 
the Living Standard of the Population in Serbia (SLSP). 
In 2002, in Belgrade, about 24 percent of household 
income were spent on housing expenditures, and 45 
percent was spent just for food (Ministry for Social 
Aﬀ airs 2002).
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2.2.1.4 Arrears in Paying Utility Costs
Almost no data is available on utility arrears, but it 
is widely believed that late payment of utility bills, 
sometimes for long periods, is a widespread problem 
in Belgrade. According to the most recent, and only, 
survey that covered housing consumption, about 17 
percent of households in Belgrade have one or more 
utility bill unpaid. Average total arrears per house-
hold for those households who have at least one bill 
unpaid are about EUR 80 (Ministry for Social Aﬀ airs 
2002). 
It is reasonable to assume that the length of the 
delay depends on the type of utility bill, as there are 
penalties for not paying some bills but not for others 
utilities; for instance, electricity and phone services 
are cut if bills are not paid. According to the above 
mentioned survey on living conditions, the average 
number of months for which the household had 
arrears in paying electricity bills in 2002 was 2.5 
months in Belgrade. Arrears in water consumption, 
building maintenance, and waste disposal are the most 
widespread likely because all these utilities come as 
a single bill that must be paid to a single public com-
pany. Th is is indirectly conﬁ rmed by the survey: the 
average number of months for which the household 
had arrears in paying this integrated bill was four 
months in Belgrade. Th ere are, however, two possible 
reasons for arrears in utility payments: 1) sheer 
negligence; and 2) insuﬃ  cient funds. It is diﬃ  cult to 
determine who falls into which group, and only those 
in the latter can be counted as housing poor.22
2.2.1.5 Homelessness
Th ere in no legal deﬁ nition and no oﬃ  cial records 
kept of homeless people in Serbia. In the registers 
of the Belgrade Center for Social Care, there were 
234 households registered as “in need of housing” 
in 1999. Even the Center, however, does not record 
systematically the persons and households in this 
category. Th e number mentioned above represents 
only those in need, who themselves turned to the 
Center for other reasons, and when registered were 
asked about their housing situation.23 Th us, the 
number of 234 households is not a useful estimation 
of the number of homeless people.
As mentioned above, those statistically registered 
as living in “other-than-ﬂ at” conditions (i.e. sub-
standard living conditions) are, in eﬀ ect, homeless. In 
addition, considering the indicators of overcrowding, 
it can be argued that in situations in which more than 
one household occupies a ﬂ at, that one household out 
of two, two households out of three, three out of four, 
and so on, are homeless. It is worth repeating that this 
does not say anything about the number of families 
sharing a ﬂ at—that is, the number of families who 
might be “homeless with a place to live,” because the 
oﬃ  cial statistics register only households, and one 
household can consist of more than one family. In 
Petrović’s words:
 “It is very diﬃ  cult to estimate the real number of 
homeless or inadequately housed people in Belgrade. 
If we use the broader deﬁ nition of homelessness 
taking the households living in shared apartments 
or in spaces other than apartments (as the oﬃ  cial 
statistics registers) then some rough estimation 
would indicate that 7.5 percent of all households 
are homeless or inadequately housed. Th is 
conﬁ rms that the problem is purely recognized, 
registered and treated in society in spite of its 
widespread existence.”24 (Petrović 2000, 7)
Having in mind the large refugee population 
in Serbia (9 percent of total population, including 
Table 6
Housing Expenditures-to-Income Indicators for Belgrade
1995 1998 1999 2000
Percent of public rent expenditures in the average total household income 2.6 3.2 3.0 2.5
Percent of private rent expenditures in the average total household income no data 55.0 55.0 58.0
Percent of utility costs in the average total household expenditures 6.7 10.9 11.2 9.2
Sources: Belgrade Statistical Yearbook 2001; Petrović (2002, 152, Table 5.1).
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2002, the Ministry established a second team—the 
Social and Refugee Related Housing Secretariat—that 
consists of four experts. Both the expert team and the 
Secretariat were expected to provide input for the 
Policy, initially announced to be ready by the end of 
July 2003.
Th e National Housing Policy is to be a strategic 
document. Th e Social and Refugee Related Housing 
Secretariat’s role in the process of preparing the Policy 
is to relate the housing policy for refugees (developed 
in the Program of implementation of the national 
strategy for solving the situation of refugees,27 accepted 
by the government in May 2002) to the housing 
problems of the socially and economically deprived 
in the general population. Th e Secretariat is then 
expected to incorporate the refugee housing policy 
within the National Policy. Th e Sec-retariat was also 
granted the responsibility to give recommendations 
for future policy options and measures to be taken to 
develop social housing and aﬀ ordable market-based 
housing for both refugees and domestic low-income 
population (Action Plan of the Social and Refugee 
Related Housing Secretariat 2002).
As a part of the work on the National Housing 
Policy, in September 2002, the Serbian government 
announced the future establishment28 of a national 
corporation for giving guarantees for housing loans 
with start-up capital of EUR 15–20 million from the 
Serbian budget. Th is institution should help with the 
initiation and development of the mortgage lending 
system in Serbia by giving guarantees to commercial 
banks for giving loans to individual citizens (Serbian 
Government, September 2002).
Another important strategic document being 
prepared by the central government is the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. Th is project (Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Project, PRSP), supported by UNDP and 
the World Bank, was in preparation since May 2002. 
Th e government approved the Strategy in October 
2003.
In the Initial Framework of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy in Serbia (May 2002), the housing aspect of 
poverty and poverty reduction was mentioned only to 
say that the national housing policy is in preparation, 
and that providing housing solutions for people in 
poverty will be an important element.29 However, 
some measures for ﬁ ghting housing poverty were 
ﬁ nally included in the ﬁ nal version of the Poverty 
internally displaced persons), to make estimates on the 
number of homeless people is unquestionably diﬃ  cult. 
About 30 percent of all refugees nationwide live in 
Belgrade.25 Th e majority of these are accommodated 
in the ﬂ ats/houses of their relatives and friends (74.2 
percent). Some rent privately-owned ﬂ ats (16.3 
percent), and some live in collective accommodation 
for refugees (3.1 percent). Others have their own ﬂ ats 
(3.4 percent), and the rest lack ﬁ xed accommodation 
altogether (4.8 percent) (Beogradski zavod za 
informatiku i statistiku 1998).26 Th e sum of those 
who still live in collective accommodation and those 
without ﬁ xed accommodation clearly indicates the 
number of homeless in its narrowest sense in the 
refugee population. 
2.2.2 Governmental Action: What Are 
  Authorities Doing to Reduce the Problems 
  of the Housing Poor?
Since 2001, little has been done in the housing sec-
tor in Serbia, especially regarding the problems of 
the housing poor. Th e reform of the housing sector is 
not a priority of the new Serbian government, either 
in terms of its legal reforms or in terms of practical 
governmental action to relieve existing housing prob-
lems. Th e country that the new democratic coalition 
government inherited was in a desperate need of 
reforms in many areas, and some immediate actions 
have had to be taken. It is therefore understandable 
that the housing sector was destined to wait for a new 
comprehensive policy; if any improvements in hous-
ing conditions are expected even in the middle-term, 
comprehensive legal reforms must start very soon. In 
this section, the limited steps taken by the central 
(Serbian) government and by the City of Belgrade 
will be described and discussed. 
2.2.2.1 Central Government
Some action was taken at the central government 
level in 2002 during the preparation of the National 
Housing Policy. Th e Ministry for Urban Planning and 
Construction is responsible developing this policy. 
Th e process oﬃ  cially started in April 2002, when the 
Ministry established an eight-person team, consist-
ing of experts in urban economics, urban planning, 
urban sociology, real estate and ﬁ nance. In December 
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Reduction Strategy (Serbian Government 2003).30 Th e 
three main types of recommended solutions are: 
1) Development of social housing targeted at those 
social groups that cannot buy or rent a ﬂ at in the 
housing market (such as the most socially vulner-
able), including: a) the development of social 
rental housing units that will not be privatized 
under any circumstances; and b) the introduc-
tion of a housing allowance system both for social 
rental housing and private rental housing.
2) Support for aﬀ ordable rental housing develop-
ment through: a) oﬀ ering land for aﬀ ordable 
rental housing construction; b) revising urban 
planning and construction standards to support 
the construction of rental housing; and c) consid-
ering tax exemptions for developers of such hous-
ing.
3) Improving spontaneously developed settlements 
(slums or non-hygienic areas, settlements with il-
legally built housing, and so on) either by moving 
people to better housing conditions, by introduc-
ing infrastructure to those settlements, or by set-
tlement regeneration.
2.2.2.2 Belgrade Authorities
Apart from the national policy that is now in the mak-
ing—which should set up the legal and institutional 
framework for providing housing in the market-based 
economy in the future—local authorities are respon-
sible for developing local housing policies. Th e new 
Law on Local Government, approved in February 
2002, conﬁ rms the decentralization of the housing 
policy. Th e only direct responsibility of municipali-
ties for providing housing stems from the 1992 Law 
on Housing. Municipalities are responsible for those 
socially deprived citizens in need for housing who are: 
unable to work, with all other household members 
unemployed; sitting tenants in denationalized ﬂ ats 
(in order to return those ﬂ ats to their former own-
ers); people living in non-hygienic buildings and ﬂ ats; 
soldiers; and others disabled during the wars of the 
1990s. 
Belgrade city authorities announced in June 
2002 that they are starting a program of non-proﬁ t 
housing construction for employees in the municipal 
administration, local public utility companies, and all 
other institutions that serve the city. Included are those 
employed in courts, education and health centers, 
artists, distinguished sportsmen, young married 
couples, the disabled, and so on who lack their own 
housing (Belgrade City Assembly, June 2002). It was 
announced that 1,100 new ﬂ ats would be built for 
this purpose in 2003, that the construction will be 
ﬁ nanced from the 2002 and 2003 City budgets and 
bank credits.31 Th e allocation criteria were deﬁ ned 
in February 2003. Th e City will sell on credit 1,000 
ﬂ ats to selected applicants from the aforementioned 
categories in need of housing (repayment period, 
20 years; participation minimum, 20 percent; EUR 
750 per square meter)32 and the remaining 100 ﬂ ats 
will be rented to socially deprived people without 
their own housing. Applicants are to be ranked by 
local authorities, separately for both categories of 
ﬂ ats (Belgrade City Assembly 2003). Th e applicants 
for newly built ﬂ ats for sale must:33 lack ownership 
of a ﬂ at; be permanently employed; and able to pay 
a monthly interest rate. Socially deprived people 
eligible to apply are those who already receive social 
help, and whose total household income is below 
80 percent of the average income per employee in 
Serbia. Th e rental period for social rental units will 
be two years, with the possibility of the renewal of 
the contract under the same conditions until the 
applicant loses the right to receive social assistance, 
and/or the applicant or a member of his household 
ﬁ nd another housing solution. Th is project of the City 
of Belgrade is the ﬁ rst public construction project in 
years apart from the construction of solidarity ﬂ ats 
(see note 14). Even more important is that this is the 
ﬁ rst attempt to build social rental housing units, even 
in such a small number.34 
An important change in the system for providing 
housing is expected to come out of the General Urban 
Plan of Belgrade until 2021. Th e City Assembly ap-
proved this long-awaited urban planning document 
for Belgrade in September 2003. It enables a change 
in the spatial positioning of new housing. Th e new 
plan represents a withdrawal from prescribing zones 
for mass housing construction (typical for a socialist-
type housing provision). Instead, zoning will be 
oriented towards urban renewal of the existing 
housing stock, and towards ﬁ lling in the existing 
housing zones with new smaller housing projects. Th e 
new General Urban Plan (Belgrade Urban Planning 
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Institute 2003) suggests three basic types of housing 
zones: market-led housing; social housing; and 
aﬀ ordable housing. Social housing, as a new element 
in spatial planning regulations, will be allowed both 
within general housing zones35 and on separate loca-
tions, selected only as zones for social housing (about 
six to seven locations of this type on the territory of 
Belgrade have been suggested) (Th e City of Belgrade 
Beoinfo February 2003).
Municipal authorities in Belgrade36 have com-
mittees responsible for some housing issues. Th ey deal 
mostly with: 1) municipal ﬂ ats and their tenants; 2) 
illegal tenants in the municipal ﬂ ats, and possibilities 
of providing legal status to some illegal tenants; 3) 
ﬁ lling vacant municipal ﬂ ats (assuming there are 
some) with citizens in the greatest need for housing in 
the municipality. Th e ﬂ ats they can oﬀ er are reportedly 
in very bad condition, very small and sometimes with 
inadequate facilities. Th e criteria these committees 
and the municipal executive bodies use in deciding 
on applications are not clear, and the decisions 
are prone to nepotism and clientelism. Municipal 
authorities are, it seems, still not considering a more 
proactive approach to providing housing for the very 
poor, whose housing needs they are legally required 
to address. Th ere appears to be no attempt to increase 
the stock of municipal housing for the poor.
2.2.2.3 Additional Remarks
According to the preliminary results of the 2002 
national census, the number of ﬂ ats is in statistical 
balance with the number of households in Belgrade.37 
However, according to a recent estimate there is a 
deﬁ cit38 of about 70,000 ﬂ ats in Belgrade. 
Looking at housing aﬀ ordability, on the other 
hand, shows that it is impossible for households 
with an average income to buy a ﬂ at that would 
satisfy their housing needs. According to the house 
price-to-household income ratio for 1994 and 1997 
it took about 21 times the average household income 
to buy a legally built ﬂ at, and 24 times in 2000. 
If the median price for illegally constructed ﬂ ats is 
considered then the situation improves somewhat. It 
took approximately nine times the average household 
income to buy an illegally built ﬂ at for each of the 
three years (Petrović 2001, 223; Petrović 2002, 152).
Th is shows that borrowing from a bank to buy 
a ﬂ at is not an option for the majority of those in 
need of housing. Only recently have private banks 
started oﬀ ering commercial loans for this purpose. 
In the 1990s there were no loans for housing oﬀ ered 
to the general public. According to some calculations, 
a person who wants to take a commercial loan 
should have the salary of a minister in the Serbian 
government, which means that existing commercial 
housing loans are far from an aﬀ ordable option for an 
average family.
3. POLICY OPTIONS: WHAT CAN BE DONE 
 TO REDUCE HOUSING POVERTY?
3.1 Framework of Analysis
Th is section presents policy options for solving the 
problems of housing poor in Belgrade and other 
Serbian urban centers. Th e choice of possible policy 
solutions is made on the basis of the evaluation of 
the present state of macro-economic, legal and other 
systemic reforms, and the overall diﬃ  cult political, 
economic and social situation in Serbia at present. It 
is important to keep in mind that Serbia is still in the 
early phases of transition, and that housing policy is 
not a priority of the current government. Th e capacity 
and willingness of the central and local governments 
to tackle the issue of housing in general and of hous-
ing poor in particular, are heavily constrained by the 
budget and the lack of ﬁ nancial means. In addition, 
large segments of the Serbian population are poor, and 
thus incapable of dealing with their housing problems 
independently. 
Th e manner in which policy options are presented 
and recommended solutions are framed is based upon 
an awareness that there are serious constraints on 
the government’s ability to address comprehensively 
housing policy and social policy in the housing sector. 
Nevertheless, because the housing sector is one of the 
most complex policy sectors, where policy program 
outcomes are not easily predicted and can often be 
evaluated only over the long term, it is crucial to 
start introducing as soon as possible a comprehensive 
policy framework to facilitate the development of 
a market-based housing sector as soon as possible. 
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A national housing policy framework needs to in-
clude a choice of strategic policy solutions for tackling 
poverty in housing. Th ese choices should be made 
immediately. In the last part of this section, policy 
solutions for particular categories of the housing poor 
will be discussed in more detail.
3.2 Evaluation of Policy Alternatives
What can the government do to ease or solve the 
problems of the housing poor in a poverty-ridden 
society of almost complete homeownership? Th ere are 
three main types of policy solutions for the Serbian 
government to consider:
• supporting the development of the rental sec-
tor—both public and private—contrary to the 
currently expressed preferences of both citizens 
and authorities for homeownership as the solution 
for housing problems;
• supporting new homeownership by developing 
the housing ﬁ nance sector instruments, primarily 
mortgage loans; and
• introducing a well targeted and transparent hous-
ing allowance system for poor homeowners and 
tenants.
3.2.1 Supporting Development 
  of the Rental Sector
Th e tenure structure of the Serbian housing stock, 
with a special emphasis on its capital city, is atypi-
cal and potentially disadvantageous for a transition 
country, and also does not resemble the tenure struc-
ture of wealthy and developed countries. As a result 
of extensive housing privatization in the ﬁ rst half of 
the 1990s, only an insigniﬁ cant public rental sector 
remains. Homeownership cannot be the only hous-
ing choice in a poor society that endeavors to build 
a market economy. Among the disadvantages of 
homeownership are: the general lack of aﬀ ordability, 
particularly aﬀ ecting the poor; inﬂ exibility in terms of 
owner relocation (which hinders labor mobility); and 
the lack of availability to those who have temporary 
and short term housing needs (single and divorced 
people, young couples, young people leaving home, 
people moving to another city, and so on).
Contrary to currently expressed preferences for 
more home ownership and against developing the 
rental sector, both the public and private rental sec-
tors need to be fashioned to accommodate the groups 
mentioned above. Th ere are three general policy op-
tions for accomplishing this objective: 1) state sup-
port for the development of the new public rental 
sector only; 2) state support for the development of 
the private rental sector; and 3) state support for the 
development of both the public and private rental sec-
tors. Within the public rental sector, the state has the 
option of developing only social housing (i.e. public 
rental housing only for socially marginalized and low-
income groups), or a diversiﬁ ed range of rental hous-
ing types, for both low- and middle-income groups.
For the reasons expressed below, the state should 
support the development of both the public and 
private rental sectors, with development of social 
housing ﬁ rst, followed by the development of rental 
housing for middle income families if the hoped-for 
economic development takes place and ﬁ nancial con-
ditions permit.   
3.2.1.1 New Public Rental Housing: 
   Social Housing
It is crucial to start developing new public housing for 
marginalized and low-income groups, namely social 
housing. Social housing did not exist under state so-
cialism, because public (“social”) housing was ideally 
meant to be the best housing solution for all citizens, 
and not intended particularly for the housing poor. 
At the European level, developed countries (except 
for Greece, Spain, and Portugal, with social rentals 
less 4 percent of the housing stock) have a substan-
tial share of public housing in their tenure structure: 
Italy, 7 percent; Ireland, 11 percent; Germany, about 
20 percent; France 17 percent; Denmark, 24 per-
cent; Britain, 26 percent; Sweden, 36 percent; and 
the Netherlands, 40 percent of the housing stock 
(Premius 2001; Gibb 2001). Th e recommendation 
of the Council of Europe is that the share of public 
rental housing in the total housing stock of a coun-
try should be from 15 to 20 percent. Social housing 
for low-income people comprises the majority of 
publicly-rented dwellings in EU countries.
New rental social housing can be acquired in 
diﬀ erent ways: through public construction; through 
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private construction by non-proﬁ t organizations; and 
by private developers. Private developers are given in-
centives such as public land obtained at no or reduced 
cost and tax exemptions, through adaptation of other 
types of structures, or through redevelopment of sub-
standard dwellings bought back into public ownership.
New public housing requires a new institu-
tional setting for the management of dwellings and 
buildings. Both government and private non-proﬁ t 
organizations can be involved in the social housing 
management structure. One of the most common 
types of managers of public housing in Europe are 
non-proﬁ t housing associations. New legal and regu-
latory frameworks will be needed to permit private, 
non-proﬁ t associations to operate all or part of the 
public housing stock. Th is can be regulated such that 
a public agency or municipal authorities prescribe 
standards and then supervise the work of housing 
associations, which will be responsible for the actual 
management and maintenance of premises.
Th e selection criteria for granting access to social 
housing should be elaborated fully, and their applica-
tion transparent (which is not always the case with the 
distribution of the existing limited municipal stock). 
Th e proﬁ les of low-income and marginalized people 
who are eligible for the new social housing should be 
well deﬁ ned and targeted, with initial means testing 
and periodic household eligibility reviews. Th e dura-
tion of the rental contract should be limited, with 
renewals only as long as the individual household 
remains eligible. Th is is a common practice in the 
management of public rental housing in Western 
European and North American countries.
Setting rent levels should be closely related to the 
well-targeted, means-tested and transparent selection 
process. Rents in the existing public rental sector 
(municipal housing after privatization) are set very 
low as a legacy of the socialist housing policy. Th is 
must not happen in new social housing, which should 
clearly be targeted at only the low income and housing 
poor. Rent levels should be based upon the income 
and economic assets of the tenant. Preferably, the rent 
should be arranged as a cost rent, and subsidized for 
those who cannot aﬀ ord it. Diﬀ erent degrees or levels 
of subsidization should reﬂ ect the proﬁ le of a house-
hold. Th is should be a part of the future housing al-
lowance system; as such, it will be discussed in more 
detail later in the text.
3.2.1.2 Private Rental Housing
With almost complete homeownership of the housing 
stock in Serbia and the city of Belgrade, the private-
rental sector can be the ﬁ rst and ﬁ nancially the easiest 
to develop as a way to solve the housing problems of 
some groups of the housing poor. At present, the pri-
vate rental sector is completely unregulated, there are 
no reliable data on the size and quality of the stock—
rather, only very rough estimations. Landlords do not 
want to register (or even report for the purpose of the 
national census) dwellings as private rentals, fearing 
the tax they would be required to pay. Th ose who 
have tried to rent a ﬂ at or have been renting for years 
report that it is very diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd decent-quality, 
well-maintained aﬀ ordable rental dwellings. Th e rela-
tionship between tenants and private sector landlords 
is governed entirely by personalities, because there is 
no obligation to sign a contract, and no mechanism to 
secure legal enforceability of contract.
Th is situation should change. Th e state should 
take on an enabling role and create the legal frame-
work that will facilitate development of the private 
rental sector. It is cheaper and faster to develop a 
functioning private-rental market and to give pri-
vate entrepreneurs the opportunity to begin solving 
the rental housing problem, than to develop a new 
public rental sector that will satisfy only a portion of 
the needs of the housing poor. It is a question of the 
ﬁ nancial means and the time needed to develop any 
of the policy solutions suggested here.
After the private rental sector is regulated in a 
way that provides contract security that is fair for 
both parties, incentives should be given to individual 
households to oﬀ er existing ﬂ ats for rent. Th is will 
require some minimum quality and maintenance 
standards. Finally, the state should support the sup-
ply side of the rental sector through incentives to 
developers and potential private landlords to build 
new, private, multi-family housing and renovate ex-
isting structures to be used as rental housing (oﬀ ering 
public land for free or with discount, tax exemptions, 
and so on). Th e development of the role of private 
landlords as important actors in the housing market 
should be welcomed and supported. Once there are 
more private rental units available, private rent levels 
will recede as well. It will then be more aﬀ ordable to 
rent a ﬂ at than it is at present (a rough estimation is 
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that more than 50 percent of an average household 
income should be given for a private rent). Once there 
is a legal, regulatory framework for the private rental 
market, it will be possible to consider the role of pri-
vate landlords in providing rental housing for low- to 
middle-income people, such as social housing.
3.2.2 Developing Housing Finance Instruments: 
  Mortgage Loans
Developing housing ﬁ nance instruments for a market-
driven housing sector is one of the core components 
of a national housing policy, which aﬀ ects the aﬀ ord-
ability and availability of housing for the poor. Estab-
lishing a housing ﬁ nance system aﬀ ects all aspects of 
housing supply and demand.
Unlike the development of the rental housing 
sector, development of housing ﬁ nance instruments 
serves primarily to increase homeownership. In the 
short- and middle-terms, only a very limited number 
of those who need a (separate) housing unit for their 
family will be able to acquire one through the mort-
gage loan system, due to the generally low income 
levels of the population. Nevertheless, it is crucial 
to create a system of housing ﬁ nance instruments, 
primarily mortgage loans, to enable those who can 
aﬀ ord it to plan their individual housing strategy 
along these lines. Likewise, it is necessary to improve 
the system of housing ﬁ nance with a hope that it can 
become a viable option for the majority of the popu-
lation. It is therefore important to fashion a general 
policy framework for development of an aﬀ ordable 
ownership housing market as a “policy solution in 
waiting” for the housing poor.
Special attention should be paid to developing 
mortgage loan schemes for low- and middle-income 
inhabitants, which includes: giving state/municipal 
guarantees for low-income mortgages and reverse 
mortgages for older homeowners; supporting hous-
ing-related savings; providing lump-sum grants and 
targeted interest rate subsidies; and so on. (see Hoek-
Smit and Diamond 2003). Th is should be a priority 
for the government once the mortgage ﬁ nance system 
is established; without a conscious eﬀ ort, the mort-
gage ﬁ nance market will not address the housing 
needs of low and middle-income families in Serbia. 
Th e government should be aware, however, of the 
danger that better-oﬀ  households usually enjoy most 
of the beneﬁ ts directed at improving the housing con-
ditions of the poor.
A mortgage ﬁ nancing system should be diversi-
ﬁ ed to provide the ﬁ nancial means not only for con-
struction and purchase of newly built dwellings, but 
also for the purchase of ﬂ ats and other dwellings in 
the secondary market, for home renovation, and for 
renovation of condominium buildings as well.
3.2.3 Introducing a Housing Allowance System
Th e mass privatization process during the early 1990s 
brought about a great number of income-poor home-
owners. Even before the actual start of the reform 
process after the change of power in 2000, arrears in 
utility bills were widespread. Reforms have already 
brought about some increase in user charges—most 
dramatically in the case of electricity consumption—
but signiﬁ cant growth in the real cost of services is 
expected in the near future. Although the housing 
expenditure-to-income ratio is not oﬃ  cially used in 
Serbia, as previously mentioned, estimates show that 
the utilities-to-income-ratio for Belgrade was not high 
at the beginning of the reform process (see Table 6, 
above). Even before the recent rise in utility prices, 
however, homeowners were not able to pay utility bills 
because of insuﬃ  cient household income. Th e situa-
tion will only worsen in the near future as the reforms 
take eﬀ ect and cost recovery user charges are gradually 
introduced in housing related public services.
As far as the existing public and private rental sec-
tors are concerned, the rent in the remaining munici-
pal rental sector is still very low, but it is possible that 
in some time, it will increase. If authorities decide to 
start developing social rental housing with the rents 
approximating cost rent, marginalized and low-in-
come households will eligible, but incapable of pay-
ing the full cost rent. Private sector rents are very high 
compared to the total average household income, and 
are thus generally unaﬀ ordable. Total housing expen-
ditures-to-income ratios for those renting a private 
ﬂ at are extremely high. Th is option can be considered 
aﬀ ordable only for higher-income groups. In all these 
cases—poor homeowners, as well as public and pri-
vate sector renters—a diversiﬁ ed housing allowance 
system is needed.
In addition to regular housing consumption costs, 
the maintenance and renovation of individual private 
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dwellings, together with the inherited neglect for the 
maintenance of multi-unit buildings, are the issues 
to be addressed soon after many years and decades 
of policy disregard. If regular building maintenance 
and renovation costs are realistically estimated and 
included in the total housing expenditures, it will cer-
tainly lead to a dramatic increase in the total housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio. In that case, a signiﬁ -
cant majority of homeowners, not only the poor, will 
not be able to pay for housing related bills.
A well targeted and transparent housing allow-
ance system is needed to act as a social safety net in the 
housing sector. It should include: subsidies for some 
utility expenditures; private rent subsidies (and in the 
future, public rent subsidies if public rent reaches the 
level of the cost rent); housing maintenance subsidies 
for homeowners in condominium buildings (once a 
law on condominiums is introduced, and all common 
spaces in multi-family buildings privatized); and one-
oﬀ  multi-unit buildings renovation subsidies.
3.3 Policy Options by Housing Poor 
  Category
Th e following section turns, at last, to each of the 
groups previously deﬁ ned as belonging to the hous-
ing poor in Belgrade and other Serbian urban centers, 
and considers how the policy solutions recommended 
above correspond to their housing problems.
3.3.1 Substandard Housing
Usually only very poor people live in substandard 
housing; in general, they should be oﬀ ered support 
in upgrading physical living conditions through reno-
vation. Certainly, not all premises used for housing 
should be upgraded. It is preferable that those living 
in the worst quality units be registered as homeless, 
or in great need of public housing, and then accom-
modated in the new public housing units discussed in 
the previous section.
Th e solutions for those living in private substand-
ard housing should diﬀ er from those living in public 
housing of very low quality. In the case of the latter, 
the state and municipalities are directly responsible 
for maintenance, and they should undertake their 
responsibility through special programs. In the case 
of the private substandard housing, there should be a 
private loan system for upgrading projects; as well, a 
comprehensive subsidy scheme should be considered 
for those substandard dwellings where some small 
upgrading would lead to a long-term housing solu-
tion for the household in question. Ultimately, there 
will be a limited number of private premises in very 
unhygienic and unhealthy conditions, that would 
be better-oﬀ  demolished or used for other purposes. 
Municipal authorities should consider either repur-
chasing these private premises (that should not have 
been privatized in the ﬁ rst place) or giving some sort 
of compensation, and then consider the inhabitants 
households eligible for new public housing.
3.3.2 Overcrowded Conditions
“Overcrowding” must be deﬁ ned comprehensively, 
such that all relevant aspects in urban areas are cov-
ered (and not only “more than one household living 
together”). Th is will help the screening of the prob-
lem, and encourage reliable data collection. Since it 
can be assumed that people living in overcrowded 
conditions belong to diﬀ erent income and age groups, 
the scenarios for solving their current and changing 
housing needs will vary a great deal. For those who are 
low-income, new public-rental housing will present 
a relatively permanent solution (in the case of two 
or more separate, low-income households living to-
gether), or a rather temporary solution until the fam-
ily can aﬀ ord a mortgage loan to buy a ﬂ at or inherit 
property (such as young couples). Others with average 
incomes could rent a private ﬂ at in a developed rental 
market, receiving a private rent subsidy if necessary; 
later, when their employment and ﬁ nancial situation 
allows, they might purchase a dwelling with the pri-
vate mortgage loan scheme that suits them best. Still 
others will remain living with relatives, and then look 
for a mortgage scheme to buy a ﬂ at of their own.
3.3.3 Increasing Housing Expenditures and 
  Arrears in Utility Payments
A well developed, well targeted and transparent 
housing allowance system is the key instrument in 
addressing increasing housing expenditures. A social 
safety net for housing should be designed and intro-
duced through a system of subsidies, aimed at paying 
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utility bills, private rents, and housing maintenance 
costs for the most deprived categories of the hous-
ing poor. Measures for rationalizing consumption of 
individual households should be also introduced. Th e 
introduction of cost recovery user charges should be 
gradual and well planned, so that individual house-
holds are provided with both the time and means 
to adjust their housing consumption according to 
their needs and ﬁ nancial resources. A housing allow-
ance system should assist the very poor, but also help 
the adjustment process of wider sections of housing 
consumers. Th is means that some subsidy programs 
will be only temporal, while others will need to be de-
signed as more permanent instruments of social policy 
for income poor households. 
3.3.4 Homelessness
Homelessness must ﬁ rst be legally deﬁ ned. Th is cat-
egory should include both “rough sleepers,” as well 
as those having a roof over their head but living in 
extremely unhealthy conditions or premises unsuit-
able for living. Th e clarity of the deﬁ nition should be 
followed by a systematic attempt to register homeless 
people. A clear deﬁ nition and registration of diﬀ erent 
categories of the housing poor will likely reveal that 
there are more homeless than visible on the streets of 
Belgrade. As such, there will be an increase in home-
lessness once the reform process gains force. Th en, 
the registration procedure should serve to help detect 
the unfolding process. Th e problem of homelessness 
is a complex issue, and only partly a problem of the 
housing sector. Depending on the deﬁ nition and the 
estimation of the size and needs of diﬀ erent categories 
of homeless people (permanent or temporary, fami-
lies, children, single adults, and so on) in Belgrade, 
one policy solution could be the provision of ac-
commodation in special shelters; this is the case in 
many countries with comprehensive homeless plans. 
Transforming some existing premises into well run 
homeless shelters is a possible short-term solution for 
accommodating families in acutely substandard con-
ditions until new premises for new public housing, as 
suggested above, are provided.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND 
 RECOMMENDATIONS
Serbia is a poor society with almost complete home-
ownership. Th e political regime of the 1990s left in 
its wake a poor state, run-down economy, and a over-
whelmingly impoverished society. Th e mass privatiza-
tion process of the ﬁ rst half of the 1990s produced 
an exceptionally skewed housing tenure structure in 
Belgrade and other urban centers in Serbia, in which 
nearly 98 percent of the housing stock is in private 
ownership.
Even before the bloody disintegration of the 
former Yugoslavia, it was a commonly understood 
that urban housing problems were widespread. Th e 
socialist regime did not solve these problems, and 
during the period of extreme political, economic and 
overall social crisis in the 1990s, housing problems 
signiﬁ cantly worsened. Th ese factors directly aﬀ ected 
the size and characteristics of the social group known 
as the housing poor after the change of power in 
2002.
In this attempt to describe and analyze the hous-
ing poor in the capital city of Belgrade, poverty in 
housing has been deﬁ ned as: 1) living in substandard 
housing; 2) living in overcrowded conditions; 3) a 
high housing expenditures-to-income ratio; 4) an 
inability to make utility payments; and 5) homeless-
ness. Th e analysis of existing data reveals a generally 
the lack of data sources needed to engage eﬀ ectively 
with some of these aspects; as well as a dearth of relia-
ble data even for those aspects that have been publicly 
and oﬃ  cially recognized as housing problems. 
Substandard housing is used in Serbian statistics, it 
is diﬃ  cult to know precisely what is actually included 
in the term, and why. Consequently, it is diﬃ  cult to 
deﬁ ne the number of people who constitute housing 
poor in this sense. Th e available estimations suggest 
that between 7 and 15 percent of Belgrade city dwell-
ers live in some sort of substandard conditions.
Overcrowding of dwellings has long been identi-
ﬁ ed as a signiﬁ cant housing problem in Belgrade, 
especially in ﬂ ats in multi-unit buildings. However, 
no reliable data exist due to the way this problem has 
been treated statistically. Existing estimates are rough: 
from 32 percent of all housing units (if counting 
meters squared per person) to 42 percent (if the 
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relationship between the number of rooms and 
number of household members is considered) had 
some degree of overcrowding in 2002 in Belgrade.
Th e share of housing expenditures in the total 
household income has been measured to some extent 
in Serbia, but the indicator widely used internation-
ally—housing expenditures-to-income ratio—has 
not ﬁ gured into statistics or the policymaking. Th ere 
has been little consideration of, and no agreement 
on, the threshold at which the share of total housing 
expenditures in the household income would be con-
sidered an unbearable burden for a household. In the 
1990s, the costs of utilities in general and of regulated 
rent in the remaining public housing were rather low: 
estimates are, respectively, 11 percent and 2.5 percent. 
Th ere have been no oﬃ  cial data on the cost of rent in 
the unregulated private rental sector, but rough esti-
mations show that private rent is a sizeable burden on 
an average household income—about 58 percent of 
the average total household income in 2000.
However, low user charges for housing utilities 
has already started to increase, and will continue to 
increase as an unavoidable part of economic reforms 
that are already underway. Electricity costs, which 
grew signiﬁ cantly in 2002, were the ﬁ rst to become 
a serious burden, especially for those families who do 
not have a central heating system. 
Th is directly impacts those members of the hous-
ing poor who are unable to make utility payments. 
Other than a widely held belief that utility arrears are 
widespread, there is no available data on how many 
people have not been paying various utility bills, and 
for how long.
As for the number, proﬁ les and problems of the 
homeless, there is no legal deﬁ nition, no public aware-
ness and no public records. It is impossible to make a 
realistic estimate.
4.1 Policy Recommendations
Th is paper identiﬁ es and recommends three main 
types of policy solutions for the Serbian government 
to consider:
1) Supporting the development of the rental sector
—both public and private. Contrary to currently 
expressed preferences of both citizens and authori-
ties for homeownership as the solution for hous-
ing problems, both the public and private rental 
sectors must developed. Developing both sectors 
opens the door to aﬀ ordable housing solutions for 
the poor, increasing labor mobility, and oﬀ ering 
more ﬂ exible choice for those who have tempo-
rary and short-term housing needs. 
2) Introducing and developing housing ﬁ nance instru-
ments, and primarily mortgage loans. Th is serves to 
increase homeownership, but could also provide 
the ﬁ nancial means for the purchase of dwellings 
on the secondary market, for home renovation, 
and for renovation of condominium buildings. 
Special attention should be paid to developing 
mortgage loan schemes for low- and middle-in-
come people. 
3) Introducing a housing allowance system. A well 
targeted and transparent housing allowance sys-
tem would help poor homeowners and tenants, 
both in the private and public rentals. Th is would 
also represent the introduction of a social safety 
net in the housing sector. 
Th e current constraints on central and local gov-
ernments attempting to implement any housing policy 
solutions are numerous. Th ey primarily ﬁ nancial, but 
the current political situation and the questionable 
capacity of both levels of government to carry out the 
overwhelming task of putting some order and hope 
into the housing sector are also of serious concern. 
Certainly, “doing nothing” is hardly a viable option. 
Housing solutions start operating and can be evalu-
ated only over the long-term, so it is recommendable 
to start as soon as possible. It takes time and eﬀ ort for 
a housing market to start working eﬃ  ciently; this ﬁ rst 
requires an enabling policy framework to be put in 
place. For instance, there are a number of legal con-
straints (such as countrywide, accurate and complete 
property cadaster records, mortgage law that would 
enable mortgage loans, new law on the maintenance 
of condominiums, and so on) that must be dealt with 
immediately. An immediate response will enable the 
market to provide housing solutions, at least for those 
families that have some means to satisfy their housing 
needs.
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4.2 Practical Policy Options
• Collect data on all aspects of poverty in housing. 
Th e government should revise the usefulness of 
the existing methodology of data collection and 
analysis on the state of the housing sector. Census 
data are not enough. Yearly surveys of the housing 
situation—with a special emphasis on deﬁ ning 
and monitoring housing poverty—should be in-
troduced. Th e proﬁ les of collected data should be 
improved and expanded in order to correspond 
more closely to the information on housing pov-
erty needed for eﬀ ective policymaking.
• Deﬁ ne overcrowded housing conditions, diﬀ erent 
degrees of substandard quality of housing, home-
lessness, and a “housing poverty line” in terms 
of an acceptable threshold for total housing 
expenditures-to-income ratio. Adapt existing and 
introduce new methodology for monitoring these 
phenomena. 
• Th ink strategically about middle- and long-term 
eﬀ ects of possible policy solutions. Financial con-
strains, current and expected, are very serious, 
but much can be done in building up an enabling 
regulatory framework for an eﬃ  cient housing 
market without huge public investment. Priori-
tize recommended policy solutions according to 
their potential to alleviate accumulated poverty 
in housing and to produce positive eﬀ ects on the 
working of the housing market (and not only ac-
cording to the shortage of ﬁ nancial resources). 
For instance, facilitating the development of pri-
vate rental sector costs far less than building so-
cial housing, although the state will need to invest 
in some rental units for marginal and low-income 
people.
• Provide incentives for private landlords and devel-
opers to invest in aﬀ ordable private rental housing. 
Th is could include oﬀ ering public land with a 
discount or for free, or developing tax exemp-
tions.
• Estimate the existing need for social housing in ur-
ban centers, and decide what and how much needs 
to be provided ﬁ rst. Introduce national regula-
tions for developing new social housing. 
• Enable the establishment of non-proﬁ t housing as-
sociations to provide and/or manage new social 
housing. Establish clear allocation criteria and 
make the allocation process transparent.
• Facilitate housing mobility. Adopt measures that 
do not prevent or otherwise limit countrywide 
mobility of tenants in public housing, new social 
housing and those who will receive housing al-
lowances in the future. State-initiated housing 
poverty reduction programs should support labor 
mobility: Housing poor and income-poor people 
should be given the opportunity both to go where 
the jobs are and to get decent housing.
• Provide special shelters for homeless people. Depend-
ing on the outcome of a future analysis of the 
number, categories and diﬀ erent needs of home-
less people and families, provide shelters that can 
serve as short-term housing solutions. Involve 
non-governmental organizations in providing/
managing care for the homeless. Homelessness 
will rise in Belgrade and other urban centers as 
necessary economic and social reforms are under-
way. Prepare measures to deal with it now.
• Well-targeted and transparent housing poverty re-
duction programs are crucial for the success of the 
policy. Housing production programs in Serbia—
at the national and municipal level, under state 
socialist and until today—have been associated in 
the public mind with corruption and nepotism. 
Th is diﬃ  cult legacy, together with the concern for 
the eﬀ ectiveness and eﬃ  ciency of future housing 
poverty reduction programs, requires that pro-
gram implementation be fully transparent and 
well-targeted (so that only those who need sup-
port actually receive it), and that allocation cri-
teria (for renting public ﬂ ats, diﬀ erent allowance 
schemes, and so on) be clear and implementable.
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NOTES
1 I wish to express my gratitude to the members of the LGI Fellowship team working on the housing poverty in the major urban centers in Central 
Eastern Europe, and especially James Fearn for his invaluable critical comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this paper. I also want to thank 
Mina Petrović (University of Belgrade) and József Hegedűs (Metropolitan Research Institute, Budapest) for generously sharing their insights with me 
in preparing this policy paper.
2 Except in the largest cities, the amount of privately-owned housing in the socialist times substantially exceeded the amount of public housing. Th ere 
was no cooperative housing stock. At the end of the socialist period, the overall housing stock did not contain a large proportion of publicly-owned 
ﬂ ats, as would be expected for a socialist regime. Overall ﬁ gures for Serbia and Montenegro show that only about 22 percent of the total housing stock 
in 1991 was publicly-owned. Even in urban centers (except for Belgrade), the number of publicly-owned ﬂ ats nowhere near as high as the number of 
private housing units. In Belgrade, publicly-owned ﬂ ats were 53 percent of the housing stock. In other larger urban centers in Serbia and Montenegro, 
this percentage was 39.2 percent in Novi Sad, 40 percent in Priština, 41.9 percent in Podgorica, and 31.4 percent in Niš (Petrović 2002, 79). Th e 
remaining housing units were privately-owned. It can be said, therefore, that the former Yugoslav socialist regime was a society with a public housing 
ideology, that in practice favored private ownership in the housing sector (Mandić 1990, 263). 
3 All the data for Serbia in the text below refer to the territory of Serbia without Kosovo.
4 Tenants in denationalized ﬂ ats have the right to stay in the ﬂ at until the owner or municipal authorities ﬁ nd another appropriate publicly-owned ﬂ at 
for them to rent.
5 Th e only publicly-ﬁ nanced housing production in the 1990s was directed towards so-called “solidarity ﬂ ats.” According to the 1992 Law on Housing, 
all enterprises and governmental institutions were obliged to pay a rate of 1.3 percent of the total monthly income of their employees to the Fund 
for solidarity housing construction. Th e objective of this fund was to build and distribute new ﬂ ats to employees with insuﬃ  cient income solve their 
housing needs by their own. Th e Law prescribed that an enterprise should pay ﬁ fteen percent of the construction costs of a ﬂ at if they wish to take it 
over for an applicant who is their employee (in addition to the above mentioned rate they have to deduct regularly). As such, a very small number of 
enterprises could aﬀ ord a solidarity ﬂ at and help an employee in the greatest need. Th is suggests that the idea behind the provision of solidarity ﬂ ats, 
as an remnant of the socialist thinking that enterprises should be responsible for providing housing for employees, was turned rather upside down 
in reality: only the richest enterprises obtained ﬂ ats for their employees, although everybody was paying the regular rate into the Fund. Th e Law also 
enabled the privatization of solidarity ﬂ ats with up to four times lower selling prices than market prices, so its construction was not tending towards 
improving the public rental housing stock (Petrović 2002, 144).
 In June 2001, the legal framework concerning solidarity housing changed. Direct responsibility for solidarity ﬂ ats was transferred from enterprises to 
local authorities. Local authorities are to determine the amount of the tax on the total wage fund (up to 3.5 percent ) of enterprises on its territory. 
Th en, 0.3-1.0 percent of ﬁ nancial means accumulated in this way in the municipality are to be invested into solidarity housing construction. Still, only 
those enterprises which pay additional amount of the market price of the ﬂ ats can give a solidarity ﬂ at to selected a employee (UN Habitat 2003b; 
Petrović 2003).
6 It is important to note that the Serbian statistics do not register illegal housing construction, but exclusively legal construction. Th e data on illegal con-
struction can be collected on the level of municipalities, with a changing methodology of what is actually registered and what is later estimated. Th at 
is the reason why all numbers on illegal construction in Belgrade can only be estimations.
7 Th e majority of illegal housing consists of individual detached houses. However, since the mid-1990s, the majority of legally built housing premises 
were also individual, detached houses. Th is partly explains the size of illegal construction. Namely, the former General Urban Plan for Belgrade was 
draw-up in 1972, partly changed in 1985, and again amended in 1999, only concerning legalization of some illegally constructed buildings. Th e plan 
left very little space for individual housing plots (collective buildings were preferred under socialism), and that was in discrepancy with the growing de-
mand for individual housing units. Th is is why Belgrade has several settlements consisting exclusively of illegal individual houses built on non-serviced 
land. Th is situation is to be changed by the new regulations coming out of the new General Urban Plan for Belgrade until 2021, approved by the City 
Assembly in September 2003.
8 Approximately 1.6 million people live in the City of Belgrade, according to the latest census data. More reliable data will be known once all oﬃ  cial 
census data are published.
9 Th e reason why only this category of ﬂ ats is taken to demonstrate the tenure structure of the housing stock is that the unoﬃ  cial preliminary 2002 na-
tional census data exist only for this category. Th is is the largest subcategory of the oﬃ  cially recognized housing stock (433,697 units): about 93 percent 
(403,254 units) of all ﬂ ats are inhabited ﬂ ats for permanent habitation in Belgrade metropolitan area. Th e rest are temporary, vacant ﬂ ats for permanent 
habitation (24,487 units or 5.6 percent ), permanently vacant ﬂ ats for permanent habitation (1,368 units or 0.3 percent ), ﬂ ats used occasionally for 
holidays or seasonal work (1,560 units or 0.4 percent ), and ﬂ ats permanently used as oﬃ  ce space (3,028 units or 0.7 percent ) (Republički zavod za 
informatoku i statistiku 2002).
10 Belgrade metropolitan area (so-called “Naselje Beograd” in oﬃ  cial statistical terminology) is a constnatly urbanizing area that covers most of the ten 
metropolitan municipalities. Six suburban (rural type) municipalities are totally excluded here.
11 Th e average number of rooms per ﬂ at and average number of persons per room will be known only when the oﬃ  cial data are published. Th e respective 
numbers from 1991 national census were 2.2 rooms per ﬂ at, and 1.4 persons per room in Belgrade metropolitan area (Petrović 2002, 80).
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12 In Serbia, there are nearly eight million inhabitants, over 2.5 million households and almost three million housing units, according to the 2002 na-
tional census.
13 Due to the fact that the private-rental market is completely unregulated, and that real owners of private rentals do not want to register as landlords in 
order to avoid paying the tax.
14 According to the unoﬃ  cially reported behavior of private owners who rent a ﬂ at but did not want to report it even for the purpose of the national 
census, there is reason to assume that a signiﬁ cant part of reported temporary vacant ﬂ ats (about 24,487 units or 5.6 percent of the housing stock) 
are in eﬀ ect private rentals. Th is suggests, tentatively, that between ten and ﬁ fteen percent of all ﬂ ats in Belgrade metropolitan area might be privately 
rented. Assumptions of experts before the national census in 2002 were that between ﬁ ve and ten percent of all ﬂ ats are rentals in the private sector.
15 Petrović (2002, 82) states that according to the 1991 national census data, 1.3 percent of households living in “other-than-ﬂ at” premises “out of neces-
sity” in Belgrade (in administrative borders).
16 Critical overcrowding refers to single and one room ﬂ ats occupied by three or more member households, two room ﬂ ats occupied by four or more 
member households, and three room ﬂ ats occupied by six and more member households.
17 Partial overcrowding refers to single- and one-room ﬂ ats occupied by two-member households, two-room ﬂ ats occupied by three-member households, 
three-room ﬂ ats occupied by ﬁ ve-member households, and four-room ﬂ ats occupied by seven-member households.
18 Looking back at the 1991 census data on overcrowding, Petrović (2002, 81) made a calculation that in 27.5 percent of ﬂ ats in Belgrade there was 
critical overcrowding, and in an additional 14.7 percent there was partial overcrowding. Taken all together, approximately 42 percent of ﬂ ats had some 
degree of overcrowding in Belgrade in 1991. Th e situation seems to have remained unchanged between 1991 and 2002, in spite of emigration from 
Belgrade, and several waves of refugees coming to Belgrade from Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo throughout the 1990s. Th e diﬀ erence 
between the outcomes of Petrović’s calculation for 1991 and mine for 2002 for two types of overcrowding taken separately, apart from showing some 
small change, might be due to methodological reasons, and/or preliminary nature of the data for the 2002 national census.
19 Utility costs, as calculated here, cover heating expenditures and electricity. Th e cost of other utilities—water consumption, waste water disposal, gar-
bage disposal, maintenance of the building, contribution for the use of serviced land—are statistically presented together with the public rent (for those 
who are public tenants) because all of these costs are integrated into one bill, and paid to one public utility enterprise (Infostan). Th us, it is impossible 
to make a more accurate calculation, since even the Belgrade Statistical Bureau does not attempt it. Th is also distorts existing data on the public rent, 
making it even higher than it should be. Phone bills are not covered by oﬃ  cial statistics, so this cost is unknown and not calculated here into any type 
of housing expenditures. It is important to note that two types of maintenance are distinguished in Serbia: current maintenance (consisting of regular 
cleaning of common spaces and urgent interventions in the case of big problems in the building); and maintenance as investment in the renovation of 
the building. Th e latter does not exist, there are no funds selected for that purpose, and households do not receive a bill for that. Th e former is covered 
in the following way: regular cleaning is organized and paid by the housing association in the building, (i.e. directly by the households living in the 
building), and only urgent renovations are covered by the public utility company which sends the integrated bill mentioned above. 
20 Th e price range for private rent is greater in Belgrade than in other Serbian cities, but the estimation is that the average monthly rent in cities is EUR 
100 per one 50 square meter ﬂ at. Th e author who made the estimation of the rent-to-household income ratio made use of newspaper ads and data from 
real estate agencies in Belgrade. Oﬃ  cial statistics do not register the rent in the private rental sector in their regular Survey on Household Consumption. 
Th us, there are no data on the size of the private rental sector in Belgrade, the quality of ﬂ ats, and the number of people who live there. 
21 Here, the problem is with the “average.” Th e average household income is taken as the income indicator in all three cases, though people who live in 
social rentals in average have probably lower income than the average income for all households suggests. On the other hand, those who live in private 
rentals certainly have higher than average household income; consider that, during 1990s, about 40 percent of the average household income was spent 
on food only (Belgrade Statistical Yearbook 2001).
22 Petrović estimates that “almost 50 percent of Belgrade households have been in arrears (due to rising utility costs) without being penalized under the 
existing law, in recent years” (2001, 228).
23 Out of the total of 234 registered, 55 percent are one-person households, and the rest are families with children. “Most of them are living in cellars, old 
vehicles, containers, without electricity, water supply and sewage” (Petrović 2000, 7). It is clear that many more do not come to the Center and register 
because they do not expect any help from authorities. Even in the case of those registered, the term “homeless” is not used.
24 According to the 1991 national census data that would represent approximately 33,000 households in Belgrade. According to a statement of the Ser-
bian Minister for urban planning and construction in September 2002, in Belgrade alone there are 40,000 families whose housing status is not solved 
(Interview with Dragoslav Šumarac for Blic).
25 As well, only about eighteen percent of refugees and 7.6 percent of internally dispersed people from Kosovo had their housing situation solved in Serbia 
in 2001 (see National Strategy for Solving the Situation of Refugees, Serbian government 2002).
26 According to the UNHCR data, 60 percent of 660,000 refugees in Serbia want to stay in Serbia and do not want to return.
27 Th e part of the strategy that deals with housing solutions for refugees recommends: i) programs of accommodation in housing units to be purchased 
into private ownership by refugee households; and ii) accommodation programs into social rental housing and medical centers. Recommended social 
housing is supposed to be built in less urbanized and cheaper zones of Serbian cities and towns, with fewer square meters per person and lower qual-
ity standards (about 30 square meters per ﬂ at). Rents would be subsidized, but the tenant would pay utility costs. Th e contract would be periodically 
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renewed if the conditions were still satisﬁ ed by the family. Apart from refugees (2,500 units for refugees), the program for social housing is supposed to 
cover a certain number of the domestic socially deprived population (1,000 units). Financial sources would come from the Serbian budget and donors 
(National Strategy for Solving the Situation of Refugees in Serbia 2002).
28 Until February 2004, no further steps have been taken in this direction.
29 Looking at the organizational side of the work on the Poverty Reduction Strategy also shows that poverty in housing was not included in the concept 
of poverty that the PPSP and Serbian government intend to address. Th e inter-ministerial body, consisting of the representatives of most ministries of 
the Serbian government, did not include a representative from the Ministry for Urban Planning and Construction, which is oﬃ  cially responsible for 
housing issues. But in February-March 2003, the Secretariat for Social and Refugee Related Housing and an urban sociologist were invited to make a 
proposal for urban poverty reduction
30 Th e team working on PRSP ordered the Survey on the Living Standard of the Population (SLSP) on 6,400 households in Serbia that was meant to be 
the ﬁ rst comprehensive study on the basis of which a poverty line can be ﬁ nally reliably deﬁ ned in Serbia. Th e survey was done in May-June 2002. 
Th en the poverty line in Serbia was set up at 4,489 dinars or USD 72 per month (USD 2.4 per day) per person. Below this line is about 10.6 percent 
of inhabitants of Serbia or 80,000 people. However, just a small shift of the poverty line upward signiﬁ cantly increases the percentage of the poor. 
Accordingly, the number of ﬁ nancially vulnerable was calculated: if the poverty line is shifted to just 5,507 dinars per person, 20 percent of the Serbian 
population or about 1,600,000 individuals fall behind the poverty line (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, October 2003). 
 As can be expected from the fact that poverty in housing was not initially included in the Poverty reduction strategy, the survey was not meant to inves-
tigate the housing needs of the population, although it was meant to be the most comprehensive and up-to-date study on poverty in Serbia! However, 
in a section of the LSMS there are questions that are related to the housing expenditures, utility bills, arrears in paying diﬀ erent types of utility bills, 
and the quality of the housing conditions of the respondents. Th ese data were partly used for the previous section of the paper.
 Th e previous study on poverty in Serbia (Poverty in Serbia and the Reform of the State Transfers to the Poor 2002), ordered by the Ministry for Social Care, 
was completed in 2001. It was meant to deal with then existing statistical indicators in deﬁ ning poverty, to analyze the shortcoming of the statistical 
methods used in Serbia in describing poverty, and analyze existing social policy for diﬀ erent groups of those in need. Th at recent study, however, was 
not based on a specially-for-that-purpose prepared survey and methodology new in the Serbian experience, as it is the case with the LSMS. 
 According to national measures of poverty (accepted until recently), in the ﬁ rst half of the year 2000, “almost one-third of the population in Serbia 
(2.8 million) was considered poor, with an average income of less than USD 30 per month. Overall, 18.2 percent (1.44 million) was living in a 
state of absolute poverty, with the monthly income less than USD 20 in average” (Initial Framework of the Poverty Reduction Strategy for Serbia, June 
2002, 7).
31 Th e credit contracts were signed with four domestic banks on the amount of 1,650 million dinars (about EUR 27 million). Th e repayment period is 
ﬁ ve years, with a total yearly interest rate of 7.5 percent (Th e City of Belgrade Beoinfo, September 2002).
32 It was announced that banks giving credits for this construction project will be allowed to build additional 500 market-rate ﬂ ats in the same locations 
(Th e City of Belgrade Beoinfo, 2002; Petrović 2002, 150).
33 After the public call in September 2003, about 6,000 people applied for 1,000 ﬂ ats that were oﬀ ered.
34 However, there is no indication of how the buildings with social ﬂ ats will be maintained. Th e decision of the Belgrade City Assembly only prescribes 
that the person who is given a rental ﬂ at is required to return the ﬂ at in the same condition as before moving in, taking into account necessary changes 
after regular use of the ﬂ at (Belgrade City Assembly 2003).
35 Th e plan recommends that ﬁ ve to eight percent of housing units in these zones are used for social housing.
36 Th e City of Belgrade consists of sixteen municipalities—ten metropolitan, and six suburban. Th e 2002 Law on Local Government refers to the level 
of municipalities. It was announced that, six months after the Law entered into force, a subsequent Law on the Capital City of Belgrade would be 
drafted. However, it is still not ready and not much is known about the state of the preparation process. Th us, the division of responsibilities between 
the Belgrade City government and municipal level governments are not completely legally clear—and this is not only in regard to the housing sector.
37 According to these results, the total number of households in Belgrade in 2002 was 588,674; the total number of housing units/ﬂ ats was 631,197. Th e 
index of the increase in the number of households between 1991 and 2002 is 114.3, and the index for ﬂ ats is 115.6.
38 Th is number derives from the following calculation: the number of ﬂ ats and households was estimated and compared, then ﬂ ats built before 1919 were 
added, together with the number of ﬂ ats with more than one household, and the number of living spaces where people live “out of necessity” (Belgrade 
Urban Planning Institute 2001, according to Petrović 2002, 153).
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Housing is no long er a fun da men tal right but a po lit i cal and economic li a bil i ty in Cen tral 
and Eastern Eu rope. Funding and con struc tion of hous ing has de creased se vere ly. The 
result of this dramatic turn has been the cre ation of a class of “hous ing poor”—people 
un able to rent or buy mar ket-rate hous ing or main tain housing on their own.
Housing poor may be homeless, living in overcrowded con di tions, living in il le gal or 
sub stan dard housing, pay ing too large a per cent age of income for rent, or unable to pay 
for utilities or rent. Almost 50 per cent of house holds in the region fall into one of these 
cat e go ries.
As part of the LGI Fellowship Series, Too Poor to Move, Too Poor to Stay con sid ers this new 
type of poverty. Key areas of importance—not only for the cities of Prague, Budapest and 
Belgrade covered in this re port, but all over Cen tral and Eastern Europe—include: ef fects of 
housing privatization, al lo ca tion of re spon si bil i ty between central and local gov ern ments 
for hous ing the poor, effects of past gov ern ment pol i cies on con struc tion and avail abil i ty 
of af ford able hous ing, po lit i cal and eco nom ic causes of any de cline in housing production, 
quantity and type of hous ing built since the tran si tion, effects of tenant protections, and 
the situation of groups ben e fi ting from or burdened by gov ern ment regulations.
Rampant growth of the private mar ket has followed the decline of hous ing es tates 
occupied by a largely destitute pop u la tion. Instead of ignoring this development and its 
impact on the poor, this study suggests:
•     A legal framework for housing that helps to develop market-oriented institutional 
      structures from mortgages to regulations on illegal building
•     Measures to encourage the re-es tab lish ment of rental housing, especially for low-income 
      households
•     A means for tackling the backlog of repairs and maintenance in high-rise housing
•     The de vel op ment of a subsidy system that supports low-income owners
Without these housing policy reforms, many people will remain “too poor to move and too 
poor to stay.”
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